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CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS: 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT  
AND ITS CRITICS 
MICHAEL S. BARR∗ 
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderate-income 
communities and minority borrowers have not historically enjoyed full access to credit.  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977 to help overcome 
barriers to credit that these groups faced.  Scholars have long leveled numerous 
critiques against CRA as unnecessary, ineffectual, costly, and lawless.  Many have 
argued that CRA should be eliminated.  By contrast, I contend that market failures and 
discrimination justify governmental intervention and that CRA is a reasonable policy 
response to these problems.  Using recent empirical evidence, I demonstrate that over 
the last decade CRA has enhanced access to credit for low-income, moderate-income, 
and minority borrowers at relatively low cost, consistent with the theory that CRA is 
helping to overcome market failures.  I argue that the form of CRA’s legal directive, 
more akin to a standard, is preferable to more rules-based approaches, on grounds of 
both efficiency and legitimacy.  Comparing CRA to other credit market regulations and 
subsidies, I argue that CRA is a reasonably effective response to market failures and 
should not be abandoned.  In sum, contrary to previous legal scholarship, I contend 
that CRA is justified, has resulted in progress, and should be retained. 
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Financial markets in the United States are broad and deep.1  Our 
capital markets are regarded as highly efficient in spurring business growth, 
and for most Americans, access to credit has become readily available for 
consumer purchases and home ownership.  Our home mortgage markets are 
innovative and liquid, attracting investors from around the globe.  
Competition in the financial services sector is generally vibrant, and the 
removal of many geographic and product restrictions on banking has given 
rise to diversified financial services organizations with nationwide reach.   
Yet the very success of our credit markets makes it easy to overlook 
those who may have been left behind historically—low- and moderate-
income communities, as well as minority households.2  Enormous progress 
has been made in expanding access to home mortgage lending for low- and 
moderate-income and minority households,3 but there is evidence that 
minority borrowers continue to face discrimination.4  In addition, 
community advocates have long argued that “redlining”—not lending to 
borrowers in neighborhoods with high concentrations of minority 
households—has, at least historically, limited the flow of capital for 
homeownership in minority communities.5  Moreover, the effects of race 
 
 1 See generally ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, 
AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1997). 
 2 This Article systematically explores themes I first worked on at the Treasury Department, 
and then wrote about in Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century:  Five 
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 447 (2002) and Michael S. Barr et al., The Community Reinvestment Act, in 
BANKING AND SOCIAL COHESION:  ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO A GLOBAL MARKET 214 
(Christophe Guene & Edward Mayo eds., 2001). 
 3 In evaluating the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), this Article largely relies on 
evidence regarding home mortgage lending because it is an important aspect of financial security 
for low- and moderate-income borrowers, has attracted the greatest attention in the literature, and 
has different market and regulatory features than other forms of credit.  I take up issues of short-
term consumer debt and transactional financial services in Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 
YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004). 
 4 See infra Part III.B. 
 5 The federal government’s housing insurance program and private market participants in 
some cases literally drew red lines on maps around areas that were to be avoided, and more 
widespread racial discrimination in housing has been well documented.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON 
URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-34, at 101 (1969); Amy 
E. Hillier, Spatial Analysis of Historical Redlining:  A Methodological Exploration, 14 J. 
3
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and economics are intertwined because of the high degree of racial 
segregation in housing and the concentration of minority households in 
low-income communities.  Economic theories predict that low-income 
communities generally would have lower access to capital than they would 
in a fully functioning market because of market failures, in addition to 
discrimination.  For example, information externalities, which prevent 
lenders from fully recapturing the costs of gathering information and 
developing expertise in lending to low-income borrowers, may have 
impeded the formation or full development of credit markets in low-income 
communities, which generally have had fewer home mortgage transactions 
than higher-income markets.6  More recently, “subprime”7 lenders have 
provided more capital in low-income areas.  Consumer advocates have 
argued, however, that the increased flows of credit have, in some cases, 
been accompanied by “predatory” or abusive lending practices targeted at 
minorities, the elderly, and other segments of the population. 
Congress has enacted a wide range of federal laws and subsidy 
programs that affect the provision of credit.8  This Article focuses on 
perhaps the most controversial of these laws:  the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).9  Passed in response to concerns about 
redlining of minority and low-income areas,10 and market failures in low-
income communities,11 CRA encourages federally insured banks and thrifts 
to meet the credit needs of the entire communities that they serve, including 
low- and moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound banking 
practices.12  Federal banking agencies periodically examine and rate banks 
 
HOUSING RES. 137, 142–44 (citing examples of historical redlining). 
 6 See infra Part III.C. 
 7 The label “subprime” refers to the status of borrowers who pay higher interest rates, at least 
in part, because they are thought to have credit histories below the quality of prime borrowers.  
Subprime lenders are lenders who specialize in lending to such borrowers.  For a more thorough 
discussion, see infra Part III. 
 8 See generally, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING 
ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT:  CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas 
Retsinas & Eric Belsky eds., forthcoming 2005) (providing introduction to five types of credit 
market regulation and subsidy programs); Lawrence J. White, Focusing on Fannie and Freddie:  
The Dilemmas of Reforming Housing Finance, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43 (2003) (discussing 
role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in housing policy). 
 9 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2000) (Community Reinvestment Chapter); see also id. § 
1831u(b)(3) (CRA requirement for interstate mergers); id. § 1831y (CRA Sunshine 
Requirements); id. § 1843(l)(l)–(2) (CRA requirement on insured depositories must be met for 
financial holding companies or financial subsidiaries to engage in expanded financial activities). 
 10 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17,604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“[CRA] is intended 
to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending institutions.”).  In its structure, CRA focuses on 
market failures rather than on discrimination per se, but as I discuss infra Parts III.A & III.B, 
market failures and discrimination are intertwined. 
 11 For the theories underlying CRA, see infra Part III. 
 12 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2000). 
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and thrifts on their CRA performance.  Banks have an incentive to seek 
high ratings because regulators consider a bank’s or thrift’s CRA record in 
determining whether to approve that institution’s application for a “deposit 
facility,” which includes mergers with or acquisitions of other depository 
institutions.  CRA also plays a role in the approval process for more 
mundane events, such as the opening or closing of a bank branch.13  Such 
applications also provide the public with an opportunity to comment, 
including by commenting on the CRA performance of the institution.14  
CRA has been since its enactment, and remains today,15 the subject of 
extensive debate.  The contentiousness of the policy is reflected in the 
uncharacteristic drama that accompanies proposed policy changes.  For 
example, in July 2004, two of the four federal banking regulators pulled out 
of a joint CRA rulemaking process:  The Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) made a unilateral announcement that the agency was going to curtail 
CRA examinations for nearly ninety percent of institutions that it regulates, 
those holding less than $1 billion in assets, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a similar rule.16  The Federal 
Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
balked at this move.17  OTS then proposed to let any savings and loan 
institution, regardless of size, opt out of the investment and service tests 
under CRA.18  Then, the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC agreed to raise the 
small bank threshold to $1 billion but to add a new “community 
development test” for institutions with between $250 million and $1 billion 
in assets.19  At bottom, debate over these kinds of changes revolves around 
 
 13 See 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3) (2000); see also infra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
 14 12 C.F.R. § 25.29(c) (2004). 
 15 See, e.g., Michele Heller, Reg Relief? Senator Puts Everything on the Table, AM. BANKER, 
June 10, 2004, at 1 (noting that CRA is high on Senate Banking Committee list for regulatory 
relief). 
 16 Michele Heller, FDIC Seen Siding with OTS on CRA, AM. BANKER, July 20, 2004, at 1.  
See also David W. Chen, U.S. Set to Alter Rules for Banks Lending to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2004, at A1 (describing effects of proposals to raise small bank threshold and arguments about  
importance of CRA); Editorial, Endangering Community Development, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2004, at A14 (arguing that regulators should reject proposal to raise threshold for small banks).  
The Office of Thrift Supervision finalized the rule on August 18, 2004.  See Community 
Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,155 (Aug. 18, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
563.12(t)).  The FDIC proposed a similar rule, Community Reinvestment, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,611 
(Aug. 20, 2004).  
 17 Heller, supra note 16. 
 18 Community Reinvestment Act—Community Development, Assigned Ratings, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 68,257, 68,262 (proposed Nov. 24, 2004). 
 19 See Joint Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Banking Agencies Propose Revisions to Community 
Reinvestment Act Regulations (Feb. 22, 2005), at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/pr1305.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); Press 
Release, Federal Reserve Board, Request for Comments on Proposed Revisions to Regulations 
Implementing the Community Reinvestment Act, Regulation BB (Feb. 25, 2005) at 
5
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competing views of the underlying purposes of CRA, the need for 
government intervention in credit markets, and the costs and benefits of 
such policies.20 
Legal scholars vigorously question the theoretical and empirical 
claims that motivated the enactment of CRA, and many of them advocate 
eliminating the policy.21  A large body of literature suggests that 
competition in credit markets has driven (or will drive) out discriminatory22 
or abusive practices and that the market failures are illusory.23  Critics of 
CRA argue that it addresses a nonexistent problem.  Moreover, they argue 
that problems in credit markets are insufficient to justify intervention and 
that, even if intervention is warranted, CRA is the wrong policy to pursue.  
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2005/20050225/default.htm (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2005). 
 20 See, e.g., Robert E. Rubin & Michael Rubinger, Don’t Let Banks Turn Their Backs on the 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at A19 (arguing that CRA has been successfully helping 
communities and that OTS and FDIC plans would place these gains at risk). 
 21 See generally Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private 
Incentives:  Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634 (1994) 
(arguing there is lack of evidence of bigotry in mortgage market); Jeffery W. Gunther, Should 
CRA Stand for “Community Redundancy Act”?, REG., vol. 23, iss. 3, at 56 (2000) (arguing CRA 
is costly and not necessary to ensure access to credit to minorities), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n3/gunther.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); Keith N. 
Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities:  Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending, 17 
YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000) (maintaining that existing regulatory framework is partially 
responsonsible for credit market’s failure to serve minorities); Michael Klausner, Market Failure 
and Community Investment:  A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561 (1995) (finding CRA to be an inefficient solution to lending 
discrimination); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An 
Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993) (concluding that the CRA does more harm than 
good); Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1533 (1995) (using regression analysis to argue creditworthiness, not redlining, is 
responsible for minorities being underserved by credit markets); Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and 
a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349 (1993) [hereinafter 
Swire, Safe Harbors] (responding to Macey and Miller and offering safe harbor proposal for 
protection from CRA enforcement); Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good 
Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993) (faulting CRA as 
either redundant or dependent on cross-subsidy); Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries 
of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based 
Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710 (1996) 
(arguing CRA provides weak incentive to improve low- and moderate-income lending because it 
does not combat discrimination or require banks to make particular kinds of loans in specified 
areas).  For a “community empowerment” critique, see generally Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, 
Finance and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural 
Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994).  Criticisms of CRA 
are discussed in detail in Part II infra. 
 22 This view usually is derived from Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in 
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) and GARY 
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).  
 23 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking, 81 ECON. Q. 13, 15–24 (1995) 
(arguing that empirical evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that discrimination or market 
failures exist in bank lending to low-income communities). 
6
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Earlier legal scholarship suggested that CRA was having little, if any, 
positive effect, and at a high cost.  For example, in their seminal article a 
decade ago, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller attempted to demonstrate 
the weak foundations and high cost of CRA in the wake of the 1989 
reforms to CRA, charging that CRA is theoretically unjustified, undermines 
the safety and soundness of the banking system and empowers community 
group rent-seeking at the expense of bank profitability.24 
Critics lodge five main arguments against CRA:  First, they argue that 
the CRA is unwarranted in theory because market failures and 
discrimination are not significant problems in credit markets and CRA is 
ill-equipped to address them if they are.  Second, CRA provides little 
benefit to low-income communities and is costly because it forces banks to 
make unprofitable, risky loans and compliance costs are high.  Third, 
CRA’s use of a legal standard rather than a rule is lawless, and contributes 
to its higher costs.  Fourth, the scope of CRA harms banks and thrifts as 
well as the low-income communities it is intended to serve.  Lastly, other 
alternatives are better able to overcome market failures and discrimination, 
and to help low-income and minority households. 
This Article systematically analyzes these prior criticisms of CRA and 
lays a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for the Act.  The Article 
first establishes the theoretical and empirical case for the persistence of 
credit market failures and racial discrimination that justify CRA.  I contend 
that a good deal of earlier legal scholarship on CRA wrongly discounted 
these market problems.  Of course, at the most basic level, no market is 
perfect.25  The real question is a relative one—whether CRA is preferable 
to other alternatives, including simply allowing those market failures to 
persist, or relying on market forces to overcome them.  This Article 
explores why such market imperfections might be relatively greater in low-
income communities, as well as more appropriate as targets of government 
intervention, given the social benefits of expanded access to capital.26  The 
Article then argues that critics failed to explore fully how CRA could help 
to overcome market failures and discrimination.  Thus the critics have 
missed the ways in which CRA could help in theory, and has helped in 
practice, to overcome these problems. 
The Article deploys recent empirical analyses that cast doubt on many 
 
 24 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 318–24, 333–37. 
 25 The existence of transaction costs, for example, implies that markets are not perfect.  Cf. 
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing it is unrealistic to 
assume there are “no costs involved in carrying out market transactions” and therefore market 
forces will not necessarily lead to efficient allocations of legal rights). 
 26 For discussion of circumstances disfavoring government intervention to correct market 
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of the critics’ claims about the costs and benefits of CRA.  In part, earlier 
critics were wrong in their predictions about the high costs and low benefits 
of CRA, based largely on anecdotal evidence, and rooted in their belief that 
no meaningful market failures existed.  In part, the 1995 reforms to CRA 
promulgated by the bank regulators responded to earlier criticisms in 
positive ways.  Recent evidence shows that over the last decade CRA 
appears to have created far greater benefits than previous legal scholarship 
had predicted.  Lending to low- and moderate-income and minority 
households increased dramatically during the 1990s.  Through econometric 
controls, studies suggest that CRA has had an independent effect on 
increased lending to low- and moderate-income and minority communities.  
Earlier articles suggested that the costs of CRA were exceedingly high; this 
Article argues that such costs are relatively low, and that the 1995 reforms 
likely contributed to reducing the costs.  The fact that CRA lending has 
provided real benefits to communities and has not proven to be unprofitable 
or overly risky provides indirect support for market failure and 
discrimination theories underlying CRA.  That is, if market failures and 
discrimination were not significantly present, either CRA would not matter, 
or an effective CRA would wind up forcing banks and thrifts to make 
costly, risky loans.  The empirical evidence instead is more consistent with 
the argument that CRA is theoretically justified. 
In addition, this Article argues that some of the costs incurred under 
CRA—for example, those caused by the lack of bright line rules under the 
CRA standard—also represent benefits, previously ignored or dismissed, in 
the form of increased citizen participation and local, contextual 
“rulemaking.”  In that regard, I contend that the “rules versus standards” 
literature has failed to give sufficient attention to both the “expressive 
benefits” of legal standards and to their potential to improve social welfare 
and enhance the accountability and legitimacy of the regulatory process 
when such standards are structured to encourage involvement in the 
process of regulatory interpretation by both citizens and the regulated 
entities themselves.  Moreover, proponents of rules have focused on the ex 
post transaction costs involved in standards and have failed to give 
appropriate weight to the substantive benefits of flexibility that standards 
provide.  In particular, standards may be preferable to rules when the 
conduct to be regulated varies significantly by the size, market context, 
organizational structure and business strategy of the regulated entity.  
These benefits explain in part why CRA’s current approach has significant 
advantages over rule-based proposals to set numerical targets or create safe 
harbors.  In sum, I contend that CRA has a reasonable foundation,27 and 
that it can be defended as socially efficient, in the sense that the benefits of 
 
 27 See infra Parts III–V. 
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CRA likely exceed the costs.28 
CRA’s opponents are also critical of the geographic and institutional 
scope of CRA.  With respect to geographic scope, they argue that CRA is 
overly focused on communities around bank branches when there is no 
reason banks should lend near where they take deposits.  With respect to 
institutional scope, they argue that CRA unfairly or inefficiently burdens 
banks and thrifts while leaving other market participants outside CRA’s 
scope.  While there is some force to these arguments, I argue, on balance, 
that CRA’s geographic scope is broader and more flexible than critics 
allege, and that CRA’s institutional focus on banks and thrifts is 
reasonable, given governmental subsidies to these institutions and their 
specialized market roles. 
Some critics argue that CRA should be eliminated because other 
regulatory steps have been taken, or could be, to overcome market failures 
and improve access to capital in low- and moderate-income areas or to 
minority borrowers.29  These other alternatives are often mentioned in a 
cursory fashion rather than systematically explored.  On closer 
examination, by contrast, I argue that CRA seems reasonably effective at 
reducing market failures and discrimination when compared with other 
types of credit market regulation, including disclosure, fair lending laws, 
product regulation, and subsidy.  I also show that tax and transfer systems 
proposed by critics suffer from deficiencies that make them problematic as 
alternatives to CRA.  I do not argue that CRA is preferable to all of these 
approaches, but rather that all of the approaches suffer from limitations that 
make it plausible to think that the tradeoffs involved in deploying CRA to 
overcome market failures and discrimination are reasonable ones, and that 
eliminating CRA would be ill-advised. 
The approach that I will take in the Article to analyzing CRA is non-
utopian.  I do not ask, in an ideal world, what would be an ideal policy.  
Instead, my approach asks—is CRA a reasonable policy response to real 
world problems?  Given that we have CRA, should we keep it, or abandon 
it, as critics suggest?  I answer these questions by drawing on theory, 
empirical evidence, and comparative analysis.  My short answer is:  CRA is 
a reasonable policy response to market failures and discrimination, and we 
should keep it. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly describes CRA’s 
history and structure.  Part II recounts the scholarly critiques of CRA, and 
 
 28 I am making a claim here for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is 
achieved when the benefits of a policy exceed its costs, regardless of whether winners in fact 
compensate losers for their costs.  See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).   
 29 See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
9
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the remaining parts respond to these arguments.  Part III defends CRA in 
theory as an appropriate response to market failure and discrimination.  
Part IV analyzes recent empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits 
of CRA and argues that the empirical case for CRA’s role in overcoming 
market failures and discrimination is strong.  Part V shows that the 
structure of CRA, using an approach more akin to a standard, rather than a 
rule, contributes to the benefits CRA confers.  I also explain why numerical 
targets and safe harbors, which are variants of a rule-based approach, 
would be inferior to current policy.  Part VI explores the current scope of 
CRA.  I argue that critics’ arguments about the geographic and institutional 
scope of CRA have much less force than commonly asserted.  Part VII 
analyzes CRA in the context of other alternatives, and contends that the 
tradeoffs involved in CRA are plausible ones, and that CRA should not be 
eliminated in favor of these other alternatives. 
I 
 THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:  HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
The Community Reinvestment Act has a rich cultural, political, and 
economic history, but I only wish to sketch enough of the contours here to 
enable readers to engage with the arguments about the merits of the Act.  
CRA was enacted in the 1970s as part of a trio of laws—together with the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act30 (HMDA) and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act31 (ECOA)—designed to address racial discrimination as 
well as lack of access to credit in low- and moderate-income communities.  
In enacting the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977, Congress found: 
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate 
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the 
communities in which they are chartered to do business; 
(2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for 
credit services as well as deposit services; and 
(3) regulated financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirmative 
obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in 
which they are chartered.32 
Congress directed the appropriate federal regulatory agency with 
supervisory responsibility for each type of insured depository institution to 
“(1) assess the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institution; and (2) 
 
 30 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000). 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000). 
 32 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a). 
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take such record into account in its evaluation of an application for a 
deposit facility by such institution.”33  To meet the first directive, the 
regulatory agencies regularly examine each depository institution, write up 
an evaluation of the institution’s performance, and assign the institution a 
rating.34  To meet the second directive, the agencies evaluate CRA 
performance in the context of applications for mergers and acquisitions, 
deposit insurance, branch openings, and other matters constituting 
“application for a deposit facility.”35  The structure of CRA expanded on 
pre-existing requirements for the regulators to take into account the 
“convenience and needs” of the community in evaluating such 
applications,36 and the pre-existing authority for the regulators to hold 
public hearings to consider such applications.37 
During the first decade or so following CRA’s enactment, regulators 
paid CRA scant attention, and the results of CRA were likely modest as 
well.  Regulators used a series of twelve factors to evaluate banks and 
thrifts,38 and most commentators found that the regulators and banks had 
focused on process-oriented evaluations, such as the time spent at Board 
meetings discussing community needs, rather than on results.39  This began 
to change at the end of the 1980s.  Over time, particularly during the 1990s, 
both legal and market developments strengthened CRA.40  Legislative 
changes to CRA enacted in 1989 required regulators to publicly disclose 
the institution’s rating and performance evaluation,41 which harnessed the 
power of public relations to CRA’s goals.  Also in 1989, a bank regulator 
for the first time denied an application for merger on CRA grounds.42  The 
merger denial demonstrated that there could be serious consequences for 
poor CRA performance. 
Still, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, community organizations and 
 
 33 Id. § 2903(a). 
 34 See id. § 2906 (describing ratings of “[o]utstanding,” “[s]atisfactory,” “[n]eeds to 
improve,” or “[s]ubstantial noncompliance”). 
 35 Id. § 2902. 
 36 Id. § 2901(a)(1); see also id. § 1842(c)(1) (requiring Board to consider whether merger or 
acquisition meets “convenience and needs” of community). 
 37 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 5.11 (2004) (describing OCC hearing procedures for applications). 
 38 Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, Joint Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,157 
(May 4, 1995). 
 39 Id. at 22,156–57. 
 40 See, e.g., ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL., INSIGHTS INTO THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT LENDING:  A SYNTHESIS OF CRA DISCUSSION GROUPS 4–8 (2000) 
(presenting findings from discussions with lenders and community organizations), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra00-1.pdf.  I discuss these legal 
and market development and CRA’s effectiveness in further detail infra Part IV. 
 41 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183, 527 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (2000)). 
 42 Continental Bank Corporation, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 304, 305–06 (1989) (describing 
“important deficiencies” in CRA performance and denying application). 
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banks tended to view CRA as both overly burdensome and 
underperforming.  In 1993, the banking agencies, at the behest of President 
Clinton, began a process to revise the CRA regulations, and issued 
proposals in 1993 and 1994. 
Final changes to the regulations implementing CRA issued in 199543 
focused CRA evaluations on objective performance measures rather than 
the more subjective and process-oriented factors that regulators previously 
had used and that scholars, banks, and community organizations often had 
criticized.  These new regulations required banks and thrifts to disclose 
information about their small-business, small-farm, and community-
development lending.44  Under the 1995 regulations, large banks, small 
banks, and wholesale or limited-purpose institutions have tailored 
examinations that more closely align CRA examinations with business 
strategies of different types of banking institutions.  Large banks are 
evaluated on a three-part test of their lending, investments, and services, 
while small banks undergo a streamlined review of lending.45 
For large banks, the lending test, which counts for fifty percent of the 
bank’s CRA rating, evaluates the bank’s performance in home mortgage, 
small-business, small-farm, and community-development lending, and 
under some circumstances, its consumer lending.  The agency considers the 
number and amount of loans, the geographic distribution of loans, 
including to low- and moderate-income areas, and the income of 
borrowers.46  The agency also considers “innovative or flexible lending 
practices.”47  Under the investment test, which counts for twenty-five 
percent of the bank’s CRA grade, the agency evaluates the dollar amount of 
the bank’s investments, its innovativeness, its responsiveness to community 
needs, and the extent to which the investment fills gaps that other investors 
do not “routinely” provide.48  Under the service test, which counts for the 
remaining twenty-five percent of the bank’s evaluation, the agency 
analyzes “the availability and effectiveness of a bank’s systems for 
delivering retail banking services and the extent and innovativeness of its 
community development services.”49  The agency assesses an institution’s 
record under the tests in light of the “performance context” in which the 
institution is operating, including economic, demographic, credit and other 
market factors; the bank’s own capacities, constraints, and business plans; 
and the bank’s “past performance and the performance of similarly situated 
 
 43 Community Reinvestment (Regulation BB), 12 C.F.R. § 228.11 (2004). 
 44 12 C.F.R. § 25.42 (2004). 
 45 See id. §§ 25.21–25.26, 228.21–228.26. 
 46 Id. § 25.22. 
 47 Id. § 25.22(b)(5). 
 48 Id. § 25.23. 
 49 Id. § 25.24. 
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lenders.”50 
Lending has rightly been the focus of a statute aimed at the “credit 
needs” of communities, but investment and services play critical roles as 
well in meeting the credit needs of low- and moderate-income communities 
and are thus appropriately evaluated under CRA.  Investments help build 
local financial and community infrastructure and stabilize and broaden the 
economic base of low- and moderate-income communities.  Investments 
help expand access to credit by enhancing the capacity of specialized local 
lenders such as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to 
provide credit.  By stabilizing a local community with direct investment, 
banks also enable loans to be made in the community in a more safe and 
sound manner. 
The importance of services to the provision of credit has been less 
well understood in the past, but recent research shows that services also 
play a critical role in expanding access to credit.51  Access to an appropriate 
bank account for most low-income “unbanked” individuals could mean the 
opportunity for lower transaction costs, greater consumer protection, more 
access to loans, and increased savings as a cushion against financial 
emergency and as a predicate for borrowing.52 
These legislative and regulatory changes occurred during a time of 
increasingly intense consolidation in the banking industry, which provided 
greater opportunities for community organizations and regulators to 
evaluate bank and thrift performance under CRA in the context of merger 
applications.  With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “Financial 
Modernization” Act of 1999,53 some aspects of CRA were again 
strengthened.  Under the Act, banks and thrifts must have a satisfactory 
CRA record if they, or their holding companies, are to engage in newly 
authorized financial activities, such as certain insurance and securities 
functions.54  At the same time, the Act generally increased the time period 
between regular CRA examinations for small banks with satisfactory or 
outstanding ratings on their last examination.55 
II 
CRITIQUES OF CRA 
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized by 
 
 50 Id. § 25.21(b). 
 51 See Barr, supra note 3, at 138 (describing how it is more difficult to establish credit or 
qualify for loan without bank account). 
 52 See id. at 134–41. 
 53 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 54 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (2000); id. § 1843(l)(2). 
 55 Id. § 2908. 
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leading scholars.56  This Part summarizes the five key arguments against 
CRA. 
A. No Market Failures or Discrimination Justifying CRA 
One group of critics argues that CRA is not necessary because there 
are theoretical reasons to believe that credit markets are efficient and will 
drive out discriminatory practices, and in their view the evidence 
establishing the existence of discrimination in credit markets is weak.57  
Others have focused on market failures, and argued that these market 
failures, if they exist, are no worse in low-income areas than in high-
income areas and can be easily overcome by market forces.58  If there were 
profits to be had in these communities, markets would find them without 
any regulatory intervention, they argue. 
Critics also argue that even if market failures and discrimination exist 
in low-income communities, CRA is ill-designed to address these 
problems.  They charge that the CRA is vague, blunt, and contradictory.  
The Act does not make explicit whether it is targeted at discrimination,59 
and fails to explain whether low-income communities or individuals are to 
be helped.  In the critics’ view, CRA may be designed to address market 
failures, to combat discrimination, to achieve redistributive goals, or 
perhaps to advance an old-fashioned notion of “local” depositors’ funds 
being lent locally (an ideal now irrelevant in global credit markets), but 
these goals are contradictory and muddled.60  According to this view, there 
is a poor fit between antidiscrimination principles and CRA,61 and the 
structure of CRA would exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, market 
failures.62  In sum, critics argue that CRA is not justified in theory. 
B. Little Benefit, High Costs 
Critics contend that CRA has provided little benefit at a very high cost 
 
 56 See, e.g., supra note 21. 
 57 See, e.g., Lacker, supra note 23, at 17 (describing as “inconclusive” Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data on discrimination against minority loan applicants).  I discuss the critique 
further, and respond to it, in Part III. 
 58 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at 60 (raising questions about degree to which CRA is 
needed to ensure fair access to credit by all segments of economy). 
 59 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637 (indicating that CRA never mentions minorities 
explicitly). 
 60 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1561–64 (describing ambiguity of CRA goals); Swire, Safe 
Harbors, supra note 21, at 360, 366–67 (mentioning difficult tradeoffs between different CRA 
goals). 
 61 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (indicating that using CRA for “affirmative 
action” is distortion of original purpose of CRA). 
 62 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1565–80. 
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because it is the wrong answer to a nonexistent problem.63  The benefits are 
insignificant, they argue, because economic growth, bank deregulation, 
technological innovation, and competition would have driven banks to lend 
in low-income areas even without CRA.64  Loan commitments that make 
headlines are a public relations boon but simply represent what the banks 
would do anyway.65  Others contend that city renewal policies and 
community development financial institutions were responsible for 
increased lending.66  Critics contend that lending not covered by CRA and 
lending by banks and thrifts outside their CRA assessment areas spurred 
the lending increases in low-income areas, so CRA could not have been 
responsible for any increased lending in these communities.67 
At the same time, critics have argued that CRA imposes high costs in 
a number of ways,68 and recent scholarship has suggested that the 1995 
regulatory reform did not reduce compliance costs or enhance shareholder 
value.69  First, critics argue that CRA conflicts with bank safety and 
soundness regulation.  CRA expects banks not only to expand credit to 
households to whom they would not otherwise lend but also to maintain 
safety and soundness.  Critics deride these aims as mutually inconsistent.70  
Because, in their view, market failures and discrimination are not 
significant factors justifying CRA, they argue that CRA forces banks to 
engage in unprofitable, risky lending.71  To the extent that CRA forces 
banks to lend to less creditworthy borrowers, CRA increases the bank’s 
 
 63 I respond to this critique in Part IV infra. 
 64 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 56 (suggesting that recent growth in lending in low-income 
neighborhoods is due to effectiveness of market forces in breaking down financial barriers to such 
lending); Hylton, supra note 21, at 204–05 (describing factors other than CRA that may have 
contributed to improvement of lending markets for urban poor). 
 65 See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Hylton, supra note 21, at 205 (pointing to improved management policies of big-city 
mayors, as well as to Community Development Financial Institutions Act of 1994). 
 67 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 58 (indicating that lenders not covered by CRA devoted 
growing proportion of home purchase loans to low-income communities). 
 68 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 641 (describing how CRA requires banks to expend 
great deal of effort and considerable resources focusing on low-income concerns); Klausner, 
supra note 21, at 1590–91 (describing how tradeable obligations would be less costly than current 
CRA regime); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (indicating that CRA imposes significant 
compliance costs on institutions). 
 69 See David B. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in Need of 
Further Reform? Evidence from Equity Markets During the 1995 Reform Process, 23 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES., 59, 75 (2003) (indicating that expected benefits of reforms are approximately 
equal to expected costs). 
 70 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 59; Hylton, supra note 21, at 197. 
 71 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654 (indicating that CRA compliance may involve 
making unprofitable loans); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (suggesting that CRA requires 
banks to make unprofitable and risky investment- and product-line decisions); White, supra note 
21, at 282 (claiming that CRA either encourages making of unprofitable loans or is redundant 
because it encourages banks to make profitable loans they would have made anyway). 
15
Barr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
116 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:600 
 
risk and reduces its profitability.  To the extent that CRA forces banks to 
lend locally, CRA undermines the ability of banks to diversify their lending 
geographically, thereby undermining the soundness of their portfolio.72  
Moreover, critics charge that during economic downturns, when banks 
must necessarily reduce their risk profiles, CRA examiners would give 
banks bad ratings for what are in fact only prudent reductions in risk.73 
Second, CRA, in their view, deters efficiency-enhancing mergers and 
cost reductions through closures of low-return bank branches.74  By 
requiring CRA review during merger applications, CRA adds costs to all 
mergers and may impede marginal ones from proceeding, if this view is 
correct.  Whatever efficiency losses accrue from deterring such mergers, or 
from the transaction costs of CRA during merger applications, outweigh 
the benefits of CRA, if any, in their view. 
Third, enforcement of CRA’s broad standard has been described as 
arbitrary and inconsistent.75  Critics allege that regulatory outcomes depend 
on the strength of local community groups, competitive factors in the 
financial sector, the decisions of banks to merge, and the whims of 
regulators.  There is reportedly wide variation in the strictness of 
regulators, both among agencies, and within agencies by geographic 
region.76  In the critics view, CRA’s standard is effectively lawless. 
Fourth, critics argue that the CRA standard gives regulators unfettered 
discretion that they wrongly use to benefit interest groups.  For example, 
Macey and Miller decry the manner in which public participation in 
reviewing the CRA performance of banks and thrifts empowers activist 
pressure groups, who, they allege, engage in rampant rent-seeking by 
holding banks hostage to give the groups funds for their own purposes.77  
Others charge that inner-city developers gain advantage from the 
regulation.78  One scholar contends that large banks benefit from CRA 
relative to small banks and impede any changes to CRA that would benefit 
smaller institutions.79  Critics further posit that the banking regulators are 
major beneficiaries of CRA because it gives them a lever to use against 
 
 72 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 324. 
 73 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 60. 
 74 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 322–23. 
 75 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637–38 (describing how vagueness of CRA has led 
to arbitrary enforcement); Hylton, supra note 21, at 203 (same); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, 
at 295 (same); Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 361–62 (describing CRA’s high 
compliance costs and agencies’ overbroad discretion). 
 76 See KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK 547 (1998). 
 77 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 333–37 (describing how CRA has increased power 
of activist groups dedicated to various causes related to community development). 
 78 See Hylton, supra note 21, at 237. 
 79 See id. at 234–37 (arguing that large banks benefit overall from CRA and thus block 
reforms). 
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banks in mergers they are concerned about for other reasons or allows them 
to pursue political goals unrelated to CRA.80  According to this view, the 
power of rent-seeking interest groups and regulators under CRA leads 
banks to engage in CRA compliance in a way that benefits rent-seeking 
pressure groups but that does not actually help low-income or minority 
communities.  Banks, motivated by the desire to satisfy pressure groups 
and regulators, engage in wasteful spending on public relations and 
headline-making loan commitments,81 and spend inordinate hours and 
dollars on compliance, generation of data reporting, and other wasteful 
paperwork, according to this view.82 
C. Rules versus Standards 
At bottom, many of the criticisms regarding whether CRA is a 
reasonable response to market failures find their expression as an argument 
that CRA’s standards-based regulation is lawless and inefficient.83  Even 
those who take as a given the existence of CRA argue that the standards-
based approach of CRA should give way to more rules-based regimes.  
Some scholars call for tradeable CRA obligations akin to those used in 
environmental regimes,84 while others call for safe harbors under CRA for 
the top bank performers.85  These proposals stem from the view that CRA is 
an inefficient means to overcome market failures and discrimination. 
CRA’s requirement that banks lend wherever they take deposits is a 
poor design choice to overcome market failures, critics allege, because it 
undermines innovation, specialization and scale economies.  In their view, 
CRA impedes specialization because it requires banks to invest in learning 
about all their communities, rather than permitting banks to invest the high 
fixed costs of such knowledge in one area.86  CRA thwarts innovation 
because it requires a high level of lending once an initial investment in 
branches in a poor area is made.  CRA undermines the ability of banks to 
benefit from scale economies87 and precludes banks from internalizing the 
positive externalities of their lending because CRA requires many 
 
 80 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 342. 
 81 See id. at 295, 330–33 (suggesting that compliance with CRA often requires successful 
public relations plan); see also Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 638 (describing how banks feel 
obliged to waste resources in order to demonstrate their good faith). 
 82 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 361; White, supra note 21, at 283. 
 83 See, e.g., Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 637–38 (citing views that CRA is “arbitrary,” 
“vague[],” and “waste[s] resources”); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295 (arguing that CRA 
standard is “vague” and “arbitrary”). I respond to this critique in Part V. 
 84 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 652; Klausner, supra note 21, at 1580. 
 85 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 353–69. 
 86 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 655; Klausner, supra note 21, at 1574–75; Swire, 
Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 354–55.  
 87 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 652, 655. 
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institutions to lend in the community.88 
In the view of CRA’s critics, rules-based regimes would be more 
efficient than a standard at addressing these problems.  Thus, both Michael 
Klausner and Peter Swire have called for reforms that in their view would 
enhance CRA’s effectiveness at lower cost.  Klausner has called for 
tradeable CRA obligations, akin to tradeable environmental requirements, 
to take advantage of bank specialization, innovation and scale economies.  
In another effort to reform CRA, Swire has proposed safe harbors for 
strong CRA performers.  Under a safe harbor, a bank would not face CRA 
scrutiny during merger applications if the bank had achieved a given level 
of lending as of its last CRA examination.  A safe harbor, it is argued, 
would provide a measure of certainty to the best banks and thrifts and 
would thereby lower the costs of CRA, at least the costs due to relying on a 
“vague” standard rather than a rule. 
D. Geographic and Institutional Scope Distorts Markets 
Critics contend that the scope of CRA distorts the markets in two 
ways.89  First, CRA distorts banks’ location decisions in a way that actually 
hurts low-income communities.  Second, because regulatory burdens and 
incentives are targeted to some, but not all, financial intermediaries, CRA 
may simply shift the composition of lending and not expand it or change its 
terms, and place an unfair and inefficient burden on banks and thrifts.90 
Scholars argue that banks can avoid their vague CRA obligations by 
moving out or staying out of low-income and minority neighborhoods so 
that their “assessment” area for lending excludes such communities.91  
Defining communities by the geographical “accident” of deposit facilities, 
they argue, is itself a difficult process with perverse effects on bank 
locational decisions.92  They argue that CRA creates incentives for banks to 
 
 88 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1577 (arguing that coordination offers means of internalizing 
externalities, but CRA makes coordination difficult); Cf. White, supra note 21, at 285 (arguing 
that “[i]f banks could coordinate their lending decisions, they might find that their joint lending 
could arrest the community’s decline and make their loans jointly profitable; in essence, each 
bank would benefit from the lending decisions of other banks”). 
 89 I respond to this critique in Part VI. 
 90 JONATHAN ZINMAN, THE EFFICACY AND EFFICIENCY OF CREDIT MARKET 
INTERVENTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (Harvard Univ. Joint 
Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper CRA02-2, 2002), at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra02-2_zinman.pdf (last visited 
April 5, 2005).  
 91 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296, 340 (describing how CRA drives capital away 
from poor neighborhoods by imposing tax on depository institutions “foolhardy” enough to do 
business in such communities); White, supra note 21, at 287 (indicating that banks and thrifts will 
avoid areas where CRA obligations are onerous). 
 92 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1584 (suggesting some problems with tying CRA 
obligations to bank’s area of operation). 
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avoid opening branches in poor neighborhoods in the first place, in order to 
avoid having to comply with CRA by lending in those communities.93 
Critics lament the additional burden CRA places on banks and thrifts 
while no similar burden affects other participants in the financial markets.  
They deny that one can justify CRA as a quid pro quo for a net subsidy 
from the federal government to banks.  Even if a net subsidy exists (which 
some commentators doubt94), critics say the appropriate response would be 
to eliminate the distortion directly, not enact CRA.95  Moreover, CRA is 
bad economics, in the critics’ view, because it places a regulatory burden 
on one type of financial institution (banks and thrifts) while letting 
comparable institutions (credit unions, independent finance companies) and 
other financial market participants (insurance companies, securities firms) 
off without any similar obligations.96  In this view, it is irrational to apply 
CRA to banks and thrifts, but not to other financial companies, or, for that 
matter, every participant in every market, including, say, to packagers of 
frozen peas. 
E. Other Alternatives 
Finally, critics argue that if one wants to achieve CRA’s goals, 
superior regulatory alternatives exist.97  They argue that if CRA is rooted in 
distributional goals, these can better be met through the tax and transfer 
system, rather than through legal rules.98  Still others argue for in-kind 
demand-side subsidies, supply-side subsidies, or tax incentives.99  Others 
urge enforcement of existing antidiscrimination law.100  Some contend that 
the market solution—in particular, the growth of the subprime mortgage 
market—answers any concerns about underserved low-income 
 
 93 See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296. 
 94 See, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and 
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 15 (1999) (suggesting that 
if banks receive any net subsidy at all from federal safety net, it is small). 
 95 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296 (suggesting that goal of subsidizing poor 
or disadvantaged citizens can be better accomplished by direct subsidy programs). 
 96 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 655; Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 312–13; 
White, supra note 21, at 287–90 (describing frequently proffered reasons for why CRA treats 
banks differently from other lending institutions). 
 97 I respond to this critique in Part VII infra. 
 98 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than 
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that tax and 
transfer system is always superior to legal rules in redistributing income).  But see Swire, Safe 
Harbors, supra note 21, at 368 (criticizing arguments that relying on tax and transfer system is 
preferable alternative to CRA).  
 99 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1592 (suggesting “tax benefits or other transfers”); 
Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 367–68 (describing direct expenditures in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods as alternative to CRA); White, supra note 21, at 291 (arguing 
for “direct government subsidies” if there is public purpose in increasing lending). 
 100 See White, supra note 21, at 283–84. 
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communities.101  Other scholars call for an increased focus on community 
development banks and peer-lending based on ethnic communities.102 
Some of these arguments have strong theoretical force.  Market 
failures are difficult to establish empirically, and “[t]he existence of 
important credit market failures is uncertain.”103  Moreover, it is unclear 
whether banks and thrifts would respond to incentives in desired ways, and 
the costs of CRA in overcoming these market failures and discrimination 
ought to be considered in determining whether it is an efficient means to 
overcome these problems.  This debate cannot be decided in the abstract, 
nor on the basis of anecdotal evidence.  Furthermore, the literature on 
standards versus rules would lend support, if correct, to the views of CRA’s 
critics.  In addition, there is room for reasonable debate about the scope of 
CRA.  Lastly, other alternatives do exist that influence the provision of 
credit to minorities and low- and moderate-income communities.  The 
remainder of the article takes up these five points in turn.   
III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRA 
In this Part, I will discuss how the theoretical support for CRA derives 
from three bases.  First, CRA addresses market failures caused by 
imperfect information, collective action problems, agency costs, and 
neighborhood externalities that are more acute in low-income 
neighborhoods and for low-income borrowers than in credit markets 
generally.  Contrary to the views of CRA’s critics, I will argue that the 
market failures are significant, and that CRA is an appropriate response to 
them.  Second, I will argue that CRA helps to reduce discrimination against 
minority borrowers and communities.  CRA was not designed to address 
racial discrimination against individual borrowers directly, but it was 
aimed, in part, at addressing “redlining” discrimination and its legacy in 
segregated, low-income neighborhoods.  Moreover, the significant 
correlation between race and income, and between race of homeowner and 
racial composition and income of neighborhood, gives CRA leverage to 
overcome barriers to credit faced by minority households.  In some 
contexts, this leverage is greater than that of fair lending laws.104  Thus, I 
will explain why CRA is an important part of a broader regulatory strategy 
to overcome the legacy of discrimination in order to expand access to credit 
 
 101 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 57.  
 102 See Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654–57; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 354–
55 (describing how safe harbor policy might support investment in community development 
banks). 
 103 ZINMAN, supra note 90, at 1. 
 104 See infra Part VII.A (comparing CRA to fair lending laws). 
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to minority households.  Third, I will contend that CRA has largely not 
done enough to break down inefficient barriers between the bifurcated 
prime and subprime credit markets.  CRA could do more to enhance 
competition between prime and subprime lenders in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods.  Over time, along with market changes, CRA can 
help make the subprime and prime markets more efficient by completing 
the market.  In addition, CRA could play a strong role in reducing 
discrimination that results from, and occurs in, bifurcated credit markets. 
A. Market Failure 
Credit market imperfections could impede lending in low- and 
moderate-income communities in several ways.  First, information 
externalities and asymmetries may lead banks to overlook creditworthy 
borrowers and profitable loans.105  Information externalities exist when 
creditors cannot fully recoup the costs of gathering information about 
creditworthy borrowers because other lenders can use the information 
generated to lend.  Information externalities can produce credit constraints 
because the efficiency of bank lending is in part a function of “market 
thickness.”106  Information asymmetries, in which lenders cannot fully 
distinguish creditworthy from un-creditworthy borrowers, are reduced the 
more information that lenders have about prospective borrowers.  CRA 
helps to reduce information externalities and asymmetries by increasing 
market thickness.  Second, collective action problems exacerbate 
information externalities and inhibit entry into these communities.107  CRA 
could help to mitigate these credit constraints by providing “an effective 
commitment device to coordinate lending.”108  Third, agency costs make it 
difficult to align corporate interest in profitable lending with the behavior 
of loan agents.  CRA can help to address agency costs by providing 
additional incentives to reform corporate structures to align with these 
 
 105 See Janusz Ordover & Andrew Weiss, Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal 
Restrictions on Competitive Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 399, 401 (1981).  
 106 William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, A Model of Redlining, 33 J. URB. ECON. 223, 
229–33 (1993) (explaining how information externalities can lead to inefficient credit rationing in 
low-volume markets).  Market thickness refers to the amount of economic activity, as measured 
by the number of participants, or the number or total value of transactions, over some time period.  
Id. at 229–31. 
 107 If monopolies were licensed for low-income areas, there would be no collective action 
problem, but we generally believe that monopolies are inefficient because the price, quantity, and 
quality of goods will be inferior to those offered in a competitive market.  For empirical support 
of the existence of credit constraints because creditors cannot fully capture information 
externalities in competitive markets, see, for example, Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. 
Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON. 407, 
433 (1995) (finding that young firms are more credit constrained in competitive markets than in 
concentrated ones). 
 108 ZINMAN, supra note 103, at 34 n.33. 
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goals.  Lastly, neighborhood externalities provide grounds for 
governmental intervention to reduce credit constraints and increase 
homeownership.109  I take up these points in turn. 
Information externalities contribute to lower rates of lending in low-
income communities than would be socially optimal.110  Borrowers in low-
income neighborhoods find it more difficult to obtain mortgage loans in 
part because lenders lack sufficient information on home sales in these thin 
markets, that is, markets with a relatively lower level of economic 
activity.111  The smaller number of transactions in a low-income 
community makes appraisals more difficult.  Any one financial institution 
will not be willing to participate in a market with uncertain collateral 
values.  The resulting reduction in market participants will decrease further 
the amount of information available about property values and reduce the 
liquidity of other loans to that neighborhood.  Lenders will not want to lend 
in areas with low levels of liquidity.  Property values will decline as the 
market becomes less liquid, reinforcing the downward trend in lending. 
The information and expertise required to offset this trend are costly.  
In low-income communities, such information externalities are likely to be 
even more costly to overcome—and the benefits of overcoming them are 
likely to be smaller—than in high-income neighborhoods.112  Creditors will 
face the up-front costs of developing expertise in neighborhoods that they 
have not served previously and about which there is less information 
available from other creditors, appraisers, and real estate professionals.  In 
addition, creditors will need to spread the fixed costs of finding information 
about low-income neighborhoods over fewer transactions and smaller loan 
sizes.113  Creditors will have to train their personnel to search for 
creditworthy borrowers and sound residential neighborhoods in locations 
where lenders have not conducted a large number of transactions 
previously.  Such information creates positive externalities that benefit all 
 
 109 See, e.g., JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 
39 (1980). 
 110 See STEPHEN ROSS & JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE 
DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND FAIR-LENDING ENFORCEMENT 180–81 
(2002) (analyzing Lang & Nakamura, supra note 106); David M. Harrison, The Importance of 
Lender Heterogeneity in Mortgage Lending, 49 J. URB. ECON. 285, 294 (2001); Klausner, supra 
note 21, at 1569–70; David C. Ling & Susan M. Wachter, Information Externalities and Home 
Mortgage Underwriting, 44 J. URB. ECON. 317, 318 (1998).  But see Paul S. Calem, Mortgage 
Credit Availability in Low- and Moderate-Income Minority Neighborhoods: Are Information 
Externalities Critical?, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 71, 105 (1996) (finding that information 
externalities result in higher loan denial rate overall, but that this relationship does not hold in 
minority neighborhoods). 
 111 For empirical evidence on market thinness, and improvements during the 1990s, see infra 
text accompanying notes 230–238. 
 112 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1569–70. 
 113 See id. 
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lenders.  Information about collateral values and the existence of 
creditworthy borrowers will likely—if lenders report credit histories—inure 
to the benefit of all lenders.114  Thus, the lender that invested in the 
additional information will not be fully compensated for its investment. 
Given high search costs, lenders will use the average risk of the pool 
and miss good risks.  Even if search and credit-analysis costs are reduced, 
there is likely to be insufficient volume and liquidity to support a relatively 
complete market.115  The friction from information externalities likely 
makes it costlier to serve low-income borrowers living in these 
neighborhoods whether they purchase a home in a low-income community 
or seek better options in high-income ones. 
In addition, many lenders—in this context, banks and thrifts making 
prime loans—will worry that adverse selection and moral hazard will 
increase if the lenders charge more to cover their risks from market 
thinness and the uncertainty regarding distinguishing good risks from bad 
ones.  Adverse selection increases with loan price because good-risk 
borrowers will avoid the higher cost loan if they have access to other 
alternatives.  Moral hazard increases with loan price because the borrower 
faces a greater incentive to default when the costs of continuing to pay are 
higher.116  Lenders that do enter the market—in this context, mostly 
“subprime lenders”—will charge higher prices to offset these risks.  
Moreover, the higher prices may drive more borrowers out of the market or 
increase defaults, making it less likely that other lenders will be willing to 
serve the thinner, riskier market.  Furthermore, lenders may seek to 
 
 114 Lenders report credit histories of borrowers under voluntary arrangements with credit 
bureaus.  Lenders may then access the credit histories of borrowers or potential borrowers in 
order to make lending decisions.  See generally Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer 
Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 47 (2003). 
 115 In a complete market, equilibrium is always efficient.  See generally, Kenneth J. Arrow & 
Gerard Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265 
(1954).  In an incomplete market, equilibrium may be inefficient, or may not be reached at all.  
See generally, John Geanakoplos, An Introduction to General Equilibrium with Incomplete Asset 
Markets, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 1 (1990) (explaining theory of general equilibrium with 
incomplete markets); Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 
(1976) (explaining how imperfect information can prevent equilibria from forming); Pradeep 
Dubey et al., Default in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets 17 (n.d., 
unpublished manuscript) (explaining how imperfect information, such as “unreasonable 
pessimism[,] prevents many real world markets from opening”), at 
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d12a/d1247.pdf (last visited April 7, 2005).  Incomplete markets 
occur because of the presence of transaction costs (including information and evaluation costs), 
adverse selection, moral hazard, asymmetric information and information externalities, and 
insufficient volume and liquidity.  See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 147 (2001). 
 116 See generally, Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981). 
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internalize more of the benefits of customer information by not reporting 
credit histories to the credit bureaus.117  By failing to report credit histories, 
they gain market share, which would induce them to spend more on 
information and lend more.  Borrowers, however, will face higher prices 
and will not be able to demonstrate to other lenders, including prime 
lenders, that they are creditworthy. 
In addition to information externalities that lower the returns to 
lending to low-income borrowers and in low-income neighborhoods, 
asymmetries in information between lenders and borrowers that are costly 
to overcome also can lead to credit rationing.  “Credit rationing” describes 
situations where a lender decides not to make a loan to a given borrower or 
class of borrowers rather than making the loan and charging a higher price 
to cover higher cost or risk.  Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss have 
demonstrated that credit rationing can occur when seemingly similar 
borrowers differ in unobserved ways in their willingness and ability to 
repay.118  If lenders charge higher interest rates to compensate themselves 
for the uncertainty regarding the risk of a given pool of borrowers, they 
will face higher default rates because of adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  Adverse selection would mean that riskier borrowers will take out 
loans from the bank because they cannot get access to lower-priced loans 
elsewhere.  These riskier borrowers will tend to default more often because 
moral hazard increases as interest rates increase.  Moral hazard is a 
function of interest rates because the gains from failing to pay increase with 
interest owed, while losses cannot exceed the amount owed.119  Moreover, 
higher-priced loans simply will be more difficult for low-income borrowers 
to repay, and thus higher prices yield higher default rates.  Higher prices 
are an independent source of default, in addition to moral hazard, because 
low-income borrowers face a relatively hard budget constraint with little 
 
 117 See, e.g., Advisory Letter from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, to 
Chief Financial Officers (Jan. 18, 2000) (noting motivation for lack of reporting is “intense 
competition among lenders for customers”), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2000-3a.txt.  Creditors may be more inclined to fail to 
report in thin markets than in thick ones because the information externalities, and thus the gains 
derived from not reporting, are higher in thin markets than in thick ones.  That is, the gains from 
withholding information about good borrowers are smaller in a market full of good borrowers, 
than in a market with fewer good borrowers.  Credit bureaus are now well established in the 
United States and work well for the majority of borrowers, but these bureaus took a long time and 
required high levels of market volume to develop.  See Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote Accurate Credit Reporting? 4–5 (2004) (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/babc/babc_04-
14.pdf.  Moreover, even in the well developed credit reporting market in the United States 
generally, subprime lenders tend not to report to the bureaus, and other lenders incompletely 
report. 
 118 Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 116, at 408.  
 119 See id. at 393. 
24
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 125 
 
room to adjust expenditures, dip into savings, or access other credit in order 
to meet debt service requirements.  Both moral hazard and this price effect 
increase the likelihood that low-income borrowers will default even if they 
did not present a similar risk of defaulting on a lower-cost loan. 
Calomiris is correct that the problem of adverse selection is likely 
worse for small businesses than for home mortgage applicants because 
information asymmetries are lower in the home mortgage market.120  Yet 
such asymmetries are not fully eliminated even with the advent of credit 
scoring, and there are several reasons why it is costly to overcome 
information asymmetries regarding low-income borrowers.  These 
borrowers often lack credit histories, and many do not even have a bank 
account,121 so determining their creditworthiness is more difficult and 
costly.  Many low-income households could provide indicia that they are 
likely to repay their loans, such as a strong record of paying rent and 
utilities on time, or sending remittances regularly to family members, as 
immigrants often do, but banks are not accustomed to relying on such 
information.  There is not yet a clearinghouse or standardized method of 
determining creditworthiness on the basis of these factors,122 making these 
measures more uncertain than the standard credit scores produced by the 
credit bureaus.  Moreover, although credit scores are good predictors of 
repayment, there is variance around a given score.  Additionally, low-
income households often have lower levels of educational attainment and 
thus may require more assistance in completing loan applications.123  
Creditors rationally might choose not to spend the additional sums 
necessary to lend to creditworthy low-income borrowers absent regulatory 
or other interventions that alter these economics.  These high costs of 
overcoming information asymmetries would plague low-income borrowers 
seeking a loan regardless of whether the borrower wanted to live in a low-
income neighborhood or sought access to better economic opportunities in 
a higher-income neighborhood where lenders already operate. 
Creditors considering whether to enter a low-income market also face 
collective action problems.124  Lenders may delay entry into an otherwise 
 
 120 See Calomiris, supra note 21, at 644 (arguing that only source for asymmetric information 
is “likely” to be “idiosyncratic attachment to the house” and that such asymmetry would not lead 
to credit rationing). 
 121 See Barr, supra note 3, at 123 (showing that 22% of low-income households lack bank 
accounts). 
 122 For innovative pilots in this regard, see, for example, a new organization, “Pay Rent, Build 
Credit,” which seeks to develop credit histories for low-income households based on consistent 
payment of rent.  See  Pay Rent, Build Credit Homepage, at http://www.payrentbuildcredit.com 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 123 See Klausner, supra note 21, at 1568. 
 124 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971) (explaining why collective action problems can lead to 
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profitable market because their lending would lead to benefits that they 
cannot fully capture in the form of information, market volume, and 
liquidity because other lenders can free ride.  This delay in entry further 
diminishes the economic prospects of the area and reinforces other lenders’ 
decisions not to lend.  Even if there are creditworthy borrowers and 
sufficient collateral values, a lender rationally might avoid the risk of 
lending in an uncertain market because other lenders are not lending there.  
That would be the case even if all lenders would be better off if they all 
chose to lend in the community.  One can characterize this delayed entry as 
a collective action problem.125  By contrast, if lenders know that others will 
participate because they are required to do so under CRA, then their 
collateral is more likely to have knowable values, their collateral and loans 
are more likely to be liquid, loan volume might rise to the level sufficient to 
support a complete market, and property values may be able to rise more 
quickly, all other things being equal. 
Other institutions that might mitigate these market failures are weaker 
or altogether absent in low-income communities.  For example, to the 
extent that higher-income communities could, in theory, exhibit 
information externalities or collective action problems, such failures are 
overcome by real estate developers and agents (who gather and disseminate 
information about price and quality), neighborhood associations (who 
enforce rules such as lawn maintenance that bolster uniform reliability of 
collateral values), and the like.  These institutions generally are weaker or 
unavailable in low-income communities, and their absence exacerbates 
market failures. 
Neighborhood externalities that result from credit market failures also 
undergird CRA.126  Neighborhoods with low access to credit see declines in 
property values, increased vacant properties, and other indicia of distress.  
Households find it more difficult to get credit if they live in distressed 
neighborhoods.  Lower access to credit can increase neglect of 
properties.127  Adjacent property owners may decide not to invest in 
 
inefficient outcomes, including in development of public policy).  Collective action problems are 
a type of market failure that can occur when rational market participants do not produce efficient 
outcomes because the market involves a public good.  In its pure form, a public good is nonrival 
and nonexcludable, but externalities that do not meet these formal tests still can result in 
collective action problems. 
 125 Contrary to previous scholarship, see for example Klausner, supra note 21, at 1577 (“The 
CRA does little to promote coordination.”), I argue that CRA is an effective response to 
collective action problems because it helps banks and thrifts coordinate their lending.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 128–132. 
 126 See GUTTENTAG & WACHTER, supra note 109, at 7–9, 39 (describing neighborhood 
externality caused by coordination problems among rational lenders and asserting CRA’s capacity 
to mitigate that externality); Klausner, supra note 21, at 1570–71 (discussing neighborhood 
externalities caused by physical deterioration and bank lending decisions). 
 127 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1571 (stating that “owners who want to rehabilitate 
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maintenance or to move out of the neighborhood.128  Poorly kept and vacant 
homes further depress property values, and reduce the volume and liquidity 
of credit markets. 
Critics of CRA might argue that market failures, if they exist in low-
income communities, do not apply to low-income borrowers purchasing 
homes outside low-income areas.  In their view, CRA’s inclusion of 
lending to low-income borrowers outside low-income areas would thus be 
unjustified.  While critics are correct that market failures operate in more 
intense ways in low-income neighborhoods, such factors still come into 
play when low-income borrowers seek to move out of such neighborhoods.  
For low-income households seeking to purchase a home in a better 
neighborhood, rather than in a low-income one, nearly all of these market 
failures would still apply.  Information externalities with respect to 
borrower creditworthiness are costly to overcome because of the low 
volume of low-income borrowers, particularly from low-income 
neighborhoods, and the cost of developing expertise in finding 
creditworthy borrowers in these thin markets.  Information asymmetries are 
costly to overcome regardless of the location of the purchased home 
because low-income households have lower levels of assets available for 
downpayments or to demonstrate creditworthiness and many lack standard 
indicia used by creditors to evaluate risk.  Collective action problems delay 
entry in serving low-income borrowers in similar ways to entering a low-
income neighborhood.  Moreover, low-income borrowers likely lack 
familiarity with or access to many of the institutional supports, such as a 
knowledgeable real estate broker, on which higher income borrowers rely. 
CRA is a reasonable, though by no means the only possible, policy 
response to these market failures affecting low-income borrowers and 
neighborhoods.  By providing incentives to banks and thrifts to lend in their 
entire community, CRA promotes market thickness.  CRA solves the 
problem of underproduction from externalities by encouraging the banks 
and thrifts to lend anyway.  Under CRA, free riders cannot exploit 
collective action problems because each bank is, in effect, required to 
participate in the market.  Thus, CRA is a form of pre-commitment device 
that overcomes the coordination problem inherent when positive 
externalities are sufficiently large to act in ways similar to public goods.129  
 
their properties may be unable to do so because they cannot borrow the money needed,” and thus 
“a lack of credit in a neighborhood can actually precipitate its decline”). 
 128 See GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT 144–224 
(1987) (discussing factors contributing to homeowner mobility and upkeep behavior). 
 129 A pure public good is nonrival and nonexcludable.  That is, the cost of additional 
consumption of the good is zero and anyone can use the good at no cost.  No one person has an 
incentive to produce such a good because everyone else will be able to free ride on the 
production.  In the real world, pure public goods are rare, but many phenomena with large 
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Banks know that there will be liquidity and volume because other lenders 
will be looking for lending opportunities in these markets because of their 
CRA obligations.  Moreover, once a sufficient volume of loans of similar 
characteristics to similar borrowers is reached, these loans can then be 
packaged and sold on secondary markets, which provides capital and 
liquidity for continued lending. 
Over time, the thicker the market, the less each incremental loan will 
produce significant information externalities.  With lower information 
externalities, lenders face less of a disincentive to lend in low-income 
communities because they can capture a larger share of the benefits from 
lending there.  Furthermore, as lenders obtain information about 
creditworthy low-income borrowers and develop expertise in lending to 
these borrowers, the transaction costs associated with overcoming 
information asymmetries also decrease.  It becomes easier both to obtain 
information about creditworthy borrowers and property values, and to 
evaluate such information.  With lower information asymmetries, loan 
prices can be reduced so that they become commensurate with measurable 
risk, and thus adverse selection and moral hazard pose less of a problem to 
reaching further into the market of potential borrowers in low-income 
communities. 
In addition, CRA both directly and indirectly bolsters community-
based organizations in low-income communities that have been critical to 
the development of home mortgage markets in ways that are similar to the 
development of lending in wealthier communities.  CRA encourages banks 
to support community organizations directly by giving banks CRA 
consideration for loans, investments, and services to community 
development organizations that strengthen and revitalize local 
communities.130  CRA also indirectly supports these institutions because 
banks need such strong institutions in these communities in order to reduce 
the risk and increase the effectiveness of their lending operations.  These 
stronger institutions, in turn, reinforce the effectiveness of CRA in 
overcoming market failures.  Community-based organizations play roles 
analogous to real estate brokers, developers and neighborhood associations 
by stabilizing and improving housing stock, revitalizing local business 
districts, providing home ownership and other financial counseling to low-
income borrowers, and helping to match creditworthy borrowers with 
willing banks and thrifts. 
 
externalities exhibit similar traits to public goods, in which collective action problems prevent 
coordination to internalize the externality.  See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 61–62, 92 
(4th ed. 1995). 
 130 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(4) (2004) (including community development lending as part of 
lending test), § 25.23(e)(3) (including community development as part of investment test), § 
25.24(e) (including community development lending as part of service test). 
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Finally, CRA helps to address neighborhood externalities by 
increasing the volume and liquidity of credit markets.  These better 
functioning credit markets increase access to homeownership for low-
income borrowers.  CRA thus can work like other policies that are designed 
to increase access to credit and homeownership and can help to turn 
neighborhoods around, increasing property values for adjacent properties 
and neighborhoods.131  Government policies designed to increase 
homeownership thus can have positive externalities in communities not 
directly affected by the government programs.132 
If CRA succeeds in overcoming these market failures, one could ask 
how long CRA would continue to be necessary.  Critics would argue that 
enough time has passed under CRA for banks to “get it.”  Either I am right, 
and there were market failures present but now banks have overcome them 
by lending to these communities, or I am wrong, and there were never any 
market failures to overcome.  The answer to that question involves both an 
empirical and a theoretical enquiry, and unchartered terrain.  No market is 
perfect.  Market failures can exist in reasonably well-functioning markets 
without causing significant problems.  Progress has undoubtedly been 
made.  The question becomes at what point any market failures become 
relatively inconsequential so that the costs of governmental regulation to 
overcome them become unlikely to be worth incurring. 
My intuition, based on conversations over the years with senior 
management from banks and thrifts, is that this point has not yet been 
reached, although this is an area in which continued empirical research is 
essential.  In theoretical terms, low-income markets are likely to stay 
relatively thinner than high-income markets for some time, even with the 
advances in low-income lending that this Article describes.133  Low-income 
households will remain relatively more opaque to banks than higher-
income ones, and less able to signal creditworthiness through sizeable 
down payments, given their low levels of asset holding and diverse sources 
of income.  Thus, bank incentives to avoid household adverse selection and 
moral hazard, given information asymmetries, are likely to remain 
important considerations in decisions about the appropriate cutoffs for 
credit rationing and risk-based pricing with respect to such households.  At 
 
 131 See, e.g., Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Building Homes, Reviving Neighborhoods: Spillovers 
from Subsidized Construction of Owner-Occupied Housing in New York City, 12 J. HOUSING 
RES. 185, 211 (2001) (finding that two affordable homeownership projects in New York City had 
positive effect on property values in immediate neighborhood); Michael H. Schill et al., 
Revitalizing Inner-City Neighborhoods: New York City’s Ten-Year Plan, 13 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 529, 562–63 (2002) (finding that New York City’s Ten-Year Plan investments in 
housing production in city’s poorest neighborhoods had positive impact on those neighborhoods). 
 132 Ellen et al., supra note 131, at 211; Schill et al., supra note 131, at 562–63. 
 133 For a discussion of the empirical evidence, see infra text accompanying notes 231230–238. 
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the neighborhood level, home ownership, the number of home sales, the 
price of homes, and loan sizes, are likely to remain at lower levels than in 
higher-income neighborhoods, and real estate agents and appraisers are still 
likely to have lower volumes of activity in such neighborhoods than in the 
more affluent areas they serve.  These factors suggest that information 
externalities will continue to be an important factor limiting lending.  Thus, 
the volume of lending and liquidity required for a fully functioning market 
will likely continue to be difficult to sustain without at least some of the 
government policies discussed in this Article.  For banks and thrifts where 
institutional structures and incentives have not been altered to make 
lending to low-income households a core mission of the institution, the 
difficulty of focusing employee time and attention on serving this market 
will likely exacerbate the problem. 
The imperfect competition that results from these transaction costs—
including the cost of information, thinking creatively about the information, 
and information externalities; adverse selection and moral hazard; 
asymmetric information; agency costs in keeping the institution engaged in 
low-income lending; and the difficulty of creating and sustaining volume 
and liquidity to support the market—means that low-income households 
are likely to remain perennially at risk from being excluded from the pool 
of households that banks and thrifts will find it most profitable to serve.  
Thus, CRA and other policies are likely to be an important factor in lending 
to these communities for some time to come. 
B. Racial Discrimination 
CRA was not enacted to address racial discrimination against 
particular borrowers.  That role was assigned to the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA).134  Yet CRA had its origins in claims 
that banks were “redlining,” that is, refusing to lend to potential borrowers 
living in low-income, minority communities.  One cannot fully understand 
the rationale for CRA unless one sees it as part of the federal government’s 
response to the long history of private sector and official discrimination in 
housing and credit markets.  In this Section, I explore the theory and 
evidence regarding credit market discrimination as a basis for CRA.135  
Contrary to the claims of CRA’s critics, I argue that racial discrimination, 
 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 1691–1691f (2000). The Federal Reserve Board implements the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act(ECOA) under Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2004). 
 135 See A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1431, 1453 (1995) (arguing that CRA should be understood as response to racial 
discrimination).  But see Klausner, supra note 21, at 1563–64 (arguing that ECOA, not CRA, 
should address racial discrimination).  For a defense of the view that CRA should be seen as a 
legitimate response to racial discrimination in addition to ECOA, see Part VII.A infra (comparing 
CRA to ECOA). 
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and the effects of such discrimination, likely persists in home mortgage 
markets, and that the legacy of discrimination provides further theoretical 
justification for CRA.  Moreover, I will argue that CRA in fact plays an 
important role, alongside ECOA, in overcoming such discrimination. 
The dominant view, derived from the work of Gary Becker, is that in 
the long run, in a perfect market, discrimination will disappear.136  
Competition helps to drive away discrimination based on racial animus 
because market participants who practice it will lose out on hiring the best 
human capital and will leave profits from good customers on the table that 
other, nondiscriminatory actors will scoop up.  Long-run equilibrium 
probably will occur sooner in credit markets than in, say, labor markets, 
because credit markets are more efficient.137  I agree that competition likely 
diminishes discrimination.  Nonetheless, the force of competition acting on 
discrimination depends on market structure, and for those who are 
discriminated against, waiting around for competition to work may be ill 
comfort.  Government intervention can speed up the process of ending 
discrimination both by directly prohibiting it, and by overcoming market 
failures that exacerbate it. 
Market failures can exacerbate discrimination in a variety of ways.  At 
a given point in time, one would need to specify the parameters of Becker’s 
model to test his hypothesis,138 and competing theories suggest that the 
model is too limited.139  As I will explain more fully below, credit-rationing 
theory can explain the persistence of lending discrimination.  In addition, 
Becker’s model assumes that only racial animus is illegal, and it is this 
form of discrimination that Becker demonstrates would disappear in a 
perfect market.  Statistical discrimination—in which lenders use factors 
correlated with race as proxies for creditworthiness—violates ECOA, but 
such discrimination is rational under Becker’s model.140  Lastly, price 
 
 136 Becker himself is somewhat softer on this point.  See BECKER, supra note 22, at 159 
(“Employer discrimination should, on average, be less in competitive industries than in 
monopolistic ones.”). But see JOHN J. DONOHUE III, FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 189 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that laws barring discrimination in 
employment are efficient because such laws speed up long-term effects of competitive markets in 
reducing discrimination). 
 137 See John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts 
of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2595–97 (1994) (explaining why labor markets are less 
efficient than equity markets, with result that competition in labor markets will take longer than 
competition in equity markets to reduce discrimination). 
 138 Becker himself acknowledged as much.  See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The 
Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. OF POL. ECON. 385, 388 (1993) (noting that his  
model “depends not only on the distribution of tastes for discrimination among potential 
employers, but  critically also on the nature of firm production functions”).  
 139 DONOHUE, supra note 136, at 205. 
 140 Compare ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 32–33, 41–42 (explaining that statistical 
discrimination violates fair lending law); FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY 
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discrimination, whether based on animus or statistical models, can persist 
in segmented credit markets even if there is competition within each 
market.  Such price discrimination appears to be an important factor in a 
portion of today’s credit markets.141 
Credit rationing enables discrimination, whether based on animus or 
statistics, to persist even in competitive markets.  As Stiglitz and Weiss 
show, credit rationing can occur because of asymmetric information, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard.142  If credit rationing occurs, identical 
marginal applicants will be treated differently; some borrowers will get 
loans while others will not, and lenders will not charge differential prices to 
sort borrowers by risk.  This single-price model generally describes the 
prime credit market dominated by banks and thrifts,143 while the subprime 
market differentiates by risk.  Since lenders in credit-rationing models do 
not provide loans to all members of a class of identical loan applicants, in 
theory they could discriminate on the basis of race within this class of loan 
applicants without losing profits (absent legal liability under 
antidiscrimination laws) because it would not matter which group, within 
the group of marginal borrowers, banks chose to ration.  Moreover, tests of 
lending discrimination based on profitability would not identify lending 
discrimination because lenders who discriminated would be just as 
profitable as lenders who did not.144  Within the group of marginal 
 
FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES, at iv (1999) (same), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/fairlend.pdf, with BECKER, supra note 22, at 14 (defining discrimination 
as individual foregoing profits to satisfy irrational “taste” for discrimination); see also infra Part 
VII.A (comparing CRA to fair lending laws). 
 141 See infra note 162. 
 142 See supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, 
Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolist and Competitive Credit Markets, 28 
INT’L ECON. REV. 671, 672 (1987) (showing credit rationing when low-risk borrowers lack 
downpayments to distinguish as low-risk); Paul Calem & Michael Stutzer, The Simple Analytics 
of Observed Discrimination in Credit Markets, 4 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 189, 194–95 (1995) 
(discussing how creditors use high denial rates to separate low-risk from high-risk borrowers).  
Under an alternative theory, Ferguson and Peters show that even with symmetric information, 
credit rationing can occur when a lender’s marginal cost of making a loan to a given class of 
borrowers increases with the size of the lender’s portfolio for reasons unrelated to borrower 
creditworthiness.  Michael F. Ferguson & Stephen R. Peters, Is Lending Discrimination Always 
Costly?, 21 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 23, 24 (2000).  Such portfolio effects might arise, they 
argue, from either higher resale or management costs from risk diversification or regulatory costs.  
See MICHAEL F. FERGUSON & STEPHEN R. PETERS, A SYMMETRIC-INFORMATION MODEL OF 
CREDIT RATIONING (U. of Cincinnati, Working Paper, 1997).  Greater heterogeneity of loan 
pools, which would result from using more expansive underwriting criteria is itself a source of 
higher securitization costs, see TASK FORCE ON MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE, 
STAFF REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 30 
n.78 (2003) [hereinafter MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT], available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/disclosure.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005), and thus could 
be an example of such portfolio effects. 
 143 For discussion of the subprime market, see infra, Part III.C. 
 144 See ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 272 (noting that studies seeking to determine 
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borrowers, the rationed borrowers will not differ significantly in 
performance from the borrowers who get a loan.145 
Moreover, putting credit rationing aside, statistical discrimination 
could be profitable if race is correlated with an aspect of creditworthiness 
that is costly to observe directly.  It is rational for financial institutions to 
avoid information costs by making statistical assessments about 
creditworthiness, even if such factors are correlated with race.  Lenders 
could use such averages to ration credit, or use differential pricing.  
Competitive markets will not drive out statistical discrimination in the short 
term146 precisely because such discrimination is rational, in the absence of 
legal liability for improperly relying on such stereotypes.  Still, statistical 
discrimination will be less accurate than a direct measure of individual 
creditworthiness.  As technology and innovation drive down the costs of 
obtaining such measures, one would expect statistical discrimination to 
diminish in competitive markets over the long term, although that might be 
quite a while.147 
Turning from theory to evidence, the terrain becomes even more 
contested.  Critics are right that the evidence on discrimination in credit 
markets is hotly debated.148  Disparities in the rates at which whites and 
African Americans (among others) are denied home mortgage loans 
continue to be large.  But disparities alone do not prove discrimination; the 
 
whether creditors apply higher standards to minority applicants, as measured by lower default 
rates for minorities, cannot prove absence of both statistical- and animus-based discrimination).  
 145 Suppose, for example, at a given price of capital, that a lender chose to lend to all 
applicants with a credit score of 680 and above (since all of these loans will be sold on the 
secondary market) and to make 100 loans at scores of 620–679, and only 50 loans at scores of 
580–619. It does not matter which borrowers with the same scores are rationed within these 
second and third groups, so lenders could, in theory, ration only black borrowers, or ration only 
borrowers with certain characteristics that the lender believes are indicative of creditworthiness 
but that are highly correlated with race. 
 146 The short term and long term are not defined here.  In the context of higher education, 
Justice O’Connor suggested that affirmative action would no longer be needed in 25 years.  
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).  Alan Kreuger has pointed out that 25 years may 
not be long enough, given that the black-white wage gap is cut in half only over a generation.  
Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene: The Supreme Court Finds the ‘Mushball Middle’ on 
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003, at C2. 
 147 See Stuart I. Greenbaum, Twenty-Five Years of Banking Research, 25 FIN. MGMT., 
Summer 1996, at 86, 91 (arguing that reduced information costs should reduce discrimination). 
But see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics 
Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 791 (1995) (arguing that discrimination reduces returns to 
investing in creditworthiness for minorities which would perpetuate discrimination); Stanley D. 
Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, Self-Selection and Discrimination in Credit Markets 4, 11–17 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (describing 
equilibria in which borrowers sort themselves among discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
lenders based on their creditworthiness and discrimination persists). 
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empirical debate revolves around controls for creditworthiness and other 
factors that legitimately affect lending decisions.  The debate intensified 
with the release of the first Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data 
containing race in 1991 and the publication of a study by economists at the 
Federal Reserve Board of Boston in 1992.149  The study found that African 
Americans were nearly twice as likely as whites to be denied home 
mortgage loans after adjusting for an array of variables related to risk.150  
The study has come under a barrage of attacks,151 but rebuttals have 
affirmed its central findings.152  On balance, the evidence suggests that 
disparities between African American and white borrowers persist even 
after taking into account a wide variety of factors that legitimately could 
influence a creditor’s underwriting practices.153  These significant 
disparities suggest that minorities are subject to either disparate treatment 
discrimination, or disparate impact discrimination based on facially neutral, 
but unnecessary, market practices.154  Matched-pair testing also has found 
differential treatment by creditors similar to that found in the home sales 
market.155  In sum, recent analysis suggests that “extensive underwriting 
discrimination existed in 1990, and there is no more recent evidence to 
show that this discrimination has gone away.”156  Skeptics are correct, 
however, in viewing this evidence as subject to challenge, and further 
research remains warranted in understanding the role of discrimination. 
Studies of redlining on the basis of neighborhood composition also 
face greater empirical challenges and provide inconclusive results.  Two 
studies have found that largely African American census tracts received 
 
 149 See Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996) (final publication with additional controls and responses to critics of 
initial publication, ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING 
THE HMDA DATA (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working Paper 92–97, 1992)). 
 150 Id. at 26 (finding that probability of loan denial is 1.8 times higher for blacks and Hispanics 
than for whites). 
 151 See, e.g., ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 107–69 (analyzing these studies). 
 152 See, e.g., id. at 163–65 (analyzing these studies and concluding that although “a limitation 
in the Boston Fed Study [relating to variability in lender underwriting standards] could potentially 
lead to a serious overstatement of discrimination[,] . . . the Boston Fed Study provides strong, but 
not irrefutable, evidence that in 1990 lenders in Boston engaged in either disparate-treatment 
discrimination or disparate-impact discrimination, or both”). 
 153 Id.; see also McKinley Blackburn & Todd Vermilyea, A Comparison of Unexplained 
Racial Disparities in Bank Level and Market Level Models of Mortgage Lending (Jan. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (finding evidence of 
discrimination when combining data across banks). 
 154 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 211. 
 155 See, e.g., Robin Smith & Michelle DeLair, New Evidence From Lender Testing: 
Discrimination at the Pre-Application Stage, in  MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A 
REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE 23–24 (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999) 
(concluding, based on paired testing, that “race-based differential treatment is occuring in some 
cities”), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/mortgage_lending.pdf. 
 156 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 367. 
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fewer loans than other tracts, after controlling for tract characteristics, 
while one study suggests that there may be redlining on the basis of 
income.157  The redlining studies generally provide only weak empirical 
support for the theoretical propositions regarding discrimination. 
In addition to discrimination in loan denials, price discrimination also 
can occur because of market fragmentation.158  In fragmented or incomplete 
markets, markets do not clear at a single equilibrium price.159  Prime 
lenders generally offer a single price to borrowers who meet their criteria 
for a given type of loan and property and ration credit among the others.  
Subprime lenders, in contrast, offer differential pricing of loans on the basis 
of risk and other factors.  Although the growth of risk-based pricing in the 
subprime market has broadened the eligible pool of borrowers,160 
differentiated pricing also may result in racial discrimination.  Using credit 
scores, creditors can determine the price at which they would be willing to 
lend to a particular borrower, but the subprime market’s fragmented nature 
prevents all potential borrowers from learning about lenders’ pricing 
schemes.  This permits lenders to distinguish among similar borrowers in 
pricing loans.  Creditors price loans based on risk, but also on factors other 
than risk, including a borrower’s willingness to pay.  Differential pricing 
can facilitate market clearing by permitting a wider range of creditors and 
borrowers to reach agreement on a loan contract tailored to their mutual 
needs, but in practice, these pricing techniques lead to systematically 
different prices for minorities than for whites. 
Despite the fact that price discrimination is illegal under ECOA,161 
 
 157 See id. at 229–30 (citing Stephen L. Ross & Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Redlining, the 
Community Reinvestment Act, and Private Mortgage Insurance (1998) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with New York University Law Review)) (finding evidence that lenders practice redlining 
against low-income census tracts); id. at 232 (citing study that shows largely black tracts receive 
significantly smaller supply of mortgages than other tracts, controlling for other characteristics); 
see also Consent Decree, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Savings Bank, No. 94-1824 (JG) 
(D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994), reprinted in NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION 
401 (2d. ed. 1998) (settlement resulting from allegations of redlining in mortgage financing in 
African American neighborhoods). Income redlining does not violate ECOA, although it would 
affect an institution’s performance under CRA.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(e)(3) (bank’s 
assessment area may “not arbitrarily exclude low- or moderate-income geographies”). 
 158 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE 
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 31 (2001) (finding evidence of price discrimination in retail car 
sales, where vehicles do not have fixed sales price). 
 159 See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 115, at 147 (arguing that in imperfect markets, contracts 
do not trade as “homogeneous commodity at a single market-clearing price”). 
 160 See infra Part III.C (discussing growth of subprime market). 
 161 See, e.g., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 157, at 229 & n.78 (citing Consent 
Agreement, United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-CV-6(b)(n) (S.D. Miss. Jan. 
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price discrimination occurs in a range of credit markets.162  Because 
comprehensive loan pricing data are not available for home mortgages,163 
researchers have focused on case studies regarding “overages,” the amount 
by which negotiated loan rates exceed the lender’s minimum rates set forth 
on “rate sheets” for loan officers.164  Some studies have found that 
mortgages obtained by African Americans more often contain overages, 
and higher ones, than mortgages obtained by others.165  African Americans 
also fare worse than whites in negotiations with mortgage brokers and loan 
officers.166 
Another potential source of racial discrimination is automated 
underwriting systems, now widely used by creditors to determine 
 
 162 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Expert Report, Cason v. Nissan (No. 3-98-0223) (M.D. Tenn. May 25, 
2001) at 1, available in NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 2002 & 
Supp. 2004) (CD-ROM) (finding evidence of disparate racial impact in car financing practices); 
AYRES, supra note 158, at 20–21; ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 12 (“[S]everal studies 
suggest that . . . discrimination in the setting of mortgage rates appears to occur in some 
circumstances.”); Richard W. Lang, The Conference on Business Access to Capital and Credit, in 
FED. RESERVE SYS. RESEARCH CONFERENCE, SUMMARY: BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND 
CREDIT 7 (1999) (reporting that “all three papers found that African American-owned small 
businesses were less likely than White-owned businesses to receive loans, despite holding 
constant many factors likely to help account for differences in creditworthiness”), at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/business_access_capital_summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 
30, 2005); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a 
New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 304 (1995) (finding “large and statistically significant 
differences in prices quoted to test buyers of different races and genders”). 
 163 The Federal Reserve Board now requires certain price data for high cost loans to be 
reported.  Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final & Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 7221, 7222 (Feb. 15, 
2002) (to be codifed at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203).  This data will be available for the first time in summer 
2005. 
 164 On the problem of the differential effects based on race of yield spread premiums, which 
compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates than they qualify for, see 
generally Howell E. Jackson & Jeremy Berry, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield 
Spread Premiums (2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with New York University Law Review) 
(discussing payment of yield spread premiums in residential mortgage originations). 
 165 See id. at 9 (finding that blacks and Hispanics more often paid overages and paid higher 
overages than whites); ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 225–26 (citing studies that find blacks 
pay about two-point overage, as compared to whites’ one point, and that blacks and Hispanics are 
more likely to be charged overages than whites).  But see id. at 225–26 (citing study that reports 
more frequent overages for blacks and Hispanics, but that overages for blacks and Hispanics are 
slightly, but significantly, lower than for whites when paid). 
 166 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 222–27 (surveying three recent findings of 
discrimination in loan terms); see also Harold A. Black et al., Is There Discrimination in 
Mortgage Pricing? The Case of Overages, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1139, 1159 (2003) (finding that 
“minorities are significantly more likely to pay an overage than similarly situated whites, and 
when they do, they tend to pay higher overages”); Blackburn & Vermilyea, supra note 153, at 3 
(finding evidence of racial discrimination using “regulatory model”). Possible explanations for 
worse negotiating outcomes include borrower anxiety based on experience with past 
discrimination, greater risk aversion with respect to loan denials, higher levels of information 
asymmetry in which the borrower underestimates her own creditworthiness or profitability to the 
lender, or discrimination by the loan officer or broker in negotiating the loan price. 
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creditworthiness.  Automated underwriting systems can help to reduce 
discrimination to the extent that they are based on objective factors that 
best measure creditworthiness, and limit loan officer or broker discretion to 
base their decisions on the race of the borrower.  Yet they can have a 
disparate impact on minorities if the factors used are correlated with race,167 
and can allow disparate treatment if brokers treat borderline cases 
differently.  As to the former, for example, lenders might place too much 
weight on the household’s assets, and not enough weight on the loan-to-
value ratios,168 in a manner that disproportionately affects minority 
households, who hold less wealth than whites at every income level.  Asset 
holdings are predictive of creditworthiness, but so too are loan-to-value 
ratios.  Depending on the weight placed on these factors, a creditor might 
get equal predictive value from relying more on loan-to-value ratios, but 
with less of an adverse effect on minorities.  As to the latter problem of 
disparate treatment, for example, brokers and loan officers have been found 
to help white borderline applicants more readily or extensively than black 
borderline applicants.169 
Other factors may reinforce credit market discrimination.  Firms adopt 
reward structures for loan officers that favor larger loans, which are easier 
to make in high-income areas that typically have higher concentrations of 
white borrowers.  In addition, loan officers or brokers may discriminate, 
but their practices might go undetected by creditors because of agency 
problems.170  Furthermore, banks may underinvest (from a social 
perspective) in branches or in training loan officers in how to make loans in 
underserved, minority neighborhoods.  Moreover, credit discrimination 
might lead minorities to underinvest in creditworthiness, diminishing their 
prospects for a loan and further entrenching racial disparities.171 
Additionally, credit markets are affected by discrimination that may 
occur elsewhere in society.  Discrimination in the housing market172 or the 
 
 167 See ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 277–91. 
 168 For a general discussion of the problem of weighting of factors, see ROSS & YINGER, supra 
note 110, at 277–87. 
 169 See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore, Introduction, Summary, and 
Recommendations, in MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
EVIDENCE 8 (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999) (citing evidence that 
“whites were more likely to be ‘coached’ on how best to handle potentially problematic aspects of 
their credit profile”). 
 170 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 8–15 (1991) (discussing agency costs). 
 171 See Swire, supra note 147, at 791 (arguing that discrimination reduces returns to investing 
in creditworthiness for minorities). 
 172 For the history of discrimination in government housing policy and in real estate markets, 
see generally MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING 
MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 HDS 2000 i–viii (2002) (describing history of 
paired testing “as a tool for fair housing enforcement, detecting and documenting individual 
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labor market173 are transmitted to credit markets in the sense that minority 
individuals are lower-income and have lower wealth than they would 
absent discrimination.  The long history of private and publicly sanctioned 
discrimination in the United States has contributed to lower incomes and 
lower wealth for African Americans and other minorities.  Minority 
households thus are more likely to live in low-income neighborhoods, have 
low levels of assets, own homes with lower collateral values, and 
demonstrate overall less creditworthiness.  Lastly, fears of racial integration 
in housing could have depressed housing prices, leading to lower sales, 
fewer loans, and thus higher interest rates in minority neighborhoods. 
Segregation and wealth disparities are, in part, legacies of 
discrimination.  Black households are significantly more likely to live in 
low-income neighborhoods, and neighborhoods are highly segregated by 
race.174  Black families are more than twice as likely as their white 
counterparts to have low incomes:  37.4% of black families earned under 
$25,000 in 2002, while 18.5% of white families earned under that 
amount.175  Black families are nearly three times as likely to have incomes 
below the poverty level as white families:  20.7% of black families had 
incomes below the poverty level in 2002 while only 7.4% of white families 
did.176  Median income for black families was 62% that of white families.177 
The median black household holds about six to seven times less 
wealth than the median white household:  $19,000 for black households 
compared with $120,900 for white households.178  “The net worth of black 
and Hispanic college graduates is similar to the net worth of white high 
school graduates, and the net worth of black and Hispanic high school 
graduates is similar to the net worth of white high school dropouts.”179  For 
 
instances of discrimination”), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf; 
Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing Administration in the 
New Millennium, 11 J. HOUSING RES. 357, 357–61 (2000); ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 
1–10. 
 173 For discussion of causes and effects of labor market discrimination, see generally 
DONOHUE, supra note 136. 
 174 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 1–2 (1993) (describing extent of racial 
segregation by neighborhood); TURNER ET AL., supra note 172, at iii–v (describing discrimination 
in housing sales and rental markets). 
 175 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2003, at 43, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html.  
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the 1998 
and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 7–8 (2003). For further 
discussion of the income gap between black and white households, see generally DALTON 
CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED (1999); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, 
BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995). 
 179 JOHN KARL SCHOLZ & KARA LEVINE, U.S. BLACK-WHITE WEALTH INEQUALITY: A 
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most households, their home is a critical asset.180  Yet despite gains in the 
1990s, the homeownership rate for non-white or Hispanic families is only 
47% compared to 73% for white families.181  Lower wealth (or put another 
way, asset poverty) can contribute to other social disadvantages, including 
less access to credit, less ability to accumulate other assets (both financial 
and homeownership), lower standards of living in worse neighborhoods, 
lower levels of opportunity for children, and worse educational, labor force, 
marital and health outcomes.182 
While critics are correct that antidiscrimination legislation is a more 
direct method of addressing discrimination in credit markets and other 
contexts, evidence suggests that antidiscrimination laws have not 
completely eradicated discrimination from our society.183  CRA can play an 
important role in overcoming credit market, non–credit market 
discrimination, and the legacy of such discrimination.184  Any serious 
attempt to address our long history of racial discrimination and its legacy 
needs to take account of racial segregation and the vast wealth gap in the 
United States.  CRA is by no means the only or primary way to do so.  But 
CRA is well-positioned to contribute to reducing discrimination and its 
effects by engaging federally insured depository institutions in helping to 
overcome the market failures that I described in Section A.   
CRA encourages banks and thrifts to learn about low- and moderate-
income communities in which minority households are disproportionately 
represented.  To the extent that statistical and animus-based discrimination 
are rooted in lack of familiarity with minority communities, CRA can help 
foster greater understanding.  To the extent that CRA succeeds in 
 
SURVEY 4 (2003), at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~scholz/Research/Wealth_survey_v5.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2005). 
 180 See Aizcorbe, supra note 178, at 9 tbl.4, 16 & tbl.7 (showing that in 2001, primary 
residences made up 46.8% of families’ nonfinancial assets, that nonfinancial assets made up 58% 
of total assets, and that this was the largest single asset category). 
 181 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, at 
457 (2001 statistics), http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html. 
 182 See CONLEY, supra note 178, at 1–7 (discussing social impact of wealth gap between 
blacks and whites); ROBERT HAVEMAN & BARBARA WOLFE, SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS: ON 
THE EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 3 (1994) (summarizing effects of poverty on 
children); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: 
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 79–94 (1994) (discussing how lower income associated with single 
parenthood impacts children’s achievement); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 178, at 1–15 
(same). 
 183 See, e.g., DONOHUE, supra note 136, at 297 (“The passage of antidiscrimination legislation 
and the growing social disapproval of overtly discriminatory behavior have eliminated such 
proclamations far more thoroughly than they have eliminated discriminatory conduct on the part 
of employers.”). 
 184 In this Part, I discuss the reasons for the importance of CRA in overcoming discrimination.  
In Part IV, I discuss the empirical evidence that CRA has helped to do so.  In Part VII, I explain 
why CRA has important advantages over existing antidiscrimination laws in some contexts. 
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overcoming market failures, CRA can also help to reduce discrimination by 
harnessing competitive forces, increasing homeownership rates, improving 
credit opportunities in low-income neighborhoods and for low-income 
borrowers, and helping to connect low-income households to mainstream 
credit markets.  Overcoming market failures in credit markets will inure to 
the benefit of all low-income borrowers and communities.  Given the high 
correlation between being black and having a low income, living in a low-
income neighborhood, and having little wealth, overcoming these market 
failures will help minority households gain access to new economic 
opportunities and diminish the space for discrimination. 
In addition to addressing discrimination by helping to overcome 
market failures that affect minority households, CRA helps to reinforce 
ECOA’s antidiscrimination norms directly.  Under the 1995 regulations, 
“[e]vidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices adversely 
affects” the bank’s CRA performance rating,185  including evidence 
regarding violations of ECOA and the Fair Housing Act.186  The basic 
principle is that engaging in such illegal credit practices would be 
“inconsistent with helping to meet community credit needs.”187  To the 
extent that CRA is underenforced in non-CRA supervisory contexts, or to 
the extent that the difficulty of proving an ECOA case, or ECOA’s 
penalties once discrimination is proved, under-deter discriminatory 
practices, this provision of CRA would help to reinforce ECOA.188 
C. Problems in the Subprime Sector 
The expansion of lending by subprime specialists to a broader range of 
borrowers is generally a positive development, reflecting in part a reduction 
in informational barriers in low-income communities as well as advances in 
financial innovation.  In many ways, however, problems in the subprime 
sector illustrate the overlapping and mutually reinforcing problems of 
market failure and racial discrimination.  Thus, while the subprime sector 
exhibits its own pathologies warranting separate treatment in this section, 
analysis of this sector can help to reveal the ways in which market failures 
exacerbate discrimination, and how overcoming such failures can reduce 
discrimination and improve the efficiency of the home mortgage market as 
a whole.  As I explain in Part IV, banks and thrifts have increased their 
lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers in ways that suggest that 
CRA is working.  But subprime lending—a sector largely outside CRA’s 
 
 185 12 C.F.R. § 25.28(c) (2004). 
 186 Community Reinvestment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community 
Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,640 (July 12, 2001).  
 187 Id. 
 188 For further analysis of ECOA, see infra Part VII. 
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purview because such lending has been undertaken largely by financial 
services companies other than banks and thrifts189—has grown dramatically 
at the same time.190  Subprime lenders specialize in making loans to 
borrowers with impaired or limited credit history.  Most subprime loans are 
refinance loans.191  Although refinancing may be used to obtain better rates, 
subprime refinance loans usually are used for home improvement or 
consumer purchases, to pay for education expenses, or to consolidate other 
consumer debt.192  With new and lower-cost sources of funding available 
from the secondary market through securitization, and with advances in 
information and risk management, subprime lending has grown sevenfold 
from a relatively small base in 1994 to reach $241 billion, or 9% of the 
market, by 2002.193  In 2002, there were just over 200 subprime and 
manufactured home lenders.194 
The subprime market is plagued by serious problems that are a blend 
of the market failures and racial discrimination discussed in the previous 
two Sections.  Some subprime borrowers who could have qualified for 
loans from prime lenders end up in the subprime market, paying higher 
rates:  Preliminary research suggests that between 10% and 35% of 
subprime borrowers could qualify for prime mortgage loans.195  Some 
minority borrowers may have been improperly “steered” to higher cost 
lenders by brokers or real estate professionals.196  Even after accounting for 
 
 189 As I explain below, affiliate loans can be counted at the bank’s option and although such 
affiliate loans are not usually included, if they are included, and if the affiliate is a subprime 
lender, such subprime affiliate loans could be included in a bank’s CRA performance rating.  In 
the late 1990s, a number of banks and bank holding companies purchased affiliates that, among 
other things, make subprime loans.  Moreover, some loan pools purchased by banks and thrifts 
could include subprime loans, and subprime loans currently are not distinguished from other 
types of loans in HMDA data. 
 190 For evidence that CRA nonetheless can be demonstrated to have been an important factor 
in driving increased lending in low-income areas, see infra Part IV.A. 
 191 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY 
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 31 (2000) [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT] 
(co-directed by the author), available at http://www.hud.gov.80/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf. 
 192 See id. at 30–31. 
 193 Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Texas Association of Bank Counsel 27th 
Annual Convention (Oct. 9, 2003), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031009/default.htm (last visited Mar. 
30, 2005).  
 194 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD SUBPRIME AND MANUFACTURED HOME 
LENDER LIST, at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).  
Manufactured home is the term for a home that is factory-built and usually sold at retail outlets.  
Manufactured homes include what are commonly referred to as “mobile homes,” as well as 
factory-built homes that resemble traditional site-built ones. 
 195 FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER 
AND FAIRER FOR AMERICA’S FAMILIES Chap. 5 (Sept. 1996), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/mosehome.htm. 
 196 It is difficult to find direct evidence of credit steering, as opposed to evidence of steering 
by real estate professionals regarding home location.  Minorities disproportionately use subprime 
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neighborhood and borrower characteristics that influence lending decisions, 
there is “a strong geographic concentration of subprime lending in those 
neighborhoods where there is a large population of African American 
homeowners” and “African-American borrowers, regardless of the 
neighborhood where they are located, have relatively high likelihood of 
obtaining a subprime compared to a prime loan.”197  Moreover, studies have 
documented abusive practices in the subprime sector.198  These practices 
have included “flipping,” repeatedly refinancing a loan in a short period of 
time.  Flipping subjects a borrower to high fees, including prepayment 
penalties, which diminish the borrower’s home equity without providing 
significant benefit.  Loans have been “packed” with additional products 
(such as credit life insurance) without the borrower understanding that the 
products were optional or unsuitable.199  Loans have included fees unrelated 
to risk or servicing, and which are structured to disguise the loans’ true 
costs.200  Some brokers have made home mortgage loans without regard to 
the borrower’s ability to repay.201  These so-called “asset based” loans often 
were made by brokers who earned high fees and were less concerned about 
their reputations among lenders.202  In other cases borrowers have testified 
that “unscrupulous mortgage brokers, lenders, home improvement 
contractors, appraisers, and combinations thereof” engaged in “outright 
fraud” as well as “deceptive or high-pressure sales tactics,” and often 
“prey[ed] on . . . the elderly, minorities, and individuals with lower 
incomes and less education.”203 
While credit risk is a key determinant of whether a borrower receives 
a prime or subprime loan, a recent study suggests that “credit risk alone 
may not fully explain why borrowers end up in the subprime market.”204  
For example, borrowers who are older, Hispanic, or search less for interest 
 
lenders, but in addition to steering, minorities may misperceive their own creditworthiness, 
believe that prime lenders would deny their loans, or make bad choices.  Moreover, subprime 
lenders market heavily in these communities, and prime lenders may not market sufficiently in 
minority communities for them to be perceived as real options by community members. 
 197 Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 407 (2004). 
 198 For a full discussion of such practices, see generally HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 
191 (detailing predatory lending abuses and evaluating reform proposals).  I co-directed this 
report while at Treasury.  See also Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st 
Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447, 455–62 (2002) (describing problems in and opportunities 
for reform of subprime mortgage market). 
 199 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191, at 2. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 76–77. 
 203 Id. at 2. 
 204 Marsha J. Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 
J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 373 (2004). 
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rates are more likely to end up in the subprime market.205  Having a 
subprime loan is an important determinant of refinancing with a subprime 
loan even after controlling for relevant factors related to risk and 
creditworthiness:  Some 60% of subprime borrowers who refinanced did so 
with subprime loans rather than prime ones,206 indicating that many 
subprime borrowers get stuck in the subprime market. 
The higher price that borrowers pay is a function not only of using a 
subprime lender, but also of negotiating with mortgage brokers, who 
dominate the subprime market.  Brokers are compensated for getting 
borrowers to pay higher rates than those for which the borrower would 
qualify.  Such “yield spread premiums” are used widely.207  In loans with 
yield spread premiums, unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in 
prices paid to mortgage brokers.  Within the group of borrowers paying 
yield spread premiums, African Americans paid $474 more for their loans, 
and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority and 
white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in practice minority 
borrowers are likely to pay much more.208  Minority borrowers and white 
borrowers tend to go to different lenders, with minority borrowers more 
likely to use subprime lenders, “some [of which] use particularly 
aggressive rate-setting rules with minority customers.”209  Moreover, 
borrowers in the subprime market form a pool whose risk characteristics 
are worse and more widely dispersed than borrowers in the prime 
market.210  Even though there is rough risk-based pricing in the subprime 
market, defaulting borrowers create an externality that raises interest rates 
on all subprime borrowers because creditors price loans based on pooling 
risk by observable characteristics.  Regulation of the subprime sector is in 
part a response to the problem of incomplete contracts.211  Borrowers 
 
 205 Id. at 371–72. 
 206 Id. at 375, tbl.1. 
 207 See Jackson & Berry, supra note 164, at 127.  While in principle yield spread premiums 
could permit lenders legitimately to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to a cash strapped 
borrower in the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form of a cash payment, the 
evidence suggests that yield spread premiums are in fact used to compensate brokers for getting 
borrowers to accept higher interest rates. 
 208 Id. at 125 (describing differences in “total mortgage broker compensation,” which includes 
both yield spread premiums and their functional equivalents, broker “discount fees”); see also 
JACK GUTTENTAG, ANOTHER VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 8 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 01-23-B, 2000) (“According to the brokers, [a] major determinant of profit 
per loan is the sophistication of the borrower relative to the sales skills of the loan officer.”), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/01/0123.pdf. 
 209 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 344. 
 210 Anthony Pennington-Cross, Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime 
Mortgages, 27 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 279, 299 (2003). 
 211 On the problem of incomplete contracts, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88–89 (1989) 
(distinguishing between paternalism and externalities as bases for immutable rules to fill gaps in 
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cannot contract with one another to allocate the costs of the negative 
externality of default.  Moreover, these externalities are more likely to be 
concentrated in low-income communities.  Concentrated defaults make it 
less likely that creditors will be willing to lend to households living in 
neighborhoods with high default rates, both because the defaults will have 
undermined the stability of property values in the neighborhood, and 
because living in a neighborhood with high defaults will signal lower 
creditworthiness.  Moreover, foreclosures concentrated in low-income 
neighborhoods cause negative externalities to neighboring property owners 
in terms of lower property values, reduced levels of investment in 
maintenance, and an increase in vandalism and crime on abandoned 
properties.212 
Some critics believe that the subprime market’s growth obviates the 
need for CRA.  After all, if subprime lending has increased without 
impetus from CRA, why not simply rely on subprime lenders in low-
income communities?  Critics like Gunther argue that market forces have 
solved the alleged market failures that I described.  I think the empirical 
evidence is more complicated than that, as I discuss more fully in the next 
Part.  Lending by subprime specialists does not replace lending by banks 
and thrifts.  First, subprime creditors specialize in refinance loans rather 
than in home purchase originations.213  Because they specialize in refinance 
loans, subprime lenders free-ride on the information generated by firms 
engaged in home purchase lending, predominately banks and thrifts 
covered by CRA.  Second, many subprime lenders have failed to report 
credit scores for sound borrowers in order to capture the informational 
benefits from their investment.214  As a result, the positive externalities 
from increased lending in low-income areas are not always realized.  Third, 
borrowing from a subprime lender may signal to prime lenders that a 
borrower is more likely to be a bad credit risk.  While in one study, 40% of 
subprime borrowers were able to obtain prime refinance mortgages, 60% 
were not.215  For these borrowers, rather than increasing access to prime 
lending, subprime borrowing helped to keep them in the subprime market, 
where borrowers pay more for credit.  As this study found, “previous 
mortgage segment is an important determinant of current market segment 
even after controlling for risk-related underwriting and demographic 
 
incomplete contracts); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 115 (1999) (explaining theory of incomplete contracts based on inability of parties 
to contract at reasonable cost for all contingent states). 
 212 See, e.g., Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 369. 
 213 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191, at 31. 
 214 See supra note 117. 
 215 Courchane et al., supra note 204, at 374. 
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effects.”216  Thus, the growth of subprime lending does not obviate the need 
for prime lending to creditworthy borrowers in low-income communities.  
Lastly, the empirical evidence I explore in Part IV is more consistent with 
the view that CRA has had an independent role in expanding access to 
credit in low-income communities than with the view of CRA’s critics. 
CRA has not yet done enough to integrate the prime and subprime 
markets, as evidenced by these problems.217  CRA is uniquely positioned to 
overcome the bifurcation between the prime and subprime markets by 
enhancing competition from banks and thrifts.  Overcoming that 
bifurcation would improve market efficiency, reduce racial discrimination, 
and speed the process of correcting other market failures.  An integrated 
market would reduce the scope for price discrimination among similarly 
situated borrowers.  As I explain in Part VII, CRA can help bolster ECOA 
in reducing some forms of discrimination, especially those involving 
disparate impact that results from bifurcated markets in which minority and 
white borrowers tend to go to different lenders, and market fragmentation, 
which increases the opportunity for differential pricing that disadvantages 
minorities.  CRA can also help reinforce the Home Owners Equity 
Protection Act (HOEPA), as I explain in Part VII, to overcome problems in 
the subprime market by helping to enhance competition from banks and 
thrifts in serving these households. 
D. Summary 
Market failures in low-income communities, racial discrimination, and 
bifurcated credit markets warrant governmental action.  I have argued that, 
in principle, CRA is a reasonable policy response to these problems.  CRA 
helps to overcome information externalities and collective action problems 
by helping to coordinate bank lending.  CRA responds to the continuing 
effects of racial discrimination by encouraging banks and thrifts to lend in 
 
 216 Id. at 375. 
 217 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., In re Citigroup Inc. & Citifinancial Credit 
Co., Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued Upon 
Consent, May 27, 2004 (alleging subprime affiliate engaging in asset-based lending in violation 
of HOEPA, requiring co-signators to sell more credit insurance in violation of Regulation B, 
misleading examiners, and assessing civil money penalties of $70 million and securing agreement 
to pay restitution to borrowers), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2004/20040527/attachment.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2005).  But see OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, N.A. 7, 11–12 (June 9, 2003) 
[hereinafter CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK] (rating Citibank outstanding after 
evaluating performance of bank and its mortgage affiliates, including Citifinancial, and noting 
that fair lending concerns at another affiliate “did not significantly impact our CRA assessment of 
Citibank” because affiliate did not constitute significant percentage of institution’s low- and 
moderate-income mortgage lending), at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/craeval/may04/1461.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005).  
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low-income areas and to low-income borrowers, where and among whom 
minorities are disproportionately represented.  With modest regulatory 
changes, CRA could offer an even stronger response to the market failures 
and discrimination that have arisen in the subprime market.  In the next 
Part, I use recent empirical evidence to explain how CRA already is 
helping to overcome many of these barriers, even though problems remain. 
IV 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT CRA IS EFFECTIVE 
Part III identified specific market failures and discrimination that are 
the theoretical foundations for CRA and explained how CRA could help to 
overcome such problems.  The debate over CRA, however, cannot be 
decided based on abstractions or anecdotes.  This Part explores recent 
empirical evidence showing that CRA, on balance, constitutes a defensible 
policy response to market failures and discrimination.  The first Section 
relies on empirical evidence, some of which was published in a study that I 
directed at the Treasury Department, to demonstrate that CRA has a 
positive impact on access to credit, despite the empirical difficulty of 
isolating CRA as a cause of recent positive developments in credit 
markets.218  This evidence effectively rebuts the arguments of critics that 
CRA provides little benefit, or is actually harmful, to low-income 
communities, and is consistent with a theory that CRA is helping to 
overcome market failures and discrimination. 
Section B analyzes the critics’ claims that CRA is overly costly, and 
explains how the costs of CRA generally are overstated.  In particular, the 
claim that CRA induces banks and thrifts to make dangerously unprofitable 
loans is not substantiated by the data.  Instead, the data is again more 
consistent with a theory that CRA is helping to improve market efficiency 
by overcoming market failures and discrimination.  Similarly, I present 
evidence to rebut claims of rampant rent seeking, high compliance costs, 
heavy burdens on efficient mergers, and other costs predicted by CRA’s 
critics.  Even a rough sense of the costs and benefits of CRA adduced thus 
far suggests that it is on net socially beneficial, and reasonable legal 
response to market failures and the legacy of discrimination. 
A. The Benefits of CRA Are Substantial 
The experience under CRA over the last decade suggests that CRA 
has been effective in helping to overcome market failures in low-income 
 
 218 It should be re-emphasized in this Part, as in the discussion of market imperfections, that 
empirical studies in an area as complicated as credit markets cannot prove any contention with 
certainty.  Technological and economic change exacerbates this difficulty, as do the multiplicity 
of regulations and the pervasiveness of subsidies. 
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communities.  In this Section, I first describe innovative initiatives that 
CRA has spurred by banking organizations in order to serve low- and 
moderate-income communities.  I then evaluate recent empirical evidence 
that attempts to measure the effects of CRA on home mortgage lending, 
which constitutes the bulk of CRA-eligible lending and as to which data is 
most readily available.  I also discuss evidence regarding small business 
and community development lending as well as community development 
investments. 
Initiatives by financial institutions over the last decade suggest that 
CRA—in combination with other factors that I assess more fully below—is 
helping banks and thrifts to eliminate or reduce barriers to credit.  These 
activities are consistent with the view that CRA is encouraging banks and 
thrifts to undertake steps to overcome market failures in order to meet the 
“credit needs of their entire community.”219  For example, lenders have 
formed multi-bank Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and 
loan consortia, and partnered with third parties to reduce risk, overcome 
collective action problems, and share the costs and benefits of developing 
information about low-income markets.220  Banks have invested in locally 
based Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) to develop 
specialized market knowledge, share risk, and explore new market 
opportunities.221  They have engaged in special marketing programs to 
targeted communities, and have experimented with more flexible 
underwriting and specialized servicing techniques to determine if a broader 
range of applications could be approved without undue risk.222  Banks also 
have funded credit counseling to improve the creditworthiness of potential 
 
 219 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2000). 
 220 See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PERFORMANCE AND 
PROFITABILITY OF CRA-RELATED LENDING, 86–87 (2000) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND 
PROFITABILITY] (noting that banks limit “potential exposure to losses by sharing risks with third 
parties, including local or state public authorities or private revolving loan funds”), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/craloansurvey/cratext.pdf; infra note 222 and 
accompanying text.  Third parties are involved in three quarters of CRA special lending 
programs.  Id.  Third parties include financial consortia, nonprofit organizations, and public 
entities at all levels of government.  Id. at tbl.12, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/crloansurvey/cratables.pdf; see also Robert B. 
Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, FED. RES. BULL. 711 (2000) (reporting on results 
of survey); How an Innovative Bank Launched a CDC, COMMUNITY DEV. OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY (Winter 2004–05) (describing successful housing project funded 
through national bank CDC that provided revenues sufficient to cover CDC loan costs), at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/ezine/winter04/how_a_inn.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 221 See, e.g., COMMUNITY DEV. NEWSL. 2002 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Washington, D.C.) (describing variety of strategies for bank partnerships with CDFIs), available 
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/E-zineText.pdf  (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 222 See, e.g., PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, 86, tbl.13 (describing 
characteristics of “affordable mortgage lending programs”). 
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borrowers.223  Many larger institutions have developed specialized units 
within their organizations that focus on the needs of low- and moderate-
income communities.224  These units help overcome agency costs by 
keeping the organization focused on expanding its low-income and 
minority lending, and by sharing expertise as to how to do so.  A positive 
lending cycle has begun in many communities:  Once lenders know that 
others will be making loans to a community, they face less liquidity risk, 
gather and disseminate information more quickly, and produce positive 
information externalities.  Experience suggests that increased lending to 
low-income communities has occurred, and that such lending has not led to 
the kind or the extent of unprofitable, excessively risky activity predicted 
by critics.225 
Home mortgage data show increased lending to minority and low-
income borrowers.226  From 1993 to 1999, the number of home purchase 
loans made to Hispanics increased 121.4%; to Native Americans, 118.9%; 
to African Americans, 91.0%; to Asians, 70.1%; and to whites, 33.5%.227  
Over that period, the number of home purchase loans extended to 
applicants with incomes less than 80% of the median increased 86.2%, a 
much higher rate of growth than any other income group experienced.228  In 
1999, conventional home purchase loans extended in neighborhoods that 
are predominantly minority were up 17% over the previous year, compared 
with 6% growth in other neighborhoods.229 
Consistent with the theoretical analysis presented earlier, empirical 
evidence suggests that markets were relatively thin, and thus prone to 
relatively higher information externalities, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
 
 223 Id. at 86–87. 
 224 See, e.g., id. at 65 (“About 63 percent of the [CRA special lending] programs are operated 
by a distinct unit or department.”). 
 225 See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing results of study in greater detail). 
 226 See, e.g., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL 
SERVICES SYSTEM 3 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT], available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/cra02-1.pdf.  
 227 Author’s calculations based on HMDA data as reported by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council.  See HMDA data, tbl. 7, at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/hmda03.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).  As Peter Swire was kind 
enough to point out to me, critics might contend that this overstates progress in lending to 
minority households because Hispanic household growth was much higher than white household 
growth.  Over this time period, the number of white households grew by 6.2%, black households 
by 12.4%, and Hispanic households by 36.7%.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1970 TO PRESENT, tbl. HH-2 (2004), 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabHH-2.pdf.  Adjusting for growth in the 
number of households, however, still shows progress for minorities.  The growth in loans to 
whites was 3.58 times its household growth rate; for Hispanics, 3.31 times; for blacks 7.34 times. 
 228 See supra note 227.  
 229 Author’s calculation based on HMDA data, supra note 227, at tbl.5. 
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and that market thickness improved during the decade.230  One measure of 
market thickness for home purchase loans is the volume of potential 
transactions as measured by the level of home ownership in low- and 
moderate-income communities as compared with high-income 
communities.  In 1990, there were 19.6 million homeowners in low- and 
moderate-income communities, 49.6% the number of homeowners in high-
income areas.231  By 2000, the ratio had improved, so that the 24.8 million 
homeowners in low- and moderate-income communities were 55% of the 
number in high-income areas.232   The number of homeowners in low- and 
moderate-income communities grew by 26.6% over the decade, while the 
number of homeowners in high-income areas grew by only 14%.233  
Another measure of market thickness is liquidity in home sales, as 
measured by the turnover rate—the percentage of homeowners who move 
in a given time.  In the five years preceding 1990, 28.7% of homeowners in 
low- and moderate-income areas moved, as compared with 36.8% in high-
income census tracts, a difference of 8 percentage points.234   By 2000, the 
percentage of homeowners who had moved in the prior five years was 
32.3% for homeowners in low- and moderate-income tracts and 36.9% for 
high-income tracts, a difference that had diminished to 4.5 percentage 
points.235   A third way of thinking about market thickness is to look at the 
number of low- and moderate-income area homeowners who moved, 
generating a home sale, compared to the number of high income 
homeowners who moved.  In the five years preceding 1990, about 5.6 
million homeowners living in low- and moderate-income tracts had moved, 
about 38% of the number of homeowners who had moved in high-income 
areas.236   By 2000, the gap had narrowed:  The number of homeowners 
who had moved in the prior five years in low- and moderate-income areas 
increased to 8 million, about 48% of the comparable figure for 
homeowners in high-income areas.237  The basic trend lines are the same 
for low- and moderate-income census tracts in which at least half of the 
 
 230 I would like to thank Geoffrey Miller for suggesting that I examine the empirical evidence 
for the “market thinness” proposition using turnover rates and Rachel Drew for generating the 
tables of Census data that support this analysis. 
 231 Author’s calculations based on table, Homeownership and Turnover Rates, 1990, 2000 (on 
file with New York University Law Review) generated using microdata from U.S. Census 1990 & 
2000.  See genereally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, www.census.gov.  
Individual census tracts borders may have shifted between 1990 and 2000, but it is not possible to 
obtain the same micro files for 1990 data using 2000 census tract definitions, and these shifts are 
unlikely to affect the data in a meaningful way. 
 232 Id.  
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
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households are minority, but the absolute levels of homeownership and 
home sales are much lower than in non-minority low- and moderate-
income tracts, turnover rates are somewhat lower in minority tracts than in 
non-minority tracts, and the trends in improvement less pronounced in 
minority tracts than in non-minority tracts.238      
Examples of innovative lending structures, growth in lending to these 
communities, and higher levels of home ownership and sales are indicative 
of progress, but careful econometric studies are essential to understanding 
the role of CRA itself in overcoming market failures and discrimination.  
Such studies have found evidence that CRA improved access to home 
mortgage credit for low-income borrowers during the 1990s, when CRA 
regulations were amended to focus on performance, regulatory agencies 
stepped up the seriousness of their CRA reviews, and bank merger activity 
increased.  One study found that the share of loans to individuals targeted 
by CRA and fair lending regulations originated by banks, thrifts, and their 
affiliates in the 1990s increased; it also found evidence of gains to 
minorities and low-income areas from all lenders, which the authors 
attribute in part to increased fair lending enforcement.239  Other researchers 
have found evidence consistent “with the view that the CRA has been 
effective in encouraging bank organizations, particularly those involved in 
consolidation, to serve lower-income and minority borrowers and 
neighborhoods.”240  Lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers grew 
much faster than lending to other groups in the 1990s, which may be 
attributable both to CRA and to other factors.241  A case study found that 
one lender had extended loans to low-income and minority borrowers with 
lower credit scores than it normally required, and had essentially doubled 
its lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers, because of CRA.242  
These studies generally found much higher levels of activity during the 
1990s than during the 1980s, when CRA was thought generally to be 
 
 238 In minority tracts, there were 4.6 million homeowners in 1990 and 5.1 million homeowners 
in 2000.  There were 1.1 million homeowners who had moved in the previous 5 years in 1990 and 
1.4 million in 2000.  Turnover rates were 24% in 1990 and 27.6% in 2000.  Id. 
 239 Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M. Siegal, CRA and Fair Lending Regulations: Resulting 
Trends in Mortgage Lending, 20  J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 28–38 (1996). 
 240 Robert B. Avery et al., Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 FED. RES. BULL. 81, 82 (1999). 
 241 Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home 
Mortgages, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 621, 638–39 (1996). 
 242 Michael LaCour-Little, Does the Community Reinvestment Act Make Mortgage Credit 
More Widely Available? Some New Evidence Based on the Performance of CRA Mortgage 
Credits 14, 21 (May 4, 1998) (Conference paper presented at the Midyear Meeting of the 
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Washington, D.C., unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (noting that in study of loans from 
one mortgage lender, “only about half of all loans extended to the low-to-moderate income 
segment would not have qualified anyway under traditional scoring standards”).  
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ineffective because of inadequate regulatory attention. 
Many of the studies described above, however, had difficulties 
discerning the effect of CRA apart from other policy and market changes.  
As a result, researchers attempted to isolate the effects of CRA with greater 
precision.  I directed a two-part study at the Treasury Department, 
undertaken by researchers from the Brookings Institution and the Joint 
Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, which constituted one 
such attempt.  The baseline study found that, in absolute terms, between 
1993 and 1998, depository institutions covered by the CRA and their 
affiliates made nearly $620 billion in home mortgage, small business, and 
community development loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers 
and communities.243  Although fully comparable data are not available for 
the 1980s, available evidence suggests that stepped up regulatory attention 
under CRA, as well as other developments that I discuss below, resulted in 
much higher levels of lending to these borrowers.244  One way to measure 
CRA’s effectiveness during the 1990s is to compare CRA lending by each 
bank or thrift to the same institution’s non-CRA-eligible lending.  CRA-
eligible home mortgage lending increased relative to other home mortgage 
lending by banks and thrifts and their affiliates.  The number of CRA-
 
 243 Author’s calculations based on ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE 
REPORT ES-5 ($467 billion in home mortgage lending including $135 billion in 1998 alone), ES-
14 ($99 billion in small business lending), ES-16 ($53 billion in community development 
lending) (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT], available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/crareport.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); see also 
ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL 
MODERNIZATION: A FINAL REPORT 26 (Jan. 2001) (noting continued growth rate in 1999 in 
home mortgage lending from 1998 levels) [hereinafter LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT], available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/finalrpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). Updating 
the total figures through 1999 would yield over $800 billion in flows.  Author’s calculations 
based on LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, ($619 billion); LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, 
supra (based on conservative assumption of additional $135 billion in home mortgage lending); 
Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 2-2, 1999 ($35.4 billion in 
small business loans in low- and moderate-income areas), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); Fed. Fin. Inst. 
Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 3, 1999 ($17 billion in community 
development lending), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 
30, 2005).  For further analysis based on the data from the Treasury reports, see Eric S. Belsky et 
al., The Effects of the Community Reinvestment Act on Bank and Thrift Home Purchase 
Mortgage Lending (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper CRA01–1, 2001) 
(confirming results of LITAN ET AL., supra), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/belschillyezer_cra01-1.pdf. 
Mortgage loans made between 1993 and 1998 constituted $467 billion of that total.  See LITAN ET 
AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, at ES-5, 36 tbl.2.  In 1998 alone, CRA-covered institutions and 
their affiliates made $135 billion in mortgage loans to these borrowers, an eighty percent increase 
over their lending in 1993.  See id. at ES-3 tbl., ES-1, ES-5. 
 244 BELSKY ET AL., supra note 243, at 5–6; LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, 
at 61–69; LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 3. 
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eligible mortgage loans increased by thirty-nine percent between 1993 and 
1998, while other mortgage loans increased by only seventeen percent.245  
Excluding all affiliates (which are included in CRA assessments only at the 
lender’s discretion246) banks and thrifts themselves increased their home 
mortgage lending to CRA-eligible low- and moderate-income borrowers 
and areas by ten percent; in contrast, mortgage lending in more affluent 
markets by these lenders did not change.247  The faster growth in CRA 
lending compared to other mortgage lending is reflected in the larger shares 
of bank and thrift portfolios devoted to CRA-eligible loans.  Over this 
period, the portfolio share of CRA-covered lender and affiliate mortgage 
loans going to these low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas 
increased from 25% to 28%.  That is, over the relevant period, these CRA-
covered institutions and their affiliates increasingly focused on underserved 
markets.248 
Critics argue that the growth of lending by independent mortgage and 
finance companies in the subprime market shows that CRA is irrelevant.249  
In their view, since non-CRA lenders are serving low-income markets, 
CRA must be unnecessary.  I do not believe that to be the case.  To begin 
with, subprime lenders provide a different product from prime lenders.  The 
dramatic expansion of non-covered lenders in the subprime refinance 
market, albeit from a low base, means that banks and thrifts lost market 
share overall in low- and moderate-income communities.  Yet fully 85% of 
non-covered institutions’ growth is attributable to lending by specialists in 
subprime and manufactured home lending.250  More than 77% of this 
subprime lending growth is attributable to refinancing rather than home 
purchase loans.251  As a result of the growth in subprime refinance lending, 
if one includes both prime and subprime markets, non-covered institutions 
increased their overall market share of lending to low- and moderate-
income borrowers and areas from 35% in 1993 to 37% in 1998.252  By 
contrast, lenders covered by CRA primarily specialize in prime lending.  In 
the prime market, banks and thrifts covered by CRA and their affiliates 
increased their market share of lending to low- and moderate-income 
borrowers and areas from 66% in 1993 to 71% in 1998.253  Thus, banks and 
thrifts subject to CRA increased their market share in home purchase 
 
 245 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at ES-6. 
 246 Id. at 111. 
 247 See id. at 79. 
 248 See id. at ES-6–7 & ES-2. 
 249 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at 57, 60. 
 250 LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 39. 
 251 See id. at ES-9. 
 252 See id. 
 253 See id. at ES-10. 
52
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 153 
 
lending, while finance and mortgage companies focused on subprime 
refinance loans.  That is, to the extent that CRA is designed to overcome 
market failures that diminish the opportunities for low-income borrowers to 
purchase a home, such home purchase lending by CRA-covered lenders 
increased more rapidly than similar lending by other lenders.  
Without more evidence, however, the critics are correct that one 
cannot attribute the rapid growth in lending to low-income, moderate-
income, and minority borrowers and areas to CRA.  A series of other 
factors undoubtedly contributed to these gains.  First and foremost, strong 
economic growth during the 1990s led to rapid income growth and lower 
unemployment rates for minorities and gains for low-income households.254  
Real interest rates for mortgages were at low levels during much of this 
period.255  Second, financial and technological innovation helped drive 
down the costs of assessing creditworthiness, offering mortgage products, 
effectuating transactions, and funding loans through securitization.256  
Third, extensive consolidation in the financial services sector in the wake 
of the removal of important geographic restrictions on banking heightened 
the potential to magnify the adverse consequences to banks and thrifts of 
poor performance under CRA when they undertook major transactions.257  
At the same time, consolidation also likely enhanced competition for the 
delivery of credit in many markets, including both mature markets in high-
income areas and newly found opportunities in low-income communities.258  
Fourth, it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of CRA, HMDA, ECOA, 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) lending, and the government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE) Affordable Housing Goals, which all operated 
in intensified and perhaps differing ways on different mortgage market 
participants during this period.259 
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, a follow-up 
Treasury report that I again directed, undertaken by researchers from 
Brookings and the Joint Center for Housing Studies, found that CRA 
provides important benefits.  For example, evidence benchmarking banks 
 
 254 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 24; Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent 
Changes in US Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 4 FED. RES. BULL. 4–5 (Jan. 2003) (showing income growth between 1992 and 2001 
among nonwhite or Hispanic families and among bottom twentieth percentile of income). 
 255 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 1; LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, 
supra note 243, at ES-11. 
 256 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 15. 
 257 Id. at 14, 24. 
 258 For a thoughtful analysis of how consolidation can increase bank competition and benefit 
consumers, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic 
Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083 (1992) (arguing in favor of deregulation of geographic 
restrictions on bank mergers and acquisitions). 
 259 See infra Part VII. 
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and thrifts against non-CRA lenders facing similar market and legal 
conditions (other than CRA) suggests that CRA is effective.  The report 
found that CRA lenders (with or without their affiliates) increased their 
CRA-eligible home purchase prime lending faster than those not regulated 
by CRA from 1993 to 1999.260  If the growth rates in CRA-eligible home 
purchase lending by banks and thrifts and their affiliates had been as slow 
as the growth rates for non-CRA lenders, CRA-eligible lending by CRA-
lenders would have been 20% lower over that period.261 
Similarly, analysis of CRA lending across metropolitan areas with 
divergent economic circumstances and divergent levels of home mortgage 
activity reinforces the view that CRA helps expand access to home 
mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers.262  The report 
controlled for median household income, unemployment rate, housing 
affordability, home ownership levels, demographic composition, the role of 
the secondary market and government loan programs.  It then assessed the 
role of CRA, as measured by the relationship between the share of loans to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas and the share of loans 
within the bank’s assessment area that are CRA-eligible, and the presence 
of CRA lending agreements with community groups.  Although the 
measures are problematic in some ways,263 the report did find a correlation 
between CRA and higher shares of loans to low-income neighborhoods and 
borrowers.264  Case studies of lenders and community organizations in four 
metropolitan areas also support this view.265  Lenders and community 
organizations believe that CRA “drove” market changes in lending.266  On 
these measures, CRA appears to make a difference, although the report 
acknowledged that further econometric modeling would be required to 
provide more definitive results.267  Additional analysis of this data by 
authors of the Treasury report—controlling for economic situation, 
 
 260 See LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at ES-4. 
 261 Id. at 35. 
 262 Id. at 36. 
 263 See id. at 36–46 (describing measurement, variable and other errors including spatial 
aggregation bias and possible presence of heteroskedasticity). 
 264 Id. at 46. 
 265 Id. at 62. 
 266 Id. at 47. 
 267 See id., at ES-3-4.  This research stands in contrast to the approach taken by Gunther, supra 
note 21, at 60 (concluding that CRA is ineffective).  Gunther examines data from 1993 and 1997, 
years that are not comparable because of differences in refinancings.  Gunther fails to distinguish 
between home purchase and refinance loans, and between prime and subprime lending.  He also 
excludes loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers outside of low- and moderate-income 
areas even though such loans count for CRA purposes and are important in expanding 
opportunity for low-income households.  Lastly, Gunther repeats arguments that CRA lending is 
unsound, ignoring the contrary evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s report.  See infra note 
313 and accompanying text. 
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demographics, housing market, market organization, Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) insurance, secondary market sales, and other 
factors—confirmed that “CRA has increased the flow of credit to [low- and 
moderate-income] borrowers and areas by CRA-covered lenders and their 
affiliates over the period studied.”268 
The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University followed 
up this research by examining the behavior of CRA lenders, the portion of 
CRA-eligible market share held by banks and thrifts, and price changes and 
turnover rates in low-income neighborhoods.269  The study controlled for 
economic, demographic, and housing market variables as to metropolitan 
areas, tracts, loans, and borrowers, across the more than 300 metropolitan 
areas studied.270  This research again found that CRA has had positive 
effects consistent with the theory that CRA is helping to overcome market 
failures and discrimination.  For example, if CRA were helping to 
overcome information externalities, one would expect to see higher rates of 
home sales—thicker markets—in CRA-eligible areas.  In fact, the report 
found somewhat higher turnover rates in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods within banks’ assessment areas than in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods outside assessment areas.271   
Measuring the precise effects of CRA is difficult given other 
regulatory and market changes.  The models used in the Joint Center report 
do not “reveal[] with precision the exact magnitude of the impact of 
CRA,”272 and should be interpreted cautiously.  Point estimates can be 
described in different ways.  For example, the report found that the effect 
of CRA on the share of home mortgage lending to low- and moderate-
income borrowers and areas was equivalent to the effect of a 1.3 percentage 
point decrease in the unemployment rate, while the actual drop in 
unemployment over that time period was about twice that figure.273  By this 
measure, CRA’s effect should be considered quite economically 
significant, although clearly much less than the effect of economic growth.  
In addition, the report found: 
CRA lenders have changed their behavior.  CRA lenders originate a 
higher proportion of CRA-eligible loans than they would if CRA did not 
exist, and they seem to reject fewer CRA-eligible loan applications than 
they would if CRA did not exist. 
CRA lenders appear to have captured a higher share of the CRA-eligible 
 
 268 BELSKY ET AL., supra note 243, at 22. 
 269 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 59. 
 270 See, e.g., id. at 64. 
 271 Id. at 75 (finding turnover rate of 6.24% in low- and moderate-income CRA assessment 
areas and rate of 6.21% in low- and moderate-income non-CRA-assessment areas). 
 272 Id. at 58. 
 273 See id. at 58–59. 
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lending market than they would have if CRA were not in place. 
CRA-eligible neighborhoods seem to have more rapid house price 
increases and higher turnover rates than other neighborhoods, which is 
consistent with an expansion of credit in those areas.274 
In reaching these conclusions, the report used two key variables to 
assess the impact of CRA:  one measuring lending within, as opposed to 
outside, assessment areas, and one denoting whether community groups 
had signed CRA agreements with banks or thrifts that promised increased 
lending.275  Not surprisingly, given the messiness of the real world, some 
findings from the study are open to conflicting interpretations.   
On the one hand, critics would contend that the growth of the 
subprime market may mean that CRA is less important than it once was, or 
may even challenge the idea that CRA has improved lending by banks and 
thrifts, since the growth of subprime lending has been much stronger.  In 
addition, some portion of the increased lending by CRA-covered, prime 
lenders represented lending that shifted from subprime lenders to prime 
lenders, rather than a net increase in loans.276  Moreover, the significant 
increase in lending that the Joint Center attributed to CRA from lending to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers in middle- and high-income 
neighborhoods277 presumably led to lower positive externalities for 
neighborhoods than would lending to borrowers in low-income 
neighborhoods.  Lending to low-income borrowers in these higher income 
areas lends less support to a market failure theory based on information 
externalities than would increased lending in low-income areas.  To the 
extent that market failures are neighborhood-focused and to the extent that 
CRA is aimed at overcoming such failures, one would expect to see most 
of the change in lending under CRA directed at such areas.  Moreover, the 
growth of subprime home purchase lending by independent mortgage and 
finance companies in low-income communities could be taken as evidence 
either that CRA is not working, or that it is not necessary. 
On the other hand, each of these points is amenable to a contrary and 
often more plausible interpretation.  The Joint Center’s approach actually 
may understate the effect of CRA on changing banking practices, both 
within and outside assessment areas.  Once banks decide to change their 
lending practices, it is more efficient to do so across the banks’ operations.  
Banks likely change their business practices to meet the credit needs of 
low-income communities and then apply those changed practices across all 
of the areas that they serve, low-income or not.  The costs of developing 
 
 274 Id. at 58. 
 275 Id. at 61–63. 
 276 Id. at 59, 72. 
 277 Id. at 59, 68. 
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products and training personnel make the consistent application of these 
business practices more efficient across all lending areas.  Thus, using 
lending outside of assessment areas as a control will understate the effects 
of CRA. 
Moreover, if bank performance under CRA has a demonstration effect 
on other lenders and helps to thicken the market, as information externality 
theory would predict,278 then the success of CRA also contributed to the 
relative growth in low- and moderate-income lending by non-CRA 
regulated lenders.  As the Joint Center report notes, the “fact that many 
large independent mortgage companies (i.e., mortgage lenders not subject 
to CRA) have been stunningly successful at serving the lower-income 
market is highly suggestive that this dynamic has indeed played out and 
that a reasonable portion of the CRA-eligible market is now being served 
economically.”279  As I argued above, while progress has been made, my 
intuition is that CRA is still required to overcome persistent market failures 
and much more could still be done by banks and thrifts to serve low-
income communities. 
In addition, in the absence of CRA, banks and thrifts may not have 
behaved the same as independent mortgage firms in lending to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers, but in fact behaved worse.  Glen Canner and 
his colleagues suggest that this is plausible, given that banks have higher 
costs of funds and business plans that tend to focus on higher cost services 
to a higher income clientele.280  Thus, comparisons between bank and non-
bank lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers would understate 
CRA’s impact on changing the lending patterns of banks and thrifts. 
Furthermore, a focus on CRA lending only in low-income 
neighborhoods is too narrow.  As explained in Part III, market failures, in 
principle, can occur both as to low-income communities and as to low-
income borrowers.  Discrimination, likewise, can affect minority borrowers 
wherever they choose to live.  Banks and thrifts under CRA have likely 
lowered the cost of acquiring information and gaining expertise in serving 
low-income borrowers wherever they buy, in addition to borrowers in low-
income neighborhoods, because the expertise and technology needed to 
develop alternative measures of creditworthiness would span both types of 
lending.  CRA lending to low-income borrowers outside of poor 
 
 278 Increases in loan volume and liquidity make it more profitable for lenders to enter the 
market.  Such lending increases available information and reduces information externalities from 
each additional loan. 
 279 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 60. 
 280 See, e.g., GLENN B. CANNER ET AL., DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) 
CAUSE BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS? 45–47 (Fed. Reserve 
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neighborhoods improves social mobility by helping low-income borrowers 
move to better neighborhoods.  In addition, CRA lending that gives 
minority borrowers the opportunity to move to less segregated, middle- and 
upper-income neighborhoods advances CRA’s purposes in overcoming the 
legacy of discrimination.  These patterns of increased CRA lending to low-
income and minority borrowers in better neighborhoods also are consistent 
with the evidence of some deconcentration of poverty in the latter part of 
the 1990s in many metropolitan areas.281 
In addition, GSE affordable housing goals and fair lending laws likely 
increased lending by non-banks and banks,282 but the different industry and 
regulatory structure affecting different types of institutions may vary the 
impact of these laws, so it is difficult to measure what independent 
mortgage companies and banks would have done in the absence of these 
laws.  Ideally, one would want to model the interactions of these laws on 
different market participants and then test the model empirically.   
Lastly, even if some gains in prime lending merely represent a 
substitution of prime lending for subprime lending, such shifts directly 
lower prices for borrowers who obtain a prime rather than a subprime loan.  
Over time, with increased competition, industry pricing and practice in 
low-income neighborhoods may move towards the standards of the prime 
market, which would provide significant benefits to low- and moderate-
income and minority households.  Enhanced competition in these markets, 
and increased volume and liquidity, from both prime and subprime lenders, 
is consistent with the theoretical model of CRA as helping to overcome 
collective action problems and information externalities. 
Despite the robustness of these studies, other empirical research has 
failed to find significant effects of CRA.  For example, economists at the 
Federal Reserve Board tried to measure whether increased mortgage 
lending under CRA has had any effect on outcomes in moderate-income 
neighborhoods.283  They found that CRA-eligible, moderate-income census 
tracts “had higher homeownership rates, higher growth in owner-occupied 
 
 281 See PAUL A. JARGOWSKY, THE BROOKINGS INST., STUNNING PROGRESS, HIDDEN 
PROBLEMS: THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN THE 1990S (May 2003) 
(finding significant declines in concentrated poverty in 1990s), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/jargowskypoverty.pdf. 
 282 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 70 (noting effects of government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE) affordable housing goals on purchases from both CRA-covered 
lenders and non-CRA-covered lenders); LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 45 
(finding correlation between increased CRA origination share and increased secondary market 
sales). 
 283 Robert B. Avery et al., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Effects of the 
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units, and lower vacancy rates than would have been predicted on the basis 
of changes in the not CRA-eligible census tracts” with slightly higher 
incomes; but these results were not robust, and two other outcome 
measures, for crime and median home values found that “lower-income 
neighborhoods actually fared worse than would have been predicted.”284  
Generally speaking, the results were inconclusive as to the effect of CRA 
on neighborhoods. 
It is not surprising that the study had difficulty isolating an effect of 
CRA not only on lending, but also on how increased lending, if any, 
affected neighborhood outcomes.  There are too many policy and other 
factors that come into play in particular neighborhoods, and these factors 
are unlikely either to track census tracts or to be consistent across census 
tracts.  Furthermore, some measures of outcomes, such as the measure for 
crime, are only distantly related to increased access to credit.  Moreover, as 
the authors note,285 the census tract is likely too small a unit of analysis 
given that banks and thrifts are unlikely to target business practice changes 
at the census tract level.  As explained above, looking for census tract level 
differences will mask the effect of CRA, if any, on changing bank and thrift 
practices as they affect low- and moderate-income areas and borrowers 
more generally, not just those that qualify for CRA eligibility.  In addition, 
the study seeks to explore changes within a narrow band of income range 
of census tracts, from seventy to ninety percent of median income, which 
would exacerbate the problem of narrow geographic focus because tracts 
just above the cutoff for CRA eligibility are the tracts that are most likely 
to benefit from CRA-induced changes to bank practices.  Lastly, the study 
does not include the effects of increased home mortgage lending to low- 
and moderate-income borrowers who choose to find homes in middle- and 
upper-income neighborhoods.  As described above, expanded access to 
credit for such borrowers is an important element of CRA’s success. 
Two other studies lend support to the view of CRA’s critics that CRA 
does not benefit low-income communities.  One study found that banks that 
had been downgraded in their CRA ratings during the years from 1990 to 
1995 did not respond in the year after the downgrade by increasing their 
targeted home mortgage lending to low-income borrowers and 
communities.286  Another study found that banks rated “needs to improve” 
and “substantial noncompliance” over the period from 1991 to 1997 did not 
increase their home mortgage lending to minority borrowers or reduce the 
 
 284 Id. at 27. 
 285 Id. at 28. 
 286  Drew Dahl et al., Community Reinvestment Act Enforcement and Changes in Targeted 
Lending, 25 INT’L REGIONAL SCIENCE REV. 307, 318–19 (2002). 
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disparities in denial rates after receiving such a rating.287  Both studies 
indicate that the examination process and ratings downgrades during the 
early and mid-1990s may not have had an impact on the behavior of banks 
and thrifts whose CRA performance was low or declining. 
While both studies indicate that the CRA rating process may not be 
effective for some banks, and that regulators ought to pay greater attention 
to how to improve the performance of low ranked or declining performers, 
four important cautions should be noted.  First, the studies focus on low or 
declining ratings.  As one study notes, banks trying to maintain satisfactory 
ratings do appear to increase minority outreach.288  Second, CRA also plays 
an important role during merger reviews, and both the evidence on merger 
reviews specifically,289 and the evidence described above in this Section on 
CRA’s effectiveness overall, suggest that CRA is helping to alter lender 
behavior.  CRA may have more bite for institutions seeking to improve 
their ratings prior to a merger.  Third, few banks are downgraded or receive 
low ratings,290 so the universe of banks is small for those to whom low 
ratings or downgrades are the operative force of CRA.  Fourth, denial rates, 
which are used as one measure of performance in one of the studies,291 are 
not a reliable measure of CRA performance.  Regulators do not look at 
denial rates without controls for the creditworthiness of the applicant, but 
rather at the share of lending going to targeted borrowers, because denial 
rates could be evidence either of discrimination or failure to use more 
flexible underwriting standards on the one hand, or expanded marketing 
and outreach to low-income communities on the other.  Increased denial 
rates could be evidence of looking harder for creditworthy borrowers.  The 
study’s second measure, of minority representation in the loan pool, is a 
much better predictor of changed lender behavior, and it does not suffer 
from this defect.  On this measure, CRA again appears not to influence 
low-rated institutions, but does “suggest, however, that institutions with 
already satisfactory performance may target improving minority 
representation relative to lower-rated peer institutions as a means of 
 
 287  Keith D. Harvey et al., Disparities in Mortgage Lending, Bank Performance, Economic 
Influence, and Regulatory Oversight, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 379, 404–05 (2001). 
 288  Id. at 405. 
 289  See Part IV.B.2, infra. 
 290  See Dahl et al., supra note 286, at 312. 
 291  Harvey et al., supra note 287, at 390.  The incorrect equation of denial rate with low CRA 
rating has been made by other critics.  Hylton charged that CRA uses loan rejection rates as a 
measure of performance, when this would punish banks for outreach into harder to serve 
communities.  See Hylton, supra note 21, at 233 (implying that high rejection rates lead to 
negative CRA evaluations).  But see, e.g., FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR LARGE RETAIL INSTITUTIONS 8 (1997) 
(listing factors to be considered in evaluating loans, with number and volume of loans, not loan 
denials, considered under examination procedures), available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/pdf/exlarge9.pdf. 
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maintaining their CRA rating.”292  On balance, these studies suggest 
caution in interpreting CRA examinations and ratings, in the absence of 
merger reviews, as effective in changing the behavior of low-rated 
institutions. 
Home mortgage lending data represents the bulk of data available in 
understanding the role of CRA.  There are, however, three additional 
categories of data:  small business data, community development lending 
data, and community development investment data.  Moving from home 
mortgage lending to small business lending, evidence from small business 
markets reinforces the view that CRA has been effective.  The 1995 
changes to the CRA regulations imposed a new requirement on large 
commercial banks and savings associations to report on small business 
lending.  In 2003, the most recent year for which data is available, banks 
and thrifts subject to CRA’s small business reporting requirement 
originated $126 billion in loans to firms with revenues under $1 million,293 
nearly double the 1997 figure.294 
A recent empirical study found “that CRA does increase lending to 
small businesses as intended.”295  The study suggests that CRA increases 
the number of small businesses that can access credit by four to six 
percentage points.296  The study found that CRA generally increased access 
to credit for small firms, as intended by CRA, but the evidence did not 
support a finding that CRA increased access to credit for small firms 
located in low- and moderate-income areas, holding other factors 
constant.297  Moreover, the study determined that the increased lending to 
small businesses induced by CRA provided benefits to the real economy in 
the form of increased payrolls and reduced bankruptcies without any 
evidence that such lending either crowded out other financing available to 
small businesses or adversely affected bank profitability or loan 
performance.298  It is somewhat remarkable that studies of CRA show any 
effect on small business lending at all, given that small business data 
collection is relatively new, data are not as comprehensive, and the 
examinations for small business lending are not as well developed as for 
home mortgage lending. 
Aside from lending activities, financial institutions also have increased 
 
 292  Harvey et al., supra note 287, at 405. 
 293 See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 1, 2003, at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).  The earliest year with 
comparable data is 1997.  See id. 
 294 See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, CRA National Aggregate Table 1, 1997, at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/cranaag.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). 
 295 ZINMAN, supra note 103, at 2. 
 296 See id. at 20. 
 297 See id. 
 298 Id. at 3–4. 
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their community development investments in low-income communities 
under CRA.299  Although comprehensive data on investments are not 
available and reporting is not standardized, one can assemble some broad 
aggregate statistics using data from other regulatory provisions.300  For 
example, national bank community development investments totaled $15 
billion from 1965 to 2002, with well over half of the investments coming 
during the last decade, when CRA regulatory oversight intensified.301  
Banks have engaged in innovative efforts to serve low-income 
communities through investments.302   
Such investments are in addition to community development loans, 
which are tracked under CRA.  Community development loans totaled 
$42.3 billion in 2003 alone, and $184 billion since 1996, when community 
development loans were first reported under the revised CRA 
regulations.303  Although careful econometric work has not been done on 
community development lending and investment, the scale and innovative 
 
 299 Under the regulations, “qualified investment” includes an “investment, deposit, 
membership share [in a credit union], or grant that has as its primary purpose community 
development,” 12 C.F.R. § 25.12(s), as well as disposition of branch premises to minority or 
women-owned institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 25.23(d) (2004). 
 300 12 C.F.R. pt. 24 (2004), implementing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Eleventh), 93a, 481, 1818 (2000) 
(investments designed to promote public welfare).  Banks are required to use the “Part 24” 
authority only for investments that otherwise would not be authorized for national banks, 12 
C.F.R. § 24.1(d), so data collected under this authority may understate CRA-eligible investments; 
however, this data may overstate CRA-eligible investments because not all such investments are 
within assessment areas or necessarily otherwise included in the bank’s CRA performance.  The 
CRA investment test could be improved if comprehensive, comparable data were available under 
that test. 
 301 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 2002 DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL BANK 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS 4, 6 (author’s calculations), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/2002Part24Dir.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2005).  A similar authority 
is available for state member banks, and bank holding companies, as a “public welfare” 
investment, see paragraph 23 of section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 338a (2000), or 
a “community development” investment under Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(6) (2004).  
For recent investments, see FED. RESERVE BD., 2002 DIRECTORY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
INVESTMENTS, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, STATE MEMBER BANKS, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/DCCA/Directory/cdi02.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). 
 302 See, e.g., RYAN TRAMMELL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, UNDERSTANDING 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INVESTMENT TEST EXAMINATION CRITERIA AND INVESTMENT 
TEST RATINGS,  1 (2004) (finding that qualitative factors, not solely investment volumes, drive 
CRA investment test ratings), at http://www.frbsf.org/community/resources/QIfinal.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2005). 
 303 Press Release, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (July 26, 2004), at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/cra072604.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). A community 
development loan is a loan, other than a home mortgage loan, that “has as its primary purpose 
affordable housing for low- or moderate-income individuals, community services targeted to 
these individuals, activities that promote economic development by financing small businesses or 
small farms, or activities that revitalize or stabilize low- or moderate-income neighborhoods.” Id. 
Prior year data summed from yearly National Aggregate Reports, at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/reports.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
62
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 163 
 
types of activity suggest that it is plausible that CRA has contributed to 
increased activity in these areas.  Further research would be warranted to 
examine these effects. 
CRA’s benefits appear to have been substantial, but are they likely to 
continue?  Changes in the financial services industry may mean that CRA 
covers less and less of the financial services world.  Banks’ and thrifts’ 
share of financial assets has declined dramatically since the end of World 
War II, from 63% to about 29% in 1999.304  Moreover, for business 
organization reasons unrelated to CRA, banks and thrifts may pursue a 
greater portion of their lending activity through affiliates not covered by 
CRA, particularly mortgage finance company affiliates.  According to the 
Joint Center, the reach of CRA is likely declining: 
In combination, the changing industry structure, along with the fact that 
CRA expanded the capacity of all industry players to better serve lower-
income borrowers, has diminished the extent that CRA-regulated 
organizations now lead the market.  Econometric analysis suggests that 
on average over the period 1993 to 2000, CRA may have increased the 
share of loans going to CRA-eligible borrowers by 2.1 percentage points 
(or from 30.3 to 32.4 percent).  Estimates for individual years suggest, 
however, that the CRA impact has declined from 3.7 percentage points 
in 1993 to 1.6 percentage points in 2000.305 
In part, this decline may be less momentous than community-based 
organizations suggest:  Although assets subject to CRA are declining as a 
share of financial assets, such assets continue to grow in absolute terms.306  
Moreover, as CRA-covered institutions develop new products, train 
employees, and alter organizational structures to meet the credit needs of 
low-income communities, such changes may have important influences on 
uncovered affiliates of banks and thrifts. 
In addition, CRA enforcement through mergers and acquisitions will 
continue to be important.  Consolidation in the banking industry, after a 
brief respite during the recession of 2001–2002, has picked up again, and 
long-term forecasts suggest that more likely will come.307  Furthermore, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act made expansion into new activities, such as 
insurance and securities, contingent on banks’ CRA performance.308  
Therefore, banking organizations will have to pay attention to their CRA 
 
 304 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 9. 
 305 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 135. 
 306 LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 79; see also FDIC-Statistics on 
Depository Institutions Report, available at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (comparing total 
assets held by depository institutions on September 30, 2004, September 30, 2003, September 30, 
2002, and September 30, 2001). 
 307 See, e.g., Madeleine James et al., Playing to the Endgame in Financial Services, 4 
MCKINSEY Q. 170, 172 (1997). 
 308 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903(c), 1843(a)(l)(2) (2000). 
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performance for many years to come as they seek to enter new financial 
markets. 
Admittedly, market and technological forces are tending to reinforce 
access to some types of credit, particularly home mortgage loans that are 
now easily commodified, as some critics of CRA have suggested.  In many 
ways, competition and CRA are driving in the same direction.  
Nonetheless, market pressures also will mean that financial intermediaries 
are under increasing pressure to serve the highest end of the market where 
larger margins and the potential for cross-selling exist.  Increasingly, 
community banks and thrifts, and community development financial 
institutions, may find that a larger portion of the local market, in particular 
the market for small business loans, is of less interest to larger banks and 
thrifts.  This will open up new business opportunities for smaller 
institutions, while CRA’s effect on larger institutions likely will push 
advances in commodified lending markets, including home mortgages and 
credit-scored small business loans that can be sold into the secondary 
markets.  Thus, there will likely be a continued need for CRA. 
In sum, recent evidence shows that CRA provides important benefits 
to low-income communities.  Other factors undoubtedly contributed to the 
growth in lending to low-income communities during the 1990s, but careful 
studies have found support for a statistically significant and economically 
important role for CRA.  Given the difficulty of finding such effects in 
policy analysis generally, these findings are remarkable.  These studies cast 
serious doubt on the contention of CRA’s critics that CRA provides little 
benefit to low-income communities and borrowers.  Instead, these studies 
are more consistent with the theoretical case for CRA set forth in Part III.  
That is, CRA appears to increase lending to low- and moderate-income 
communities and minority borrowers more than one would predict based 
on market forces and other factors.  Still, one cannot tell whether this 
increased lending is a result of forcing lenders to make bad loans, on the 
one hand, or is a result of effectively overcoming market failures and 
discrimination to lend to creditworthy borrowers, on the other hand, 
without examining the costs incurred.  I turn next to that topic. 
B. The Costs of CRA Have Been Overstated 
Critics charge that CRA imposes high costs on the banking industry.  
Most importantly, in their view, CRA forces banks to make unprofitable, 
risky loans that undermine the health of the financial sector.  If that were 
the case, such evidence would undermine the theoretical case for CRA 
based on market failures and discrimination.  Forcing banks to make bad 
loans would be evidence that CRA matters, but is not theoretically justified.  
Moreover, they argue that CRA imposes undue burdens on the merger and 
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acquisition process, and therefore impedes efficiency in the financial 
sector.  CRA also is alleged to promote distortionary rent seeking by 
community groups and bank regulators.  Critics charge that CRA has high 
compliance costs and that CRA’s vague standards lead to uncertainty that 
further burdens financial institutions.  In addition, critics argue that the 
1995 reforms to CRA did little to alleviate these burdens, as measured by 
shareholder value.  If these critiques were valid, they would cast significant 
doubt on the efficacy of choosing CRA as a policy response to market 
failures or discrimination.  I take up these arguments in turn. 
1. Profitability and Risk 
Critics of CRA argue that if there were profitable loans to make in 
low-income communities, banks and thrifts would already be making them.  
For example, Macey and Miller argue that CRA “impairs the safety and 
soundness of an already overstrained banking industry” and “encourages 
banks to make unprofitable and risky investment and product-line 
decisions . . . .”309  While acknowledging that “[t]here is undoubtedly truth 
to the argument that profitable loan opportunities exist in low-income and 
moderate-income neighborhoods, and that some of these loans would not 
be made if it were not for the CRA[,]” Macey and Miller contend that such 
profitable loan opportunities are sparse.  In their view, there may be “a few 
profitable loans,” but the search costs of finding them will make such 
lending unprofitable and “[t]he fact that there are some profitable loans to 
be made in low-income and moderate-income communities does not mean 
that greatly increasing lending in such communities is going to be a 
profitable activity.”310  Because they find the existence of market failures or 
discrimination to be unlikely, they doubt that “CRA is plausibly going to 
increase the efficiency of lending by depository institutions . . . .”311  Thus, 
they charge that “CRA encourages depository institutions to devote 
depositor funds to low-profit or losing propositions in derogation of overall 
economic welfare . . . .”312 
Macey and Miller are correct to look to measures of profitability and 
risk in assessing whether CRA improves the efficiency of lending by 
overcoming market failures and discrimination, and that higher search costs 
ought to be factored in when weighing the profitability of CRA lending.  
Unfortunately, they present no serious evidence for their claims.   
Recent empirical evidence suggests that those costs were overstated 
significantly by CRA’s critics.  Instead, the evidence tends to support the 
 
 309 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295. 
 310 Id. at 319–320. 
 311 Id. at 319. 
 312 Id. at 321. 
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theoretical underpinnings of CRA as resting on market failures and 
discrimination.  Despite the significant increase in lending to low-income 
communities during the 1990s described above, CRA loans appear to be 
reasonably profitable—not “a few profitable loans,” but CRA lending 
generally.  A Federal Reserve Board report issued in 2000313 casts 
significant doubt on the claims made by critics about the likely 
performance of CRA loans.  Most institutions responded that CRA lending 
was profitable or marginally profitable:  82% indicated that CRA-related 
home mortgage lending was profitable, 86% indicated that CRA-related 
home improvement lending was profitable, 93% indicated that CRA-related 
community development lending was profitable, and 96% indicated that 
CRA-related small business lending was profitable.314  The median 
difference between return on equity for CRA home mortgage loans and all 
such loans, and between CRA small business loans and all such loans, was 
zero.315  Most respondents reported that CRA lending was at least as 
profitable as comparable non-CRA lending.316  The profitability of serving 
these borrowers and communities helped drive the increase in CRA-eligible 
lending by banks and their affiliates between 1993 and 1998.317 
Many respondents reported other benefits from such lending, which 
suggest that CRA lending, while strengthening communities, also is 
helping to improve profitability for banks.  Some 81% of respondents, for 
example, developed new business opportunities from their CRA small 
business lending,318 while 71% of respondents cited “source of additional 
profits” as a benefit of their community development lending, and 96% 
cited promoting “community growth and stability.”319  These broader 
societal benefits also represent benefits for the banks operating in these 
communities because they reduce the risk of lending there.  These 
additional benefits further contradict the notion that CRA forces banks to 
engage in unprofitable activity. 
Moreover, CRA loans do not appear to be overly risky.  The loss rates 
that surveyed banks and thrifts reported for CRA loans are quite low.  The 
median difference in charge-off rates (the net losses after collections) 
between CRA home mortgage loans and all such loans was zero.320  The 
institutions responding to the survey reported weighted median charge-off 
 
 313 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, 43–64. 
 314 Id. at 45, 52, 62, 58. 
 315 Id. at 46 & tbl.5a. 
 316 The exact percentages of responses of “about the same” or “somewhat higher” profitability 
for CRA loans were 56% for home purchase and refinance loans, 72% for home improvement 
loans, and 86% for small business loans.  Id. at 45–46, tbl.3a, tbl.4a, tbl.5a. 
 317 See supra text accompanying note 243. 
 318 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbl.8. 
 319 Id. at tbl.6. 
 320 Id. at tbl.3c. 
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rates of 0.18% on CRA-related home mortgage loans and 0.40% on CRA-
related small business loans.321  About 70% of respondents reported credit 
losses for CRA home mortgage lending that were the same as or less than 
losses for other such lending, and 91% of respondents reported credit losses 
for CRA small business loans that were the same as or smaller than losses 
for all small business loans.322  Community development loans had a 
median charge-off rate of zero.323  Generally speaking, the categories of 
loans made pursuant to CRA—home mortgage, small business, 
multifamily, and community development lending—have had relatively 
low loss rates. 
Pushing further into low-income markets has not weakened banks’ 
profitability and soundness as White, Macey and Miller, and others 
predicted.  As one would expect, the performance and profitability of CRA 
“special programs” is not as strong as the performance and profitability of 
CRA loans in the institutions’ general portfolios.324  Special programs 
account for only 17% of CRA-eligible lending as the Federal Reserve 
Board defines it.325  These programs serve as the banks’ and thrifts’ lending 
“laboratories,” employing new and innovative strategies—such as lower 
downpayment requirements—to deliver credit to underserved borrowers.326  
Once these strategies are refined, they often are “graduated” to borrowers 
in the institutions’ core product lines.  Despite the programs’ experimental 
status, the Board reported that 61% of respondents found CRA special 
programs to be profitable.327  Moreover, most institutions reported low 
delinquency and charge-off rates; the median charge-off rate on these 
programs was zero.328 
The Federal Reserve Board survey finding that CRA loans generally 
are profitable is consistent with other studies.  Federal Reserve Board 
economists determined that, after adjusting for creditworthiness and the 
benefits of the home mortgage interest deduction, banks do not offer 
borrowers substantially lower mortgage rates to make CRA-eligible 
loans.329  The evidence of any such subsidy is “economically and 
 
 321 Id. at tbl.3e (home mortgage), tbl.5e (small business). 
 322 Id. at tbl.3d (home mortgage), tbl.5d (small business). 
 323 Id. at tbl.7c. 
 324 Compare, e.g., id. at 69 (profitability of special lending programs) with id. at 45 (home 
purchase and refinancing), 52 (home improvement), 58 (small business), and 62 (community 
development). 
 325 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at 66. 
 326 See Robert B. Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 711, 717–
19 (describing features of special lending programs) (2000). 
 327 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbl.14a. 
 328 Id. at tbl.14c. 
 329 GLENN B. CANNER ET AL., DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) CAUSE 
BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS? 5–6 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. 
& Econ. Discussion Series No. 2002-19, 2002), 
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statistically insignificant.”330  Earlier studies found that institutions with 
strong CRA performance were as profitable as those with less CRA 
activity.331  Similarly, an earlier survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City had found that nearly all respondents reported CRA lending to 
be profitable, though not as profitable as other lending.332 
That is not to say that the Federal Reserve Board’s survey found no 
differences in the performance of CRA loans and other loans.  In the 
survey, for example, 44% of respondents reported that CRA home purchase 
and refinance loans were less or somewhat less profitable than other loans, 
and about half reported higher delinquency rates for such CRA loans than 
for other loans.333  For these institutions, CRA lending was indeed more 
costly.  Moreover, as critics have argued, CRA lending can entail greater 
risks and higher origination costs.  As noted by the Board’s report,334 
previous studies had found that borrowers with higher loan-to-value ratios 
were more likely to default,335 and that a combination of negative home 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200219/200219pap.pdf.  The upper bound on such 
a subsidy, if any, is “tiny.”  Id. at 6. 
 330 Id. at abstract.  A study by the Independent Community Bankers of America found that 
about 61% of larger banks it surveyed provided interest rate concessions under CRA and 41% of 
smaller banks provided such concessions, but the total dollar value of such reported concessions 
was small, and the study did not attempt any econometric controls.  See GRANT THORNTON LLP, 
INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., THE HIGH COST OF COMMUNITY BANK CRA COMPLIANCE:  
COMPARISON OF “LARGE” AND “SMALL” COMMUNITY BANKS 15 (2002), at 
www.icba.org/files/PDFs/crareport.pdf. 
 331 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (1993); Glenn B. Canner 
& Wayne Passmore, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Profitability of Mortgage-
Oriented Banks 26 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 1997-7, 1997) 
(suggesting that “lenders active in lower-income neighborhoods and with lower-income 
borrowers appear to be as profitable as other home purchase lenders,” but noting some limitations 
in study), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199707/199707pap.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2005); Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, The Relative Profitability of Commercial 
Banks Active in Lending in Lower-Income Neighborhoods and to Lower-Income Borrowers, in 
PROC. 32ND ANN. CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE & COMPETITION, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO 
531, 546 (1996); David Malmquist et al., The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending, 11 J. 
FIN. SERVICES RES. 169, 182 (1997) (finding that “low-income lending generates higher gross 
mortgage-related revenues but also higher costs,” and also that “low-income lending is associated 
with a higher level of credit losses but that low-income lending is no more and no less profitable 
than non-low-income lending”). 
 332 Larry Meeker & Forest Myers, Community Reinvestment Act Lending: Is It Profitable?, 
1996 FIN. INDUSTRY PERSP. 13, 16–17. 
 333 PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at tbls.3a, 3c. 
 334 See id. at 7–14 (summarizing previous research on performance and profitability of CRA-
related lending). 
 335 James A. Berkovec et al., Discrimination, Competition, and Loan Performance in FHA 
Mortgage Lending, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 241, 245–47 (1998) (finding important effects for 
high loan-to-value ratios and also noting smaller effects for higher housing-expense-to-income 
ratios and lower income and liquid asset levels); R. Jeffery Green & George M. von Furstenberg, 
The Effects of Race and Age of Housing on Mortgage Delinquency Risk, 12 URB. STUD. 85, 89 
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equity336 and a “triggering” event such as job loss was correlated with 
delinquency and default.337  Affordable home mortgage products with 
significant multiple risk factors also were found to be more prone to 
default.338  However, research also concluded that although borrower and 
neighborhood income were inversely related to delinquency rates, the 
differences were slight, and loan-to-value ratios were far more important.339 
The basic picture that emerges from the evidence regarding the 
performance and profitability of CRA lending is this:  CRA’s critics were 
generally wrong that CRA induces banks and thrifts to engage in deeply 
unprofitable, overly risky lending.  Instead, CRA lending appears to be 
reasonably profitable and not overly risky.  Most banks and thrifts find 
such lending to be as profitable as other lending, but a significant minority 
faces somewhat higher costs and weaker performance.  Although the 
evidence regarding the performance and profitability of CRA lending is 
open to conflicting interpretations, it is on balance more consistent with the 
theory that CRA helps overcome market failures and discrimination than 
with the theories of CRA’s critics that there were only “a few profitable 
loans” to be found.   
The studies do not show, however, that CRA lending is generally 
more profitable than other things that banks and thrifts could do with their 
funds on a risk-adjusted basis.  That is, the studies show that CRA lending 
is generally profitable from an accounting or business perspective, as profit 
would be thought of on an income statement, and that most banks and 
thrifts generally do not see CRA lending as out of line with other profits 
and risks they take.  The studies do not prove that CRA lending is always 
profitable in the formal, economic sense of accounting profits from the 
activity exceeding those that could be obtained from an alternative use of 
the firm’s capital.340  The size of the difference between accounting profits 
 
(1975) (concluding that mortgagor income has significant impact on mortgage delinquency risk); 
George M. von Furstenberg & R. Jeffery Green, Home Mortgage Delinquencies: A Cohort 
Analysis, 29 J. FIN. 1545, 1547 (1974) (noting that “rising incomes also contribute significantly to 
raising the quality of home mortgages”). 
 336 Chester Foster & Robert Van Order, An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default, 3 
HOUSING FIN. REV. 351, 362 (1984); Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential 
Mortgage Default: A Review of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341, 375 (1992). 
 337 Dennis R. Capozza et al., Mortgage Default in Local Markets, 25 REAL EST. ECON. 631, 
654 (1997); Kerry D. Vandell & Thomas Thibodeau, Estimation of Mortgage Defaults Using 
Disaggregate Loan History Data, 13 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASSOC. 292, 314 (1985). 
 338 Michael K. Stamper, Revisiting Targeted-Affordable Lending: Fresh Evidence Finds Far 
Lower Default Rate, 14 SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS 1, 17–18 (1997). 
 339 Robert Van Order & Peter M. Zorn, Income, Location and Default: Some Implications for 
Community Lending, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 385, 386–87 (2000). 
 340 See DENNIS W. CAROLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
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and economic profit depends on the relative capital constraint facing each 
firm.  Thus, to the extent that CRA induces firms to engage in lending that 
is profitable from an accounting perspective but may or may not be with 
respect to the opportunity cost of funds, the effects of CRA on a firm’s 
lending activity will be more binding the higher its capital constraints. 
2. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Macey and Miller and other critics of CRA argue that it has 
“impeded” bank mergers and acquisitions that improve the efficiency of the 
banking system.  They cite cases of delays in merger approvals in order to 
hold public hearings and instances in which mergers were abandoned 
because of CRA concerns.  Moreover, they contend that responding to 
CRA “protests” diverts essential bank resources into “public relations” and 
“window-dressing.” In addition, they view increased lending as “an 
implicit tax that the CRA imposes on the process of depository institution 
consolidation.”341   
Critics are correct that merger reviews—which encompass antitrust 
concerns, deposit concentration limits, safety and soundness, CRA, and 
other matters—add to the costs of mergers.  Yet they significantly overstate 
the contention that CRA is a costly barrier to efficient mergers and 
acquisitions.  There are three potential costs:  the costs of providing and 
assessing information about the bank’s CRA record, the cost of actual 
delay or disapproval, and the cost imposed by the threat of delay or 
disapproval. 
As to actual delay or disapproval, Treasury Department analysis 
shows that CRA likely imposes little cost from disapproval or delay of 
mergers, acquisitions, or other applications subject to CRA review.342  
From 1985 to 1999, only 692 out of 92,177 applications subject to CRA 
review received any adverse public comment—less than 0.7%.343  Of those 
applications, most received adverse public comment or regulatory scrutiny 
on both CRA and other grounds.344  Only 1% of the applications receiving 
comment—eight applications—were denied, 4% withdrawn, and 1% 
returned, for reasons that may or may not have related to CRA, leaving 
94% approved.345  Thus the agencies denied less than one tenth of one 
percent of the applications subject to CRA review. 
Adverse CRA comments also generally lead to little delay.  Again, as 
 
 341 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 322–23. 
 342 TREASURY DEP’T, APPLICATIONS SUBJECT TO CRA THAT WERE PROTESTED ON CRA 
GROUNDS (July 7, 2000) [hereinafter APPLICATIONS SUBJECT TO CRA] (document on file with 
author).  
 343 Id.   
 344 Id.  
 345 Id. 
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with application approval data, data on application processing times 
include CRA and all the other issues that regulators must evaluate in an 
application.  Since CRA’s enactment, the bank agencies processed 63% of 
applications facing CRA protests within 90 days, and processed 88% of 
such applications within 180 days.346  Still, I agree that there have been 
cases in which CRA protests likely increased regulatory delays,347 and the 
time it takes to hold public hearings and to evaluate public comments likely 
does increase the costs of merger reviews.  We do not have data on the 
costs to banks of providing or to regulators of assessing information about 
CRA during merger reviews even though such data would ideally form part 
of our analysis of the costs and benefits of CRA in merger reviews. 
Nonetheless, the 1995 regulations likely contributed to improved 
processing, as did other changes in application reviews more broadly.  With 
respect to CRA, regulators exercise their discretion to ignore frivolous 
comments, and the interagency staff guidelines indicate that prior 
examinations are “an important, and often controlling, factor” in assessing 
an institution’s CRA performance during the course of application 
reviews.348  Processing times have improved under the 1995 CRA 
regulations:  Almost 75% of all applications subject to CRA review are 
now decided within 90 days and more than 94% are decided within 180 
days.349 
Of course, critics would rightly argue that the lack of delay or denial is 
not evidence that CRA is either ineffective in changing behavior, or, 
conversely, without cost in doing so.  If the benefits of merging are high 
enough, the merger will proceed, despite the costs of merger applications, 
including CRA.  Banks and thrifts presumably internalize the risk of delay 
or denial and modify their behavior to minimize that risk.  A recent study 
found that CRA review during mergers had a significant effect on 
expanding lending to low-income communities, controlling for bank 
characteristics.  The study found that banks increased their lending in 
“economically important” ways to low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods in anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny from 
CRA that accompanies mergers.350  The effects were more pronounced for 
 
 346 Id.   
 347 See, e.g., Hibernia Corp., 72 FED. RES. BULL. 656 (1986); Somerset Bankshares, Inc., 74 
FED. RES. BULL. 619 (1988); First Union Corp., 76 FED. RES. BULL. 83 (1990).  
 348 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community 
Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,640 (July 12, 2001) (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council). 
 349 APPLICATIONS SUBJECT TO CRA, supra note 342.  
 350 RAPHAEL BOSTIC ET AL., REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND CONSOLIDATION: THE CASE OF 
COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS AND THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT, at 18 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. WP-2002-06, 2002), at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/WP2002-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 
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larger institutions, which face the most public and regulatory scrutiny 
during merger applications, and the effects became stronger as public and 
regulatory attention increased under CRA during the 1990s.351  Thus, this 
study of bank merger activity reinforces the earlier conclusion that CRA 
review during merger applications appears to be working as intended. 
The question then arises whether and how to measure CRA’s 
effectiveness in changing lending behavior as a cost.  In my judgment, this 
question collapses into the earlier inquiry into the substance of the 
theoretical justification for CRA.  This altered behavior might constitute a 
significant, unjustifiable cost if CRA loans were not profitable or were 
overly risky because such costs would undermine my contention that CRA 
helps to overcome market failures and discrimination.  Macey and Miller 
contend that “the costs of the uneconomic loans that are the implicit price 
of CRA approval” are “significant.”352  Their factual conclusion follows not 
from evidence but inevitably from their view that banks and thrifts would 
have made the loans if they were profitable because that is how competitive 
markets work.  But the Federal Reserve Board’s evidence suggests that 
CRA lending is relatively profitable and relatively safe.353  This evidence is 
more consistent with the theoretical justifications for CRA.  Thus, the cost 
to banks and thrifts during or in anticipation of the merger process that 
arises from altered lending practices is likely to be relatively low and 
justified by CRA’s role in overcoming market failures and discrimination.  
As discussed earlier, the benefits to low-income communities seem to be 
high, consistent with the view that CRA is helping to overcome such 
market deficiencies.  In sum, the critics overstated the costs of CRA to 
efficient mergers for the same reason that they overstated the costs of CRA 
to bank safety and soundness.  Markets sometimes do not work as well as 
they should, and CRA incentives do not appear to result in costly lending. 
3. Rent-Seeking 
Macey and Miller—and prominent political figures such as former 
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm of Texas—argue that 
CRA creates fertile ground for pervasive “rent-seeking” or “extortion” by 
community groups using the application process to force banks and thrifts 
to make grants to their organizations.354  In their view, “[m]any of these 
groups have become adept at using the CRA as a vehicle for extracting 
payments from depository institutions, either for their own maintenance 
 
30, 2005). 
 351 Id. at 16–17. 
 352 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 323. 
 353 See supra text accompanying notes 309–332. 
 354 Phil Gramm, The New Banking Legislation: The Financial Modernization for the Twenty-
First Century, 53 SMU L. REV. 371, 373 (2000); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295–96. 
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and welfare or for their favored causes.”355  They argue that “[p]roviding 
support and assistance to the most effective local pressure groups and 
community activists is often the best way to purchase what amounts to an 
insurance policy against the threat of a CRA challenge….”356  There are 
undoubtedly cases of abuses of the kind alleged by CRA’s critics, but these 
critics overstate the extent of the problem, and understate the extent to 
which community groups can play a role in overcoming market failures. 
Critics of CRA tend to lump grants to community groups and rent-
seeking together.  In analyzing this question, I distinguish grants to 
community groups that add value to banks, thrifts, and society generally by 
improving the ability of creditors to make sound loans, from grants that 
waste resources by simply redistributing bank income for community 
groups’ private purposes.  To the extent that community groups engage in 
the latter activity, it is properly thought of as rent-seeking and is socially 
wasteful.  Rent-seeking has occurred when transfers produce transaction 
costs but no social benefit, or more broadly when the costs of transfers 
exceed the social benefit.357  To the extent that community groups engage 
in the former set of activities, however, transfers may contribute to net 
social gains in overcoming market failures and discrimination.   
There are theoretical grounds for believing there is less rent-seeking 
than critics suggested.  The highly public nature of CRA examinations and 
the resulting evaluations, merger reviews and the availability of public 
hearings during such reviews, and written public comments and publicized 
protests make rent-seeking difficult to conceal.  In addition, the 
involvement of regulators, banks, and a relatively large number of 
community groups make capture of all the relevant players much more 
costly.  The fact that these players must repeatedly interact with one 
another in the regulatory process increases incentives for reasonable 
conduct.358 
In addition, available evidence suggests that rent-seeking under CRA 
is not of the size or scale alleged.  As noted above, only a small percentage 
of applications receive public comment, and few are delayed or denied on 
that basis.  Banks and thrifts often promise to do more lending during 
merger reviews.  The fact that community protests succeed in convincing 
 
 355 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 333. 
 356 Id. at 335. 
 357 See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 3, 228 (1967) (explaining socially wasteful effects of rent-seeking); Anne O. Krueger, 
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (coining the 
phrase “rent seeking”). 
 358 On the role of public involvement in improving the regulatory process, see IAN AYRES & 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 
71–73 (1992) (explaining how involvement of private sector, regulator and public interest groups 
can help to deter capture through “tripartism”). 
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banks and thrifts to issue voluntary pledges or even to make agreements 
with community groups to do more CRA lending to low-income borrowers 
or communities is not improper in and of itself.  In fact, increased lending 
in such communities is precisely the point of CRA. 
The banking agencies have not provided comprehensive data on CRA 
agreements.  Analysis by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 
an umbrella organization of community groups, suggests that only a small 
fraction of “CRA agreements,” which are themselves a small fraction of 
CRA activity engaged in by banks and thrifts, result in payments—for 
services or otherwise—to the community groups making the “protest.”359  
According to their report, recent disclosures required under the “sunshine” 
amendments to CRA have revealed little evidence of the rent-seeking 
feared:360  Only 0.3% of loans and investments committed under CRA 
agreements went to operating support for community groups.361   
Some of these payments may be improper, but even with respect to 
agreements involving payments, one must examine whether the payments 
are appropriate payments for services in furtherance of making sound loans 
(such as home buyer credit counseling) or are used for some unrelated 
purpose.  One would need to analyze whether these operating funds 
furthered the banks’ ability to meet their obligations under CRA before 
deciding whether to characterize even these operating support funds as 
rent-seeking.  Bank support for community organizations is a legitimate 
way to help overcome market failures.  Such community organizations can 
reduce the costs of acquiring and interpreting information about low-
income borrowers and communities, can help coordinate lending activities 
to overcome collective action problems, and can share risk to reduce bank 
exposure to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that arise from 
information asymmetries.  In my view, the new requirements for disclosure 
of these payments ought to minimize further any concerns about improper 
rent-seeking by community-based organizations. 
A recent study by Bostic and Robinson confirms the view that CRA 
agreements can enhance the performance of bank and thrift lending.  The 
study found that banks and thrifts increased their lending significantly after 
entering into CRA agreements.362  Moreover, the study found that CRA 
agreements that included a role for community groups in mortgage 
 
 359 See NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA SUNSHINE REVEALS BENEFITS OF 
BANK-COMMUNITY GROUP PARTNERSHIPS 11 (2002), at 
http://69.36.186.20/policy/cra/Sunshine_report_with_covers.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). 
 360 Id.  
 361 Id. at 11. The CRA Sunshine provisions are found at 12 U.S.C. § 1831y (2000). 
 362 See generally Raphael Bostic & Breck L. Robinson, What Makes CRA Agreements Work? 
A Study of Lender Responses to CRA Agreements (2003), 
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2003_conf_paper_session5_bostic.pdf. 
74
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 175 
 
counseling and technical assistance resulted in higher levels of lending.363  
These higher levels of lending continued even after the terms of the 
agreements had ended, and the effects were more pronounced the longer 
the agreement, providing support for the view that CRA agreements had 
led institutions over time to find profitable lending opportunities in low-
income communities.364  Bostic and Robinson’s study thus undermines the 
argument of critics who alleged that CRA agreements are generally a costly 
form of rent-seeking. 
4. Compliance Costs 
As the critics note, banks and thrifts also face other costs of 
compliance with CRA that should be weighed in evaluating whether CRA 
is an efficient response to market failures and discrimination.  These 
compliance costs include, for example, paperwork burdens, examination 
time, compliance officers, and the geocoding of loan data.365  These types 
of costs are difficult to measure; regulators likely underestimate them, 
downplaying transition costs, while industry trade groups tend to inflate 
them, often by conflating transition costs with ongoing ones.366   
The bank and thrift regulators estimated in 1999 that the annual 
compliance burden from CRA for data collection and reporting was about 
554 to 635 hours per year for large banks and about ten hours per year for 
small banks, totaling nearly 1.25 million hours per year and costing $35.4 
million industry-wide.367  That year, such a compliance burden would have 
constituted essentially 0% of the $6 trillion in bank assets and 3 billion 
hours of total bank employee time,368 and less than 0.2% of the cost of bank 
regulation.369  Even though these more recent estimates for large banks are 
much higher than they had been at the time of the 1995 reforms, as 
 
 363 Id. at 20. 
 364 Id. at 18–19. 
 365 Related to compliance cost is the administrative cost to the banking agencies of 
implementing CRA, including examinations, merger reviews, and, perhaps, the community 
development staff who publish information about best practices and engage in outreach with 
banks and community groups.  Unfortunately, there is no data of which I am aware that would 
shed light on the magnitude of these costs.  Further empirical research would usefully add to this 
analysis. 
 366 I thank Howell Jackson for this insight. 
 367 Submission for OMB Review, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,083, 29,084, 29,086 (Treasury Dep’t May 
28, 1999), and author’s calculations based on id. 
 368 Author’s calculations based on CRA-Banks and Thrifts with Assets Over $250 Million 
Sheshunoff Database (1998) (on file with the New York University Law Review).  
 369 This calculation derives from GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, THE COST OF BANK REGULATION: 
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 23 (1998) (estimating that total costs of bank regulation in 1991 
were $15.7 billion), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/171/ss171.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2005).  Presumably, the total cost of bank regulation increased between 1991 and 1999, 
thus the 0.2% estimate may even overstate the relative cost of CRA data reporting. 
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regulators had underestimated geocoding costs, the 1999 figures are 
strikingly low, and such costs have likely decreased since 1999.370 
Moreover, the 1995 regulations streamlined CRA compliance for 
small banks.  Small banks are not required to collect or report small 
business or small farm lending data under CRA and examiners evaluate 
their performance based on data collected either in the normal course of 
business or pursuant to other regulations, including the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA).371  In addition, small banks are subject only to a 
streamlined lending examination, rather than a full scope review under the 
lending, investment, and services tests.372  The Independent Community 
Bankers of America (ICBA), the trade group for small- to mid-sized banks, 
surveyed its membership about the costs of CRA regulation.373  Although 
the study is designed to highlight the high compliance costs of CRA, the 
data reported in the study suggest otherwise.  The mean employee cost for 
CRA compliance was $84,445 per year for small banks, with average assets 
of $216 million, and about $30,000 more per year for larger “community” 
banks, with average assets of $666 million.374  CRA employee costs as a 
percentage of assets were negligible—0.017% for larger “community” 
banks, and 0.039% for small banks.375 
Surveys of bank compliance officers also suggest that the 1995 
reforms reduced the compliance burdens of CRA.  The overall compliance 
costs of CRA do not rank high, relative to previous years, in the most 
recent ABA survey of compliance burdens.376  CRA ranked ninth out of 
twenty laws and regulations studied, just after Flood Insurance Rules.377  
This rank represents a dramatic improvement over just a decade ago, when 
 
 370 Geocoding costs likely have come down significantly since then, now that the fixed costs 
of new systems have been absorbed and loans can be entered automatically rather than manually. 
 371 In part, this shifts some of the costs of compliance from small banks to the regulators, who 
have to do more to assess the institution’s lending than if the bank kept more detailed data.  This 
shifted compliance cost is borne in part, depending on the institution regulated and the funding 
structure of the relevant federal agency, by general bank assessments that support the relevant 
agency, in part by deposit insurance premia (to the extent paid), and in part by taxpayers (to the 
extent that the agency is supported by interest on reserves). 
 372 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.26 (2005) (small bank performance standards); § 25.42 (noting that 
small banks are not required to collect data required under this provision). 
 373 GRANT THORNTON, supra note 330.  The ICBA survey had only a 28% response rate (276 
responses to 1000 surveys) and thus should be treated with caution.  Id. at 3. 
 374 Id. at 4, 13.  The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) surveyed small 
banks, as well as larger “community” banks with assets up to $2 billion. 
 375 Author’s calculations, based on ICBA survey.  See id. 
 376 Being Good Is Just the Beginning: The Nationwide Bank Compliance Officer Survey, ABA 
BANKING J., June 2003, at 35. 
 377 The top ten of the twenty studied, in order from most costly to least, were Bank Secrecy, 
Privacy, Truth in Lending, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act, Truth in Savings, Fair Lending, Flood Insurance, CRA, and Electronic Funds Transfer Act.  
Id. at 35 (ranking higher in bank categories over $1 billion). 
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CRA often topped the ABA survey for most burdensome regulation before 
the 1995 reforms.378  And the improvement came during a time of 
acknowledged increase in scrutiny of activities regulated by CRA and 
improved CRA performance. 
Critics of CRA also contend that the vagueness of CRA’s standard 
leads to uncertainty about what will be required of banks and thrifts in the 
CRA examination and merger process and that this uncertainty itself raises 
compliance costs.379  Costs may be higher because lenders devote 
significant time and resources to documenting activities that turn out to be 
relatively unimportant to the examination, or because uncertainty induces 
them to undertake activities that in their best judgments are not safe and 
sound or profitable.  One might also categorize banks undertaking more 
CRA-eligible activity than necessary to achieve the bank’s desired rating as 
a cost, even if the activity is profitable and sound.  This additional activity 
may have an opportunity cost from the bank’s perspective.  However, the 
additional CRA activity, if prudent, also confers a social benefit that must 
be weighed in addition to the profit to the institution.  Of course, the 
obverse case would constitute a significant cost:  That is, if banks and 
thrifts underestimate the level of performance required to achieve a 
satisfactory grade, their poor performance might lead to a lower-than-
expected grade, bad public relations, a lower likelihood of being acquired, 
or a delay in a proposed merger. 
Although Macey and Miller charged that the pre-1995-reform CRA 
process was so vague as to give regulators unfettered discretion,380 recent 
evidence suggests that CRA generally was applied consistently even during 
the early 1990s.  A recent study analyzing CRA examinations for several 
thousand commercial banks from 1990 to 1996 found that the scheduling of 
CRA examinations and the persistence of examination ratings tracked 
home mortgage loan levels and other key objective factors.381  In 
scheduling examinations, “supervisors allocate[d] their resources toward 
institutions with observed CRA compliance inadequacies.”382  Moreover, 
 
 378 See Burden of Regulation: Bank Compliance Costs Equal More Than Half of Industry 
Profits, BANKING POL’Y REP., July 6, 1992, at 5; see also AM. BANKING ASS’N, CUT THE RED 
TAPE (Nov. 1992) (finding that CRA topped the list for “most time-consuming” regulation and 
“most headaches” among 34% and 40% of banks surveyed, respectively) (on file with the New 
York University Law Review). 
 379 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 226, at 117. 
 380 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 326–29; see also Leonard Bierman et al., The 
Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 398 
(1994) (identifying “apparent subjectivity involved in the awarding of rankings” as “most 
troubling problem in the administration of the CRA”). 
 381 Drew Dahl et al., The Timing and Persistence of CRA Compliance Ratings, 23 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES. 113, 114 (2003). 
 382 Id. at 123. 
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the “level of residential lending” influenced the CRA ratings of banks.383  
That is, CRA ratings were found to be primarily related to performance, not 
community “griping,” extortion, or regulator arbitrariness.  The study 
concluded that “CRA enforcement during this period reflected, at least in 
part, objective evaluation criteria.”384   
The study’s findings of relative congruence between rating and 
performance undermine critics’ charges of the inherent arbitrariness of 
standards.  Furthermore, the study focused on the period prior to full 
implementation of the 1995 reforms.  Regulator consistency likely has 
improved substantially under the 1995 reforms, which focus more on 
objective measures of lending, investment, and services.  Still, critics are 
right to focus on the importance of consistent application of standards, and 
to look for ways in which regulators can perform better in that regard, both 
within and across banking agencies. 
Shareholder value is another possible measure of compliance costs.  
One study argued that the 1995 CRA reforms had little effect on 
shareholder value and so did not reduce compliance costs.385  The problems 
faced by event studies, which seek to measure the way in which an event, 
such as a regulatory change, enhance shareholder value as measured, 
usually, by stock price, in general are well known.386  Carefully designed 
event studies nevertheless can shed light on regulatory changes designed to 
enhance shareholder value.387  Yet an event study of a reform (such as the 
1995 CRA regulatory amendments) whose purpose was not solely to 
increase shareholder value, but rather to reduce compliance costs, increase 
lending, and focus on “performance, not paperwork,” is more complicated 
to evaluate from an event-study perspective.  For example, the CRA 
reforms may have had zero net effect on shareholders, while shifting 
compliance costs from less productive processes to investments that lead to 
more effective lending.  In addition, given that the 1995 CRA reforms 
continued to employ a standard, with room for regulatory discretion, it is 
not surprising that the reforms did not generate a measurable increase in 
shareholder value immediately after the final rule was released.  Gains (or 
losses) to shareholders would take a long time for even informationally 
efficient financial markets to transmit, as banks, thrifts and their regulators 
 
 383 Id. at 130. 
 384 Id. at 113. 
 385 David P. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in Need of 
Further Reform? Evidence from Equity Markets During the 1995 Reform Process, 23 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES. 59, 75 (2003). 
 386 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuck et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1792–93 (2002) (discussing problem of confounding events). 
 387 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law:  Part I:  
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AMER. LAW & ECON. REV. 141 (2002). 
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gained experience under the new CRA standards.  As the authors 
acknowledge, their results “could also reflect substantial uncertainty over 
the benefits and costs that might arise from reform until it becomes clear 
how the new rules will be implemented.”388 
In sum, the critics have significantly overstated the costs of CRA.  
CRA lending does not appear to be unprofitable and overly risky.  There is 
little evidence that CRA has had a significant chilling effect on efficient 
mergers and acquisitions; instead, merger reviews seem to contribute to 
increased levels of CRA lending.  Charges of rampant rent-seeking by 
community groups based on anecdotal evidence do not seem to be 
supported by the record, although there may be individual cases of abuse.389  
While it is difficult to measure all of the compliance and administrative 
costs of CRA, available evidence suggests that such costs are quite low by 
a number of important measures of regulatory burden.   
The relatively low costs and high benefits of CRA support the 
theoretical case that CRA is helping to overcome market failures 
reasonably efficiently.  If market failures and discrimination were absent, 
one would have expected studies to find little or no independent role for 
CRA and highly unprofitable, risky lending when such a role is to be 
found.  The evidence instead tends to support the opposite conclusion:  
Market failures and discrimination likely persist, and CRA appears to be 
helping to overcome them.  Moreover, the empirical case undermines 
critics’ contentions that CRA is poorly designed to overcome these failures.  
Instead, the evidence tends to support the view that CRA is a plausible 
policy response to these problems.  With the foregoing analysis as a 
foundation, the next Part reexamines from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective the critics’ contentions that the approach of using a standard for 
CRA, rather than a rule-based regime, is flawed. 
V 
CRA’S STANDARDS APPROACH COMPARED TO A RULES APPROACH 
 
Many of the criticisms of CRA described in Part II find at their root a 
criticism of the decision to employ a standard rather than a rule.  Critics’ 
arguments about uncertainty, regulatory discretion, and rent-seeking, as 
well as policy arguments in favor of safe harbors or tradeable obligations, 
boil down to arguments in favor of rules as opposed to standards.  In this 
Part, I first defend the choice for CRA of something closer to a standard 
rather than something closer to a rule, and draw some broader implications 
 
 388 Ely & Robinson, supra note 385, at 65 n.3 (citation omitted). 
 389 Needless to say, however, I have not examined every case of alleged misbehavior and there 
may have been individual instances of such problems. 
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for the standards versus rules debate more generally.  Parts V.B and V.C 
reject proposals to integrate tradeable permits and safe harbors, 
respectively, into CRA.  Both of these proposals would make CRA a more 
rule-based regulatory regime.  Although there are some advantages to both 
proposals, I will argue that they would likely not be preferable to the 
current approach. 
A. CRA’s Standard Compared to a Rule 
The CRA statute and its implementing regulations can be 
characterized as employing an approach closer to legal standards than rules.  
Schlag defines rules as having an “empirical” trigger and a “determined” 
response while standards are defined as having an “evaluative” trigger and 
a “guided” response.390  Another way of thinking about standards and rules 
is to think of them as lying on a continuum, from mechanistic, computer-
programming-type rules (e.g., if a = 1, then go to c), which provide an 
“empirical” trigger with a “determined” response, to open-ended standards 
that require judgment (e.g., decide whether this action is “just” based only 
on “human experience”), which provide an “evaluative” trigger with a 
(quite loosely) “guided” response.  Actual legal rules and standards fall 
somewhere between these extremes. 
The CRA statute directs banking agencies to “assess the institution’s 
record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community” and to “take 
such record into account” in evaluating applications for mergers, 
acquisitions, and branch openings and closings.391  The structure of the 
agencies’ responsibilities under the statute is evaluative and guided rather 
than determined.  Under the regulations, a bank’s or thrift’s “performance 
under the tests and standards in the rule is judged in the context of 
information about the institution, its community, its competitors, and its 
peers.”392  That is, bank regulators provide no fixed requirement for banks 
to undertake a certain level of activity, but rather make a judgment about 
the institution’s performance in the context in which it is operating. 
As the statute’s standard is implemented, first through regulation, then 
examiner guidance, and finally individual examinations and merger 
reviews, repeated many times across institutions, experience will suggest 
patterns of regulatory response that could be articulated as something like 
“rules.”  Financial institutions and regulators develop experience that in a 
given market with given constraints, a given level of lending is “enough”—
 
 390 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382–83 (1985). 
 391 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2000). 
 392 Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,162 
(May 4, 1995) (codified at Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production 
Regulations, 12 C.F.R.  § 25.21(b) (2003)). 
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all to the good in terms of predictability.  If it were not so cumbersome, one 
could label the results of such iterative learning a “rule derived from a 
standard” or a “learned-rule-standard,” or some such hybrid, and nothing 
would be lost in terms of my argument here.  I am not relying on the label 
of “standard” as such, but on the fact of contextualism and bottom-up 
engagement to suggest the features of this approach that are promising. 
The debate over whether standards or rules should be preferred has a 
long pedigree.393  Three basic approaches emerge in this debate.  First, 
scholars have identified philosophical underpinnings of rules and 
standards.394  Second, other scholars have rejected the notion that formal 
distinctions between rules and standards have any meaning.395  A third 
group of scholars has attempted to discern general principles for deciding 
when standards or rules are more appropriate.396  Among the last group, 
law-and-economics scholars have used transaction-cost economics to argue 
that the higher cost of articulating rules ex ante is worthwhile when many 
people engage in the activity being regulated, multiplying the ex post 
transaction costs many times over.397  Yet translating transaction-cost 
theory into application is difficult because it is hard to measure the costs 
and benefits of alternative rules and standards formulations. 
Critics of CRA have argued that its standards approach results in 
arbitrary and inefficient enforcement, permits rent-seeking by banking 
agencies and community groups, and violates basic notions of the rule of 
law.398  CRA’s critics tend to espouse rhetoric that would support the notion 
that deep philosophical differences underlie the distinction between rules 
 
 393 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72–73 (1944); MARK KELMAN, 
A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN 
LIFE 149–55 (1991); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 
82 VA. L. REV. 181, 185 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 
42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 101–07 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 577 (1988); Schlag, supra note 390. 
 394 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 393, at 1685 (arguing that standards reflect altruism while 
rules reflect individualism); Rose, supra note 393, at 609 (suggesting that debate is over what our 
relationship with strangers should be). 
 395 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 393, at 819 (arguing that every application of rule involves 
reinterpretation of it); Schlag, supra note 390, at 383 (arguing opposition between rules and 
standards is “arrested” dialectic). 
 396 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 393, at 1710 (listing qualities associated with rules and 
standards). 
 397 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 393, at 562–63.  But see Posner, supra note 393, at 103–04 
(arguing that logic of economic optimization implied by Kaplow’s approach leads to infinite 
regress rather than basis for decisionmaking); Rose, supra note 393, at 609 (criticizing law-and-
economics approaches). 
 398 See supra Part II. 
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and standards, but the anti-formalists are right that standards can be made 
to look like rules, and vice versa, undermining the importance of such a 
gulf.  Legal directives can take forms arrayed on a continuum from those 
that are more standard-like to those that are more rule-like.  Thus, for the 
purposes of analyzing CRA, I adopt a pragmatic approach and ask whether 
something like the standards approach of CRA is preferable to a more 
rules-based approach. 
The lack of certainty in standards for meeting community needs under 
CRA does have ex post compliance costs.  Lacking a numerical target 
imposed by regulators makes it more difficult for firms to know whether 
their CRA initiatives will result in the rating they seek.  Firms may 
“overcomply” with CRA, particularly given the social norm of 
disapprobation that accompanies a low rating.399  Each examiner may 
review bank performance using implicitly different standards, leading to 
inconsistent evaluations even by a single regulator.  Examiners may vary in 
their standards across regulators and regions, magnifying the likelihood of 
inconsistency.  The lack of precision in setting a standard is a matter of 
degree, and the pre-1995 CRA standard was widely criticized for 
vagueness and circularity.400 
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for preferring a standard to a 
rule for CRA.  First, a standard is likely to be more efficient than a rule in 
this context.  Kaplow suggests that the cost of rulemaking will be higher ex 
ante than the cost of developing a standard.401  How much higher will 
depend in part on how detailed the rule must be to cover the array of factual 
situations in which it is supposed to apply.  It would be quite costly to 
come up with a rule for CRA that was nuanced enough to fit the myriad 
contexts in which financial institutions lend.  One would want to adjust for 
local market conditions; competition; the structure of the local housing 
market; the presence or absence of community organizations helping with 
screening and educating potential borrowers; the strength of local 
homeowners and civic organizations; local, state, and federal funds 
available for homeownership assistance; the particular characteristics of the 
bank or thrift; and other factors.  Delineating these factors in advance 
would be enormously costly, and even so there would be a high risk of 
getting them wrong.  Moreover, the factors are likely to have to be changed 
over time to keep up with rapid changes in the market.  Even developing 
the current approach under CRA required an extensive notice and comment 
 
 399 For a strong form of this argument, see Posner, supra note 393, at 113–16, describing the 
overcompliance with the social norm against wearing Western-made motorcycle helmets in the 
Soviet Union. 
 400 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 326–27. 
 401 Kaplow, supra note 393, at 562–63. 
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process.  This extensive process drove the ex ante costs of CRA closer to 
the costs of developing a more detailed rule.  Thus, CRA’s standard may 
already have been costlier to develop, ex ante, than an even more general 
standard, and a more detailed rule would have been costlier still. 
To lower costs ex ante, one could adopt a simple set of rules instead.  
One might imagine a system that involved levying fines on banks for 
failure to comply with numerical lending targets.  Setting fines for 
violations of CRA would comport CRA enforcement more closely with 
other areas of bank regulation.  In the 1990s regulatory reform process, the 
regulators considered including fines for banks achieving only a 
“substantial noncompliance” rating on their examination, but dropped the 
idea, in part because other agencies opined that such fines were not 
authorized by the statute.402 
Yet CRA’s contextual standard has significant advantages ex post 
over an approach with fines for violating rules.  Clear, quantitative 
requirements on all firms would be ex post inefficient, at least given the 
existing framework for examinations and merger reviews.403  Different 
firms have different cost structures, scope and scale, and operate in markets 
with different demographics and competitive structures.  Firms make loans 
at different times under different market conditions.  Setting a single rate 
(or rates) of lending in advance would likely cause some firms to be unable 
to meet the standard despite their best efforts, cause others to make 
uneconomic loans, and cause still others to meet the rule without any 
serious effort to lend to low-income borrowers.  Moreover, such a rule 
would become stale over time, and would not easily be adapted to changing 
market conditions. 
By contrast, the CRA standards permit banks to respond to local needs 
based on their own institutional organization, market assessments, and 
business plans, without being judged on the basis of national norms.  
Rather, examiners look to local context and business strategy.  The 
flexibility provided by the performance context assessment is one of the 
most critical aspects of the CRA regulation.  It permits the locally based 
decisionmaking contemplated by Congress in enacting CRA.  Standards 
also diminish the extent to which regulators need fear that CRA would lead 
to “credit allocation,” since the bank makes the judgment about whether, 
and to whom, to extend a loan.404  The CRA standard can evolve with 
 
 402 See Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 
22,158 (May 4, 1995). 
 403 At some much larger number of CRA reviews it would be possible to make transaction 
costs swamp these substantive benefits.  That is, advocates of rules are correct that ex post 
efficiency does depend, in part, on the number of transactions. 
 404 Although critics label CRA “credit allocation,” regulators have avoided quotas or 
approaches involving the government in decisions about the precise level of lending or the proper 
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changes in the market at relatively low cost. 
More broadly, a second reason to prefer a CRA standard over a rule is 
that using standards, together with a process for iterative public comment, 
permits banks and local communities to participate in the formation of the 
legal directive.  This participation occurs not simply in the notice and 
comment process for rulemaking, but in each instance of the application of 
the CRA standard in an examination, or merger review, both of which are 
made public.  Use of a standard with public participation in its application 
has two main benefits:  accuracy and legitimacy. 
CRA lets banks help to shape the content of the standard in CRA’s 
application to them, in their local context, during their CRA evaluation and 
in merger applications.  This increases the likelihood that the performance 
will be analyzed according to the regulated entity’s view of an appropriate 
standard for the institution, as compared with either an industry-wide 
numerical target for lending405 or regulator judgment alone.  On its own, 
such participation might raise important concerns about regulatory capture, 
but CRA examinations and merger reviews are made public, and CRA 
engages citizen participation in the standard setting at the same time. 
CRA examinations, merger reviews, and development of a 
performance context permit greater citizen participation in the formation of 
the assessment, which may also increase its accuracy and its legitimacy.  
CRA assessment through public disclosure, rating the institution’s 
performance, and taking public input permit greater citizen participation in 
the decision about application of the standard.  The public is more likely to 
view application of the standard as legitimate if the public has been 
engaged in the administrative process.  This procedure may be even more 
important in contexts, such as CRA, in which regulators are given 
significant discretion in interpreting a statute.  While public participation in 
detailed rulemaking is also a means to enhance legitimacy, that 
participation occurs only at the moment of the notice and comment process 
 
parties to which to lend.  See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Economic Development in Low- and 
Moderate-Income Communities, Remarks at a Community Forum on Community Reinvestment 
and Access to Credit: California’s Challenge (Jan. 12, 1998), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980112.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2005); see also PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY, supra note 220, at 95–96: 
The legislative history indicates that the Congress did not intend for the CRA to result 
in government-imposed credit allocation.  The expectation, rather, was that banking 
institutions would be proactive in seeking out and serving viable lending opportunities 
in all sections of their communities.  At the same time, it was expected that lending 
activities would be undertaken in a manner consistent with the safe and sound operation 
of banking institutions.  The regulations that implement the CRA reflect these goals.  
They provide for flexibility and direct that performance be evaluated in the context of 
the specific circumstances faced by each institution. 
 405 For analysis of Klausner’s proposal for tradeable obligations based on numerical targets 
and Swire’s proposals for safe harbors based on numerical targets, see infra Parts V.B & V.C. 
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required for rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.  By 
contrast, the process of encouraging public participation in application of 
the standard is an important means to enhance the accountability of the 
regulatory agencies beyond the notice and comment period.  Moreover, the 
iterative process of public engagement also enhances the expertise of local 
organizations, which in turn improves the potential performance of loans 
made in their community, the very purpose of the Act. 
In that regard, public engagement in application of the standard may 
be a useful model in other contexts for enhancing the accountability of 
regulatory agencies and the legitimacy of regulatory action.406  By 
encouraging public engagement throughout the life of the law, such an 
approach is more likely to enhance legitimacy.407  While public 
involvement in implementing a standard that requires regulatory discretion 
adds to the transaction costs of CRA implementation, the benefits of civic 
engagement also should be weighed.  This kind of “bottom-up” lawmaking 
through public engagement in implementing standards can have important 
advantages over clear rules.408  Once a rule is established, there is much less 
room for meaningful citizen participation in its application.  That is, 
standards can open up the possibility for meaningful civic engagement.   
Third, some of the downsides critics generally associate with 
standards, such as arbitrary and unaccountable decisionmaking and agency 
or regulated entity rent-seeking, are mitigated in the case of CRA.  The 
regulator’s CRA review in examinations and merger applications becomes 
public and so can be subjected to analysis, and compared to other CRA 
 
 406 There has been some increased attention recently to enhancing public participation in the 
administrative process.  See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 358, at 71 (arguing that 
public participation can enhance accountability and reduce capture); Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, 
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (on file with author) 
(calling for increased public participation in rule-making through new specialized independent 
agency); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) 
(advocating greater private sector role in administrative process in order to enhance 
accountability).  For an early proponent of greater citizen involvement, see Roger C. Cramton, 
The Why, Where & How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 
GEO. L.J. 525 (1972) (calling for greater public participation in rulemaking). For a skeptical view, 
see generally Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis 
for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000).  
 407 For an example testing the empirical link between participation and perceptions of 
legitimacy, see Michael E. Morrell, Citizens’ Evaluations of Participatory Democratic 
Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science, 52 POL. RES. Q. 293, 317–18 (1999) 
(finding that public acceptance of decisionmaking increased with frequency of public 
participation).  
 408 Cf. PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 452 
(2000) (describing bottom-up forms of law as presenting low administrative costs, embeddedness, 
and high legitimacy); see also Orin L. McCluskey, The Community Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing 
the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33, 57 (1983) (coining phrase “regulation from below” to describe 
role of community groups under CRA). 
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reviews by the same and other bank agencies, both as to individual 
institutions and across the industry.  The review includes notice and 
comment proceedings, often with the opportunity for hearings, which 
enhances transparency and permits all affected parties to provide input.  
Regulators, community organizations, and banks and thrifts have repeated 
interactions over time on the same issues, unlike parties who appear before 
a judge only once.  The iterative nature of these interactions increases the 
incentives for consistent, reasonable, and reliable analyses from all three of 
the major players—regulators, the public, and banks.  The continuing role 
for the public in implementing the standard helps to diminish the possibility 
that the agencies will be captured by the entities that they regulate.409  
These factors increase accountability and minimize the opportunities for 
abuse. 
Fourth, the form of a legal directive as a standard rather than a rule 
conveys social meaning and affects enforcement.410  The form of the legal 
directive can enhance compliance because the law helps create social 
norms, reveals instances in which actors transgress those norms, and 
contributes to compliance even absent legal consequences.  Public 
engagement with the meaning of CRA’s standard can reinforce a norm of 
access to credit.  If the public cares about the social norm of access to 
credit, and if creditors care about their reputation with the public, CRA’s 
effectiveness can be enhanced through public acceptance of the social 
norm.  Of course, as critics of standards suggest, the social norm may push 
behavior beyond what is efficient or fall short of what was intended by the 
promulgators of the standard. 
CRA’s broad standards and “enforcement” mechanisms—public 
disclosure of examination results and consideration of the institution’s 
CRA performance during merger applications—have long been derided by 
both proponents and detractors of CRA.  Community advocates urge 
stricter rules and harsher consequences of failure.  Bankers lament the lack 
of clear rules or safe harbors and the intrusive role of the public.  Yet it is 
this interplay, this conversation, between banks and communities that is 
 
 409 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 358, at 71–73 (arguing that public interest groups 
can help to prevent capture).  In other countries where the concern over corruption is larger, and 
transparency more lacking, detailed rules might be preferable to standards on grounds of 
legitimacy even if citizen input is minimal, assuming the rule itself is not substantively 
oppressive.  I am not making a claim that standards with citizen input are more legitimate than 
detailed rules in all circumstances, but rather that in the context of the application of CRA to 
banks and thrifts in the United States, the standards approach likely enhances the legitimacy of 
CRA.  The same point is of course true with respect to efficiency; if government is ineffectual or 
incompetent, rules might be preferable on efficiency grounds. 
 410 See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (providing comprehensive account of aims 
and features of expressive theories). 
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one of CRA’s chief virtues.  A rule setting forth lending requirements 
would cut off this dialogue.  It would also send a message that banks are to 
disregard creditworthiness, business strategy, and local context, which is 
not the goal of CRA.  In this respect, CRA’s legal directive appropriately 
takes the form of a standard rather than a rule. 
CRA’s broad standard expresses the value of inclusion in lending.  
Because interpretation of CRA’s standard requires community input, CRA 
expresses an inclusive ideal of participation in rulemaking that should be 
counted among the law’s benefits.  The expressive effects of law should be 
considered alongside the operational effects.411  Even welfare economists 
acknowledge that expressive factors, like other non-consequentialist 
factors, may be included in concepts of utility or well-being that aggregate 
to social welfare.412  Thus, under either an expressive or a utilitarian theory 
of value, to the extent that CRA’s norms of inclusion resonate with low-
income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers, such expression ought 
to be regarded as a benefit of CRA.  CRA conveys that borrowers who 
have been left out of the economic mainstream ought to be treated with 
respect by lenders and regulators alike.  This expressive function of CRA 
can bring real benefits, as attested to by members of these communities. 
B. CRA’s Standard Reasonably Addresses Market Failures and Does So 
Better than Tradeable Obligations 
In Part IV, I argued that CRA’s standard was a reasonable policy 
response to market failures and discrimination in low-income communities.  
Michael Klausner argued at the time of the 1995 CRA reforms that CRA 
was the wrong response to market failures that he deemed likely to exist in 
low-income communities and that a rules-based regime would be 
preferable.413  In particular, he contended that CRA impedes specialization 
among banks in serving low-income communities and makes it difficult for 
banks to internalize information externalities, either directly or indirectly 
through lending consortia.414  Klausner argued that banks and thrifts could 
not invest efficiently in the expertise needed to lend successfully in all the 
low-income communities within their assessment areas.415  Moreover, he 
argued, if many banks and thrifts seek to serve the same low-income area, 
each lender will not be able to internalize its information costs, as 
 
 411 Cf. id. But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (arguing that expressive theories are not persuasive). 
 412 Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1009 (2001) (asserting that “welfare economics takes into account any effect of a legal rule that is 
pertinent to anyone’s well-being,” while criticizing fairness-based theories of policy evaluation). 
 413 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1564. 
 414 Id. at 1574. 
 415 Id. at 1574–75. 
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successful lending will benefit competitors in that area.416  Furthermore, 
with large numbers of creditors involved, he argued that coordination to 
develop loan consortia would be more difficult.417  In addition, Klausner 
suggested that competition from big banks seeking to meet CRA 
obligations would hurt specialized lenders focusing on low-income areas.418  
Klausner argued that less competition among banks for scarce loans in low-
income areas, rather than more competition, would permit banks to 
internalize more of their costs and develop expertise in low-income 
areas.419   
Instead of CRA, Klausner suggested a rule, in the form of a quota for 
lending to low-income borrowers that could be met by trading obligations 
among banks.420  In his view, a tradable quota would permit banks to 
specialize in lending to particular communities where they could invest in 
information or in funding loans rather than originating them.  
Specialization would mean less competition, greater cost internalization, 
and easier coordination among fewer lenders seeking to form loan 
consortia in low-income areas.  Lastly, he argued that a tradeable quota 
would cost less than the discretionary standards implicit in CRA.421 
Based on nearly a decade of experience since the 1995 reforms, 
evaluated in detail in Part IV, I argue that CRA is reasonably aimed at 
overcoming the market failures both Klausner and I believe to exist in low-
income communities, and that the current CRA standard is preferable to the 
rules-based, quota-and-trade system Klausner proposed. 
First, fostering competition among banks and thrifts in serving low-
income areas is good, not bad.  Banks generally do not want to be the sole 
lender in a low-income community.  Banks perceive less risk when other 
lenders are serving a low-income community after applying their own 
credit criteria regarding property values and neighborhood characteristics, 
loan terms, and borrower credit scores.  Larger volumes of lending from 
diverse sources add liquidity to the market and help to overcome 
incomplete markets; that added liquidity decreases the riskiness of each 
bank’s loan.  CRA fosters competition among banks and thrifts in serving 
low- and moderate-income communities in a variety of ways.  At bottom, 
banks and thrifts have an affirmative obligation under CRA to lend in their 
entire communities.422  Moreover, they are judged, in part, based on an 
assessment of their market share in low-income communities as compared 
 
 416 Id. at 1576. 
 417 Id. at 1577. 
 418 Id. at 1575. 
 419 Id. at 1574–75. 
 420 Id. at 1580. 
 421 Id. at 1585–91. 
 422 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (2000). 
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to their peer institutions.423 
Second, CRA has helped, not deterred, banks in developing 
specialization in serving low-income communities.  One important type of 
specialization spans geographic areas:  innovation in developing products 
that meet the credit needs of low-income areas with manageable risks.  And 
CRA does encourage banks to develop specialization in serving particular 
geographic areas.  For example, banks partner with Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and community-based 
organizations to penetrate low-income markets where they have not 
operated at scale before.424  CRA encourages banks to do this directly, 
through the investment test,425 and indirectly, because banks view 
partnering with these specialized entities as important ways to meet their 
obligations under the investment, lending, and services tests.426 
Third, competition from banks and thrifts under CRA has helped, not 
hurt, specialized lenders; these lenders complement, but do not replace, 
large institutions.  Under CRA, banks and thrifts have entered markets 
where only specialized institutions such as ShoreBank, the grandfather of 
the community development banking sector, had worked before.  But the 
effect of entry has been positive.  ShoreBank and other institutions like it 
demonstrated the possibility of lending in low-income communities and 
have partnered with banks on an ongoing basis.  Specialized lenders 
provide local expertise, cover some of the costs of lending in low-income 
areas (such as financial education and counseling), and take portions of the 
risk of a particular loan or project that banks do not want to bear.  In turn, 
banks have invested in CDFIs in record numbers, spurred in part by the 
CRA investment test.427  Investments in CDFIs strengthen the ability of 
banks and thrifts to serve low-income markets.  As banks offer services 
once only offered by CDFIs, the local institutions move further 
“downstream,” reaching lower-income or harder-to-serve borrowers and 
developing new approaches that mainstream institutions later may find 
cost-effective.  Specialized lenders play important roles in low-income 
communities, but they are no substitute for robust and competitive markets 
that include mainstream banks and thrifts.428 
Fourth, CRA provides a pre-commitment device that actually helps 
banks coordinate lending to reduce information costs.  Because CRA 
 
 423 Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations,  
12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(2)(i) (2003). 
 424 See supra note 221. 
 425 See Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12 
C.F.R. § 25.23 (2003). 
 426 See supra note 221. 
 427 Id. 
 428 See supra Part IV. 
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requires all insured depositories to lend to their entire communities, it 
reduces the free-rider problems that otherwise would plague loan consortia.  
In other words, even though Klausner is right that a monopoly also would 
avoid the problem of free riders, CRA can reduce or eliminate the problem 
of under-production from externalities by requiring banks to compete to 
lend in these communities in any event.  CRA thus serves as a pre-
commitment device to coordinate lending and overcome collective action 
problems.  As evidence from the last decade that I evaluated in Part IV 
attests, CRA has spurred the development of loan consortia to learn how to 
serve low- and moderate-income communities more effectively.  The 1995 
regulations treat loans made by such consortia as “community development 
lending” rather than home mortgage or small business lending.  Yet 
community development lending is an important part of an institution’s 
performance under the CRA lending test.  Moreover, institutions can and 
do easily move consortia home mortgage or small business loans onto their 
own books as home mortgage or small business originations or purchases 
when appropriate, where they “count” toward the CRA lending test.429 
Lastly, CRA after the 1995 reforms provides much of the flexibility 
and other benefits Klausner’s proposal for tradeable obligations would have 
offered.430  And it does so without the downside of fixed quotas for lending, 
which are not required for a trading system to work.  Under the 1995 
reforms, banks and thrifts get equal CRA consideration for both originating 
 
 429 See Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12 
C.F.R. § 25.22(a)(3), (d) (2004); Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 
Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,166 (May 4, 1995) (codified at Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate 
Deposit Production Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (2003)) (“Loans originated directly on the 
books of the institution or purchased by the institution are considered to have been made directly 
by the institution, even if the institution originated or purchased the loans as a result of its 
participation in a loan consortium.”). 
 430 CRA shares some traits with the kind of output regulations Klausner favors.  Output 
regulation, increasingly favored in the environmental protection context, usually sets a numerical 
target for performance rather than requiring a firm to undertake certain specified actions that 
would affect the target.  For example, an environmental output regulation might set a level for 
emission of a particular pollutant, but permit the firm to figure out how to meet that emission 
standard.  Output regulation can be more efficient than input regulation because it lets firms 
choose how to shape conduct to meet output requirements.  See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 
26, at 230–31 (differentiating between “performance-based”—or “output”—regulations and 
“input” regulations).  Firms presumably have greater expertise in figuring out which technology 
and management practice it can most efficiently use to meet the numerical target. 
  CRA is similar to output regulation, in that under the 1995 revisions, regulators no longer 
look to such “input” factors as how many community meetings the bank held, but rather to the 
bank’s actual performance in meeting community credit needs.  Moreover, banks and thrifts rely 
on their own expertise and judgment in meeting community credit needs.  Compared with input 
regulation over credit practices, for example, requiring a certain kind of underwriting, this type of 
output regulation provides for greater flexibility and enhances rather than stifles innovation.  
CRA, however, lacks numerical targets normally associated with output regulation, and 
employing a standard, rather than a rule, for output regulation is unusual.  
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and purchasing eligible loans,431 creating a sort of trading system.  
Institutions can rely on the origination expertise of others to purchase loans 
on the robust market for CRA loans.  The development of this CRA loan 
market increases liquidity and reduces loan prices.  It also improves 
transparency in CRA loan pricing, providing valuable information to 
regulators, communities, and banks and thrifts themselves about the 
performance and profitability of CRA lending. 
C. The Standards Approach Compares Favorably with Safe Harbors 
Peter Swire argued prior to the 1995 reforms that “enforcement” of 
CRA through both regular examinations and reviews after “episodic” 
protests of applications for mergers ought to be replaced with a safe harbor 
for institutions that achieve some given level of CRA performance.432  As 
Swire explains, safe harbors are, in effect, a partial rules-based regime.433  
In his view, a safe harbor would provide a strong incentive for banks to 
make more loans or invest in CDFIs at lower compliance costs.  This 
proposal was an effort to strengthen CRA in reaction to an earlier period 
thought to have been characterized by high bureaucratic burden and weak 
CRA results.  Under his proposal, regulators would set a target level of 
community development investment.434  If a bank met the target, the 
institution would not undergo CRA examinations or face CRA scrutiny 
during merger applications.  Variations of the Swire proposal, under which 
banks receiving an “outstanding” rating on their most recent examination 
would not face CRA scrutiny during merger reviews, were discussed in 
1995, and have been introduced in Congress repeatedly since then.435 
A safe harbor based on a bank’s CRA rating has a number of 
disadvantages compared to the current approach.  First, a bank’s CRA 
rating can become stale.  Circumstances can change after an examination, 
examiners may miss evidence with respect to a particular market, or 
applications may involve new markets not covered under the examination.  
 
 431 The current regulation treats loans originated and purchased the same, and asset-backed 
securities as investments.  In principle, one could measure, regardless of the structure, which firm 
bears the origination cost, the servicing cost, and the credit risk; quantify such factors as a 
percentage of the loan; and then assign a portion of each loan corresponding to each bank’s share.  
In practice, the expense is highly unlikely to make the effort worthwhile.  Banks should be able to 
provide examiners with information about their business strategy and to allocate securities to the 
investment or lending test according to that strategy.  Examiners could make qualitative 
judgments about the extent to which the firm is serving credit needs however the activity is 
categorized. 
 432 Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 349, 359–65. 
 433 Id. at 350. 
 434 Id. at 352. 
 435 See, e.g., H.R. 2491 104th Cong. § 2304 (1995) (vetoed by President Clinton); H.R. 3567, 
104th Cong., § 323 (1996); H.R. 31, 105th Cong. § 4 (1999).  
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Banks and thrifts usually are examined every two to three years.  A bank’s 
performance may change significantly in the interim.  The “safe harbor” 
would prevent regulators from considering such matters. 
Second, CRA ratings are not conclusive.  The ratings are intended to 
reflect a bank’s performance in meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community.  But an outstanding rating does not necessarily mean that the 
depository institution’s record is exemplary in every market that it serves.  
Many of the communities served by depository institutions are not 
evaluated during an examination.  In the case of large banks serving 
multiple markets, regulators only sample a portion of these markets to 
determine the lender’s CRA rating.  In addition, CRA performance in 
larger communities where the lender is more active generally receives more 
weight.436  Thus, a bank may receive a “satisfactory” CRA rating even 
when there is documented poor performance in small communities.437 
Third, providing a safe harbor would eliminate or severely curtail the 
role of the public in shaping regulatory norms.  As I argue more fully in 
Part V.A, public engagement in setting CRA standards, while costly, is a 
value worth preserving.  Under the safe harbor proposals, public input 
would be confined to regular examinations.  It would be inefficient and 
costly for small community organizations to provide extensive comment on 
every bank examination.  Public comment is more focused, and the public 
is more likely to be genuinely engaged, in the context of a change in a 
financial institution that is likely to have a significant impact on the 
community.  Materials received during application processes often provide 
relevant and valuable information to regulators on an institution’s CRA 
performance, and a safe harbor would diminish the likelihood of obtaining 
such information. 
Under the Swire proposal, regulators would set numerical targets for 
investment and other activities, and institutions meeting that target would 
not even be subject to examination.438  The public role in CRA 
examinations would be eliminated.  Numerical targets would ignore 
important contextual factors that influence a bank’s or thrift’s ability to 
make sound loans in low-income communities.  If the targets are set too 
high, safe harbor could encourage banks to make less profitable and riskier 
loans than under the current approach, which takes into account the 
performance context within which the institution operates.  A numerical 
target thus raises serious objections on the grounds of regulator-mandated, 
inefficient credit allocation.  Moreover, without regular CRA examinations, 
regulators would have no context in which to learn about how the best 
 
 436 See, e.g., CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, supra note 217, at 13.  
 437 See, e.g., id. at 40.  
 438 Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 352. 
92
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 193 
 
institutions meet the community’s credit needs—which would seriously 
hamper the regulators’ ability to set appropriate numerical targets and also 
would undermine regulators’ ability to share information about best 
practices with other institutions.  Such sharing of best practices lowers the 
cost of innovation and provides significant benefits to banks and the 
communities that they serve.  Fixed numerical targets, whether 
promulgated as a rule or a safe harbor, should be eschewed. 
Fourth, the 1995 CRA regulations provide incentives for banks to 
achieve outstanding CRA ratings that safe harbors would not.  The 
frequency of CRA examinations is based in part on previous CRA 
performance.  Moreover, in CRA reviews during mergers, the regulators 
place great weight on the previous CRA examination.439  Despite some 
cases to the contrary, a strong prior CRA record is usually an indicator for 
successful completion of CRA reviews during mergers.440  Regulatory 
discretion, rather than a safe harbor, provides the mode for analysis and the 
incentive for performance.  Thus, current policy combines efficient use of 
agency resources with incentives for good performance, while ensuring that 
new information that comes to light during applications can be properly 
assessed.  The current approach thus approximates the incentives Swire 
sought to achieve, without losing CRA’s flexibility and responsiveness to 
local concerns and changing market conditions. 
As part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act 
(GLBA), Congress codified additional incentives for small banks with 
good CRA ratings.  Rejecting Senator Gramm’s proposals for both a 
complete small-bank exemption from CRA and a safe harbor for small 
banks with outstanding CRA ratings, Congress enacted a provision that 
generally increased the time between CRA examinations for small banks 
with outstanding and satisfactory CRA ratings.  Under the Act, small banks 
with outstanding ratings will generally be examined every five years.441  
Small banks with satisfactory ratings generally will be examined every four 
years.442  Notwithstanding these provisions, small banks still will be 
examined in connection with applications for deposit facilities and mergers, 
and may be examined more frequently when the regulator determines that 
there is reasonable cause.443  While in my judgment such time periods are 
too long, they do provide an incentive for small banks with less frequent 
mergers to perform better under CRA.  Unlike safe harbors, the Act retains 
 
 439 See generally Community Reinvestment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers 
Regarding Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620 (July 12, 2001).  
 440 But see Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 328–29, 334–37 (citing examples of community 
protests of institutions that generally had received good CRA ratings on prior examinations). 
 441 12 U.S.C. § 2908(a)(1) (2000). 
 442 Id. § 2908(a)(2). 
 443 Id. § 2908(b)–(c). 
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regulators’ discretion to examine banks more frequently when appropriate 
and to undertake a CRA review when small banks merge or apply for 
deposit facilities, which can have significant effects on local communities. 
In a sense, one of the GLBA changes acts in ways that are similar to a 
safe harbor.  If all of the insured depositories in a holding company 
obtained a CRA rating of satisfactory or better on their most recent CRA 
examination, the holding company can engage in newly authorized 
financial activities in insurance and securities.  The procedure for engaging 
in activities that are financial in nature generally does not provide for an 
application or any hearing or public comment process.  Thus, there is no 
opportunity for the public to comment on CRA (or any other matter) at that 
time.  An institution with a satisfactory CRA record can engage in newly 
authorized financial activities even if new information comes to light that 
casts doubt on its CRA performance, at least until its next CRA 
examination.  Moreover, if the next CRA examination brings the institution 
to a rating below satisfactory, it need not divest itself of newly authorized 
entities; rather, it may not acquire any new entities or engage in any new 
financial activities going forward until it regains its satisfactory status.  
Empirical research in a few years may begin to shed light on whether the 
CRA requirement of GLBA has helped to continue to keep CRA relevant 
or is insufficiently attentive to current CRA performance.444 
VI 
THE SCOPE OF CRA 
Critics have charged that CRA has an overly narrow focus, both in 
terms of its geographic scope and the institutions it covers.  In their view, 
narrow geographic scope harms low-income communities by distorting 
banks’ decisions about where to locate and lend money, and narrow 
institutional scope harms banks and thrifts by targeting regulatory burdens 
and incentives to some, but not all, financial intermediaries.445  Both 
arguments raise plausible concerns, and the precise geographic and 
institutional contours of CRA are not essential to its success.  On balance, 
however, I think something like the current approach is reasonable and 
defensible.  I suggest why that is so, and offer some direction for ways in 
which the scope of CRA might be reasonably altered. 
 
 444 For an early assessment, see LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 13–14, 
describing interviews with banks and thrifts that suggest that CRA requirements of GLBA will 
continue to provide strong incentives for performance.  
 445 See supra Part II.D. 
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A. Geography 
1. CRA is Not Anachronistically “Localist” in Its Operation 
Critics charge that CRA had its origins in “localist” rhetoric that has 
no place in the globalized financial marketplace.446  In a sense, they are 
correct.  Some support for CRA has been, and is, rooted in old-fashioned 
notions that the local bank should lend locally or even that the local bank 
should use funds raised locally to lend locally.  The idea that all local 
depositor funds should be recycled only into local loans, taken literally, 
would undermine geographic diversification, starve local communities of 
outside capital, and impede the efficient flow of capital.  Moreover, today, 
bank geographic restrictions have largely given way to real competition in 
interstate banking and to massive consolidation in the industry.447  Many 
banks lend across a wide geographic area, as well as over the Internet.  
Credit scoring reduces the need in some contexts for local knowledge, 
especially as to the lowest risk borrowers.  Banks raise funds on national 
and international capital markets and accept deposits from a wide variety of 
sources.  An emphasis on local lending loses a lot of its meaning in this 
context.  Moreover, geographic and other diversification of assets is an 
important element of most banks’ safety and soundness. 
Still, there are some reasons to favor local lending, in the sense of 
having some local presence from which banks gain expertise and use their 
superior knowledge to find creditworthy borrowers and make profitable 
loans.  Community-development financial institutions and bank and thrift 
CRA programs have shown that local knowledge can be an important 
determinant in finding creditworthy borrowers that otherwise would have 
been overlooked.448  Moreover, studies of bank small business lending have 
shown that geography has not disappeared as a factor in lending even in 
competitive, national credit markets.  When large banks merge, they often 
lose market share in small business loans that instead are offered by local 
players.449  As to these local institutions, geographic distance still 
matters.450  Most small businesses rely on lenders with a local presence for 
 
 446 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 303.  
 447 See supra note 449.  
 448 See supra notes 220–224. 
 449 See, e.g., Robert B. Avery & Katherine A. Samolyk, Bank Consolidation and Small 
Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 291, 294 (2004) 
(finding that small banks gain market share from large banks during consolidations); David A. 
Carter et al., Do Small Banks Have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted 
Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 233, 234 (2004) 
(finding that small banks have informational advantage in evaluating small business loans); 
Jonathan A. Scott, Small Business and the Value of Community Financial Institutions, 25 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES. 207, 208 (2004) (discussing small-bank informational advantages).  
 450 KENNETH P. BREVOORT & TIMOTHY H. HANNAN, COMMERCIAL LENDING AND 
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credit.451  This is consistent with a theory of informational advantage for 
local creditors in assessing highly opaque small business assets and other 
data.452 
Yet supporters of CRA need not rely on localist theories, given that 
market failures and discrimination provide adequate theoretical foundations 
for CRA.  Overcoming market failures from information externalities and 
collective action problems does require a focus on some “place” where 
information will be produced and volume and liquidity increased.  To the 
extent that discrimination is rooted in a lack of knowledge or understanding 
of local minority communities—made worse by the costs of trying to 
control agents’ behavior—the same may be said of discrimination.  That is, 
overcoming discrimination may require CRA’s kind of focus on getting 
loan officers, for example, to think differently about low-income 
communities by actively seeking out loans in low-income neighborhoods.   
Besides, CRA’s current formulation does not lean heavily on localist 
policies.  Large institutions operate across wide geographic areas and can 
raise funds and make loans consistent with their nationwide (or 
international) business plans.  Institutions are not measured based on how 
the size of their lending in a particular location relates to the size of their 
deposits in that location, but rather to their asset size as a whole, and the 
lending of their peer institutions and other contextual factors.453  Loan 
consortia, as well as the active secondary market for CRA loans, which 
permits banks to purchase loans in order to enhance their CRA 
performance, further diminish the local character of CRA-eligible lending. 
2. CRA Does Not Cause Banks to Avoid Low-Income Communities 
If financial institutions could avoid CRA’s requirements by 
strategically choosing their location, CRA’s efficacy in encouraging banks 
to serve low-income communities would be undermined significantly.  
 
DISTANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT DATA 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Feb. 
2004) (on file with New York University Law Review) (finding that “distance is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of a local commercial loan being made and that deterrent effect of 
distance is consistently more important, the smaller the size of the bank,” and moreover that 
importance of distance appears to be increasing rather than decreasing in recent years). 
 451 JONATHAN A. SCOTT ET AL., CREDIT, BANKS, AND SMALL BUSINESS—THE NEW 
CENTURY app.2 tbl.9 (Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Research Found. Ed., 2003) (finding median 
travel time of six to ten minutes between small business and its bank), at 
http://www.nfib.com/object/3747922.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); Myron L. Kwast et al., 
Market Definition and the Analysis of Antitrust in Banking, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 973, 986 (1997) 
(finding median distance at or under six miles between small businesses and their bank providers 
of most credit products). 
 452 See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?, 9 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 7, 9–12 (2000). 
 453 Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 25.21(b) (2003). 
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Macey and Miller suggested that CRA created incentives for banks and 
thrifts to avoid opening deposit facilities in low-income communities 
because of the expense of complying with CRA.454  Their contention was 
subject to some doubt even at the time that they made it, but today, under 
the revised rules, that view is clearly incorrect.  Under the 1995 regulations, 
assessment areas “[c]onsist generally of one or more [metropolitan 
statistical areas] . . . or one or more contiguous political subdivisions, such 
as counties, cities, or towns” that include the census tracts “in which the 
bank has its main office, its branches, and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well 
as the surrounding [census tracts] in which the bank has originated or 
purchased a substantial portion of its loans.”455  A bank or thrift “may 
adjust the boundaries of its assessment area(s) to include only the portion 
of a political subdivision that it reasonably can be expected to serve.”456  
However, assessment areas “[m]ay not reflect illegal discrimination” and 
“[m]ay not arbitrarily exclude low- or moderate-income geographies.”457  
Banks can delineate their assessment areas as they see fit, subject only to 
these regulatory requirements. 
The current definitions for assessment areas render Macey and 
Miller’s critique inapt.  Assessment areas are not small spots on a map in 
the few blocks around a bank branch.  Rather, assessment areas are 
generally drawn broadly to comport with political boundary lines,458 and 
would include whatever range of neighborhoods measured by income, race, 
and other demographics that are contained in such boundaries.459  Putting a 
branch into a low-income neighborhood in a metropolitan area where a 
bank operates does not affect the bank’s obligations under the lending test, 
which already will be based on the entirety of the community’s income 
spectrum.  Moreover, the regulation bars “arbitrarily exclud[ing]” low- or 
moderate-income areas regardless of whether the bank has a branch in such 
a neighborhood.460  Finally, regulators have discretion to evaluate a bank’s 
investments and community development lending outside its assessment 
areas, diminishing the importance of the area’s precise boundaries.461 
 
 454 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 295–96; see also Hylton, supra note 21, at 233. 
 455  12 C.F.R. § 25.41(c). 
 456 Id. § 25.41(d). 
 457 Id. § 25.41(e). 
 458 See generally id. § 25.41(c). 
 459 See, e.g., CRA PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: CITIBANK, supra note 217, at app. C-2 
(describing assessment area as all counties in New York metropolitan area except Putnam 
County).  
 460 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(e)(3). 
 461 See, e.g., id. § 25.23(a) (noting that agencies may consider investments in “a broader 
statewide or regional area that includes the bank’s assessment area(s)”); § 25.12(i)(2)(ii) (defining 
community development loans as including loans that benefit “a broader statewide or regional 
area that includes the bank’s assessment area(s)”). 
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Nonetheless, changes in the assessment area definitions may be 
helpful.  Assessment areas, which are somewhat tied to geographies 
surrounding deposit-gathering facilities, provide a reasonable standard for 
most institutions.  However, in an era in which banks collect deposits, raise 
funds, and make loans across state and national borders, and over the 
Internet, “community” will need redefinition.  A more tailored approach 
might permit institutions to define more broadly their own low- and 
moderate-income target markets or emphasize different product and 
geographic markets in different contexts, with strong anti-gerrymandering 
protections.  For example, a bank might compete with non-bank lenders to 
make affordable loans to subprime borrowers in areas where it has no 
branches, rather than emphasizing prime loans in a tight market where it 
does have branches.  Adopting a more flexible approach to assessment 
areas is more complicated for the agencies to administer and in some ways 
riskier for banks and community organizations than the current approach.  
Nonetheless, CRA will need to evolve with the marketplace to remain 
effective.  A prudent course is for the agencies to experiment with a 
flexible approach to delineating assessment areas in the strategic plan 
option. 
B. Applying CRA to Insured Depositories Is Justified 
Critics of CRA argue that it makes little sense to apply CRA to banks 
and thrifts while exempting credit unions, independent mortgage 
companies, and other finance companies—let alone securities firms, 
insurance companies, and non-financial companies—from similar 
regulation.462  They argue that applying CRA to these institutions, but not 
to others, disadvantages banks relative to non-banks in the financial 
system, and that such a unique burden is both unfair and inefficient.463  
They argue that there is no net subsidy to banks, and that if there is such a 
subsidy, it does not justify CRA.464  There is some validity to the critique, 
in the sense that banks and thrifts are asked to bear some of the costs of 
overcoming informational and other barriers to lending in low-income and 
minority communities, while the positive externalities from such bank 
lending are shared by other market participants.   
Nonetheless, I will argue that applying CRA to banks and thrifts is not 
as illogical, inefficient, or unfair as critics suggest.  Federally insured 
depository institutions benefit from government subsidies, including 
deposit insurance, access to the Federal Reserve Board’s discount window, 
 
 462 See supra note 96. 
 463 See id. 
 464 See supra notes 94–95. 
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and the Reserve Board’s role in the payments system.465  The largest 
institutions also likely benefit from “too big to fail” subsidies, explained 
below, and a wide range of institutions across asset size receive subsidies 
through membership in the Federal Home Loan Banks.  This Section first 
provides a brief overview of these and other subsidies and then explains 
why such subsidies provide some justification for applying CRA to banks 
and thrifts.  Finally, the Section explains how depository institutions’ 
specialized role in financial markets, and their role in overcoming market 
failures, provides support for CRA’s application to them. 
1. Subsidies to Banks and Thrifts 
Deposit insurance subsidizes banks and thrifts by lowering their cost 
of capital.  As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has described: 
[A] major reason the Congress is called upon to involve itself in . . . 
financial markets is the safety net.  Institutions covered by it receive a 
subsidy because insured depositors correctly perceive their risk exposure 
as virtually zero.  These depositors―and other creditors who benefit 
from the stability brought to the banking system by the safety net―are 
willing therefore to provide funds to banks at much lower rates than are 
available to competing institutions.466 
Most banks receive the benefits of deposit insurance at no annual cost 
to them.467  While these rules strongly need reform, better risk-based 
 
 465 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures deposits held in FDIC-member banks 
and thrifts up to $100,000 per account.  The Federal Reserve Board provides access to credit 
through its “discount window” for members of the Federal Reserve System in the event that they 
are unable to access funds through the market.  The Board guarantees payments among banks and 
has sponsored and provided the backbone for the payments system.  For further details, see infra 
Part VI.B. 
 466 The Financial Services Act of 1990:  Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 70 (1998) [hereinafter The Financial Services Act of 
1990] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980617.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2005). 
 467 Under rules prescribed by the Deposit Insurance Fund Act of 1996, almost all banks—
92%—do not pay annual deposit insurance premiums.  Memorandum from Arthur J. Merton, 
Director of the Division of Insurance and Finance, FDIC, to Board of Directors, FDIC 16–17 
(May 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/2004_02/bif_2004_02.pdf.  More than nine hundred 
institutions have never paid any premiums for deposit insurance, and many institutions that have 
grown rapidly have paid low premiums compared with their coverage.  The Federal Deposit 
Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs 47 (2002) [hereinafter The Federal Deposit Insurance System and 
Recommendations for Reform] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve 
Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20020423.  Even 
the weakest institutions pay only a $0.27 premium on every $100 of deposits.  FDIC, RISK-
BASED ASSESSMENT SYSTEM: ASSESMENT RATE SCHEDULE AND FICO RATES, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/assesrte.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). 
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pricing would not fully eliminate the governmental subsidy because the 
government effectively acts as a backstop to the FDIC in case of 
catastrophic losses or systemic failures.468  In ordinary circumstances, the 
government subsidy probably benefits small banks disproportionately to 
their asset size.  Small banks rely more on insured deposits for funding than 
large banks do.  Furthermore, small banks would have a relatively hard 
time attracting funding in the absence of deposit insurance because they 
would be perceived as riskier. 
Large banks and thrifts also likely benefit from a market perception 
that regulators will not let large institutions fail because the consequences 
to the financial system would be too severe.  Regulators fostered this 
perception through a series of interventions, including in one instance an 
explicit “too big to fail” policy statement.469  Important legal changes at the 
end of the 1990s significantly curtailed the discretion regulators have to 
bail out uninsured depositors.470  Yet the market perception likely persists, 
and plausibly so, that the government will intervene to assist large 
institutions and that such assistance will benefit creditors and shareholders 
even if they must bear some loss in the process.471  Banks uniquely receive 
subsidies from other sources as well.  The Federal Reserve Board’s 
 
 468 The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform, supra note 467, 
at 46 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board) (“[W]e should not 
delude ourselves that even a wider range in the risk-based premium structure would eliminate the 
need for a Government backup to the deposit insurance fund, that is eliminate the Government 
subsidy in deposit insurance.”). 
 469 See Harold A. Black et al., Changes in Market Perception of Riskiness: The Case of Too-
Big-to-Fail, 20 J. FIN. RES. 389, 404–05 (1997) (finding that 1984 announcement of OCC’s 
explicit “too big to fail” policy resulted in increases in institutional holdings in bank holding 
companies, even among those not named by Comptroller, providing evidence of indirect subsidy 
to banks from policy). 
 470 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000) (requiring prompt corrective action); § 1823(c)(4) 
(requiring least-cost resolution).  Congress enacted both sections in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253–75 
(1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 471 See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 248 (3d ed. 2001) 
(noting “the widespread public perception (substantially confirmed by handling of Continental 
Illinois National Bank failure) that certain banks are ‘too big to fail’”); CRAIG FURFINE, THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MORAL SUASION: EVIDENCE FROM THE RESCUE OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 25–28 (2002) (finding that large, complex banking organizations saw 
their cost of funds decline after Federal Reserve Board’s intervention when hedge fund Long 
Term Capital Management collapsed in 1998, although such effects are difficult to disentangle 
from investors’ general “flight to safety” following LTCM collapse), 
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/papers/wp2002-11 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2005). 
  But see The Federal Deposit Insurance System and Recommendations for Reform, supra note 
467, at 48 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Board) (arguing that “the 
market clearly believes that large institutions are not too big for uninsured creditors to take at 
least some loss”). 
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sponsorship of the payments network,472 and its low cost provision of 
riskless financial settlement by guaranteeing large payments among 
banks,473 are additional sources of subsidy to the banking system.474  Direct 
access to the Federal Reserve Board’s discount window provides assurance 
to the market about banks’ and thrifts’ stability, and provides liquidity to 
banks that otherwise could not borrow at all.  It therefore allows institutions 
to obtain lower cost of funds, regardless of whether they actually draw on 
the window and take advantage of the price the Board charges.  Lastly, 
banks benefit from subsidies through government-sponsored enterprises 
and other government programs, some of which subsidize lending to low- 
and moderate-income borrowers and others of which simply provide a 
lower cost of funds to banks and thrifts.475  Admittedly, the gross subsidies 
to banks are offset to some degree by the costs of bank regulation, 
including reserve requirements to the extent that they exceed what banks 
would hold in the absence of the requirements.476 
Given that insured depositories receive significant governmental 
subsidies, the question remains whether such subsidies provide any 
justification for applying CRA to banks and thrifts.  The first-best policy 
response to bank subsidies is to reduce such subsidies directly.477  However, 
 
 472 See FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE’S KEY POLICIES FOR THE PROVISION OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 473 Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and 
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999). 
 474 The Financial Services Act of 1990, supra note 466, at 72 (testimony of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of Federal Reserve Board) (“The markets place substantial values on these safety net 
subsidies [specifically the discount window and riskless financial settlement], clearly in excess of 
the cost of regulation. . . .  [W]ere it otherwise, some banks would be dropping their charters.”). 
 475 For example, bank and thrift members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system 
accrue ninety percent of the $3 billion in flows of governmental subsidy to the FHLBs, in the 
form of lower cost advances and higher dividends, while only ten percent is passed on to home 
buyers in lower mortgage rates.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE 
HOUSING GSES 25–28 (2001) [hereinafter CBO STUDY 2001], available at 
http://ftp.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf .  Some portion of the subsidy that accrues to 
banks is passed on to non-home-mortgage borrowers of the banks. 
 476 See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 473, at 7.  Whether a net subsidy exists sparked 
vociferous debate during negotiations over financial modernization, with the Federal Reserve 
Board taking the self-interested position that such a subsidy was significant and thus new 
activities should be undertaken in affiliates within a holding company, and the OCC taking the 
self-interested position that no such subsidy exists, so that new activities could be undertaken in 
subsidiaries of national banks.  Id. at 10–15. The debate was effectively resolved by legislating 
“firewalls” between the bank and its affiliates and subsidiaries such that any net subsidy could not 
be passed through effectively to other entities engaged in new activities.  Id. at 13. 
 477 For example, one could reduce subsidies from deposit insurance by establishing better risk-
based pricing and ensuring that all institutions pay some premium.  Regulators’ refusal to 
intervene in financial markets could reinforce the perception that there is no institution “too big to 
fail.”  The Federal Reserve Board could continue to move towards more market-based pricing of 
access to the payments system and the discount window.  See, e.g., Press Release, Federal 
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each of these first-best solutions to reduce bank and thrift subsidies has 
faced enormous political opposition and would entail significant costs.478  
Given that we live in a second-best world in which these subsidies to banks 
and thrifts will remain, simply removing CRA would not restore credit 
markets to a “free market.”  Existing subsidies, taxes, and regulations 
distort the free market in a variety of ways.  Government-subsidized 
secondary market participants and insurance programs hold a good portion 
of the credit risk of bank and thrift lending to low- and moderate-income 
and minority borrowers.479  As a theoretical matter, one cannot assert, given 
these distortions, that moving from an “nth” best world with CRA to the 
next best world without CRA would be efficient.  In a regulated, subsidized 
credit market world, it is not improper to ensure that some portion of the 
subsidy goes to a public purpose by applying CRA to banks and thrifts.480 
2. Role in Financial Markets 
Given that market failures have plagued low-income communities and 
minority households have faced discrimination in credit and housing 
markets,481 I have argued that government regulation has a role in 
overcoming these problems.  In my judgment, it is reasonable for 
 
Reserve Board (Oct. 31, 2002) (noting changes to discount window regulations that would result 
in credit being provided through discount window at rates above target federal funds rate), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/200210312/default.htm (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2005). 
.  Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) subsidies that are passed through to banks and thrifts 
could be reduced through higher capital standards and other means. 
 478 Deposit insurance reform legislation invariably includes increases in the amount subject to 
deposit insurance, and even better risk-based pricing would leave some significant governmental 
subsidy remaining.  Refusal to intervene in financial markets is an important principle to 
announce in the abstract, but officials faced with difficult choices and uncertain information often 
intervene to prevent financial collapse.  Pricing payment system services at true market rates 
might result in socially suboptimal development of payment networks.  See, e.g., Barr, supra note 
3, at 222 (arguing that Federal Reserve Board should consider lowering prices for certain 
electronic payment services in order to expand access to banking services for poor individuals).  
Efforts to reduce GSE subsidies by increasing capital requirements and affordable housing goals 
while reducing indicia of government support have faced enormous political opposition.  
Moreover, squeezing subsidies out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac simply may balloon subsidies 
going to the FHLBs and insured depositories.  See White, supra note 8, at 54–55.  Furthermore, 
FHLB “reform” has tended to expand, rather than restrict, use of subsidized advances.  Given the 
fungibility of money, nominally restricting use of advances, rather than reducing them, is unlikely 
to prevent FHLB members from absorbing the advances as undifferentiated subsidies in any 
event. 
479 See, e.g., Glenn B. Canner et al., Distribution of Credit Risk Among Providers of Mortgages to 
Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 1077, 1089 (1996) (finding that 
“FHA is the primary bearer of credit risk for home purchase loans to lower-income and black or 
Hispanic borrowers and in lower-income and minority neighborhoods”).  
 480 Cf., e.g., White, supra note 8, at 52 (explaining why eliminating GSEs would not 
necessarily lead to more efficient policy outcomes). 
 481 See supra Part II. 
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government policy to focus on the role that depository institutions ought to 
play in overcoming them.  Banks play a special role in financial markets by 
focusing on relational lending and investing in techniques to “thicken” the 
markets within which they operate by generating and analyzing information 
on opaque values.482  This role is distinct from that of capital markets,483 
which focus on information-rich, transparent, and larger firms.484  It is even 
distinct from that of independent mortgage companies, which focus on 
transactions rather than relationships and thus have not similarly developed 
the technologies and expertise that permit banks to manage higher-risk 
borrowers.485  Instead, most of these loans from independent mortgage 
companies are packaged and sold on the secondary market where risks are 
spread more broadly.  In sum, it was reasonable for Congress to look to 
insured depositories to overcome market failures and discrimination, given 
their specialized role in credit markets, and the governmental subsidies that 
banks and thrifts receive.  Given the evidence on the performance and 
profitability of CRA loans, CRA does not appear to be a significant drag on 
the profitability or soundness of the banking industry, which reinforces the 
view that relying on banks and thrifts to overcome these market failures is a 
reasonably efficient choice. 
3. Credit Unions 
The fact that credit unions are not subject to CRA is an anomaly in 
this regard.  There is little justification for not extending CRA to credit 
unions, most of which enjoy federally insured deposit insurance, are 
subject to comprehensive regulation and supervision, and benefit from 
many of the same types of subsidies available to banks and thrifts.  
Moreover, credit unions enjoy tax exemption not available to banks and 
thrifts and are chartered with a public purpose to serve “persons of modest 
means.”486  For that reason, CRA, or something like it, should be extended 
 
 482 See, e.g., CANNER ET AL., supra note 329, at 3, 11. 
 483 See id. at 2 (discussing differences between bank loans and capital market instruments); see 
also Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and 
Financial Market Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL. ECON. 324 (2000) 
(developing model of financial market segmentation); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 
Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?, 55 J. FIN. 679 (2000) (describing specialized 
role of banks in relationship lending being altered by competition from other banks and capital 
markets); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 693 (1997) (describing specialized role of bank credit when information is costly and 
monitoring of moral hazard is important). 
 484 On the role of financial intermediation in enhancing the efficiency of markets, see ALLEN 
& GALE, supra note 115, at 469. 
 485 CANNER ET AL., supra note 329, at 10–13. This may help to explain why subprime lenders 
focus on making loans to existing home mortgage borrowers as to whose creditworthiness others 
already have invested in learning. 
 486 Credit unions are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to serve 
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to credit unions.487 
4. Affiliates 
As financial institutions increasingly rely on a broad range of 
affiliations to carry on their businesses,488 it is both possible and desirable 
to take account of affiliate activity while respecting the fact that CRA 
applies only to insured depositories.  For example, CRA regulations 
already provide that evidence of illegal credit practices will affect an 
institution’s CRA rating.489  The laws governing such credit practices are 
equally applicable to banks and thrifts and non-depository creditors.  Illegal 
credit practices of an affiliate that has been included at the option of the 
depository institution for purposes of a CRA examination are relevant to its 
rating, but so too should be the illegal credit practices of affiliates not so 
included.  Given the cost of examining all affiliates for such practices, 
enforcement of other credit laws should occur through risk-based 
examinations of affiliates.490  The results of such compliance examinations 
should be taken into account in the performance context under CRA. 
Permitting banks, at their option, to include activities of affiliates in 
meeting the credit needs of their community, with current safeguards 
against gerrymandering, is consistent with this approach.  It is also critical 
to an accurate measure of CRA performance.  Some borrowers may be 
ending up in a bank’s subprime unit, or subprime affiliate, when in fact 
they could qualify for a mortgage on better terms.  The regulators now give 
CRA consideration for “promoting” borrowers from the subprime to the 
prime market,491 and banks and thrifts should thus have in place procedures 
to ensure that borrowers with good credit histories get access to their prime 
mortgage units. 
Moreover, the other agencies should adopt the current approach of the 
OCC, which considers a bank’s subsidiaries’ assets in determining the 
performance context in which a bank operates.492  The assets and activities 
 
“individuals of modest means,” 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000). 
 487 I advocated this position as part of the Treasury team that developed a proposal to extend 
community investment obligations to credit unions, but the measure was defeated and was not 
included in the Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1994)).  
 488 See, e.g., LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 243, at 45. 
 489 12 C.F.R. § 25.28(c) (2004). 
 490 That is, the regulators could determine whether evidence suggests that an affiliate poses a 
risk of engaging in abusive practices, and then devote examination resources to investigating the 
extent of any such practices. 
 491 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community 
Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,628 (July 12, 2001).  
 492 See OCC Bulletin 97-26, July 3, 1997 (noting that examiners should consider subsidiaries 
in bank’s performance context); Letter from Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller, OCC, to 
Congressman Bruce L. Vento, May 8, 1998 (noting that “OCC examiners . . . include operating 
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of all of the affiliates of a bank should also be considered in assessing the 
performance context within which a bank meets its obligations under CRA.  
After all, a bank’s affiliates are hardly irrelevant to the bank’s business 
decisions, including how to meet the credit needs of their communities.  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act made a financial holding company’s 
commencement of newly authorized activities, or its merger with newly 
authorized entities, contingent on satisfactory CRA performance by all of 
the affiliate banks or thrifts.  A bank’s affiliates have a strong interest in 
ensuring adequate CRA performance by all the insured depositories of the 
holding company. 
Holding companies provide scale economies to their subsidiaries in 
complying with bank regulations.493  Banks that are part of holding 
companies face lower regulatory burdens from the same regulation than 
their non-affiliated counterparts of similar size.  Thus, affiliation should 
generally be weighed, not ignored, in determining tradeoffs between 
regulatory burdens and benefits.  Banks that are part of holding companies 
have available to them the range of expertise of the holding company, 
which is useful for developing programs to meet community needs under 
CRA.  The holding company and its subsidiaries can offer a range of 
services to the bank in helping the bank meet its CRA performance goals, 
such as innovative loan products, securitization, or expertise in investment 
and other matters.  These affiliates do affect a bank’s CRA performance, 
and the bank should therefore be assessed, taking the expertise and 
resources of the parent institution into account.  The agencies should thus 
include the assets and activities of affiliates in assessing performance 
context for CRA examinations of banks and thrifts, as part of an effort to 
ensure the appropriate institutional scope for CRA. 
 In sum, there is some force to critics’ arguments that CRA is too 
narrowly focused geographically on communities surrounding bank 
branches, and too narrowly focused institutionally on banks and thrifts 
rather than other market participants.  Nonetheless, the problems associated 
with this narrow focus are less significant than critics allege, and the bases 
for the current approach are stronger than critics admit.  In particular, banks 
and thrifts enjoy a range of governmental subsidies, and given the 
constraints of the second-best world in which we live, it is not improper to 
ensure that some portion of those subsidies goes to a public purpose by 
applying CRA to banks and thrifts.  With respect to geographic scope, the 
1995 reforms provided for a more inclusive and flexible approach to 
defining communities that minimizes the potential downside of focusing on 
 
subsidiary assets when assessing a national bank’s capacity for community reinvestment”).  
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a bank’s deposit taking facilities.  Still, reforms focused on greater 
flexibility with respect to assessment areas and affiliates are warranted. 
 
VII  
CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER CREDIT MARKET REGULATIONS 
Critics of CRA have argued that if the government must intervene in 
credit markets, it should do so through other means.  The presence of 
market failures is an insufficient determinant of policy.  The government 
may be ill-equipped to intervene and may choose strategies that either 
make the problems worse or cost more than their benefits.  Government 
agencies might not possess the requisite information to regulate effectively, 
the agencies may not be able to induce the private sector responses sought, 
the bureaucracy might not faithfully execute the laws, or the political 
process might lead Congress or the bureaucracy to create laws that 
improperly favor the regulated entities or some other preferred groups.494  
The extent of these problems cannot be assessed in the abstract.  One needs 
to compare CRA with alternative systems for redressing market failures 
and discrimination.495  Thus, to evaluate CRA, I compare it to a series of 
other policies designed to expand access to capital. 
I classify credit market policies into five types.  First, CRA sets forth a 
broad affirmative obligation on insured depository institutions to lend in 
their service areas.  Second, negative prohibitions, such as the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA),496 bar discrimination against minority borrowers.  
Third, disclosure laws may be thought of as having two subtypes.  Some 
laws, such as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),497 assist in the 
enforcement of other legal rules or social norms by requiring public 
disclosure of lending data.  Other disclosure laws, such as the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA),498 provide information to consumers to ensure a well-
functioning market and are backed by enforcement of the disclosure 
requirement.  Fourth, Congress enacted substantive regulation restricting 
certain loan products in the Home Owners Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA).499  Fifth, government subsidies are pervasive in the housing 
 
 494 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 8–10. 
 495 See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 98–121 (1994); STIGLITZ, supra 
note 26, at 76–90 (applying such types of comparative analysis). 
 496 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 (2000).  
 497 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000).  The Federal Reserve Board implements HMDA under 
Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. pt. 203.1 (2004). 
 498 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)–(b). The Federal Reserve Board implements TILA 
under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2004). 
 499 Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190, 2190 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 
(2000)).  
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credit market.500 
I compare CRA to these other modes of credit market regulation, and I 
also compare CRA to demand-side subsidies in the form of income 
redistribution.  I argue that on many measures, CRA is no worse, and in 
some cases better, than these alternatives.  Further comparative institutional 
analysis based on empirical research will be critical to understanding the 
relative efficiency of these laws.  For our purposes here, I only wish to 
contend that an exploration of the tradeoffs involved in other approaches 
suggests that, contrary to critics’ claims, the presence of these other laws 
does not present a compelling rationale for elimination of CRA.  In an ideal 
world, we might have a different mix of laws, but given the constraints of 
the world we live in, it is not unreasonable to include CRA as part of the 
mix, rather than eliminating it from the mix. 
A. CRA Compared with Fair Lending Law 
Critics of CRA contend that, if CRA is aimed at redressing racial 
discrimination, the government simply should enforce ECOA instead.501  
ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating in the provision of credit on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or 
age.”502  For home mortgage lending, that prohibition also is reinforced by 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.503  As with other antidiscrimination laws, 
ECOA prohibits both animus-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination, as measured by the disparate treatment and disparate impact 
tests.504  ECOA’s rule that statistical discrimination is prohibited, as 
opposed to a rule that subsidized creditors for deciding not to engage in 
such discrimination, is based on our deeply rooted sense that distinctions 
based on race, even if “rational” in the short run, are wrong.  Thus the law 
prohibits the conduct rather than subsidizing adherence to the rule. 
Empirical evidence suggests that ECOA seems to help increase 
lending to minorities.  For example, the share of bank and thrift lending to 
low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas that went to minority 
borrowers increased from twenty-one percent to twenty-eight percent from 
1993 to 1999.505  Most of the increase occurred during a period of intense 
 
 500 See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 46 (arguing that it “is possibly only a slight exaggeration 
to claim that when it comes to housing and especially home ownership, the ethos of public policy 
has been (and continues to be) ‘too much is never enough’”).  
 501 Klausner, supra note 21, at 1563–64. 
 502 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2000). 
 503 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000). The Fair Housing Act also covers other forms of discrimination 
in residential real estate transactions beyond fair lending violations. 
 504 See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,268, 18,269–
70 (Apr. 15, 1994).  
 505 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 27. 
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Justice Department focus on enforcing fair lending laws from 1993 to 
1995.506  HMDA data also show improvements in lending to minority and 
low-income borrowers.507 
Yet, relying on ECOA lawsuits alone to advance antidiscrimination 
norms has its own limitations.  Few ECOA lawsuits have been brought.  
Developing proof of lending discrimination is costly and difficult.  When 
credit scoring is not the sole basis for a lending decision, lenders have a 
high degree of discretion, particularly in the case of applicants who are 
neither highly qualified nor unqualified.  Even when credit scoring is the 
sole basis, disparate treatment might arise when creditors subjectively 
evaluate data before entering it into the credit system, provide different 
levels of assistance to borrowers in completing credit applications, or 
permit overrides of credit scoring in close cases.  Given the complex and 
proprietary nature of credit scoring systems, and the difficulty of proving 
that any two applicants are similarly situated except for race, disparate 
treatment on the basis of race is hard to prove. 
Disparate impact analysis is often no easier.  Creditors have essential 
information about their loan portfolio and proprietary credit evaluation 
systems and the weights placed on all the variables in their system.  
Plaintiffs do not have such information, and creditors resist revealing their 
methodology because of competitive concerns.508  ECOA’s disparate 
impact test as currently formulated cannot easily detect discriminatory 
overages, yield spread premiums, or risk-based pricing because of the 
difficulty of identifying the factor causing the discriminatory effect, as 
opposed to factors appropriately based on objective measures not related to 
race.  Moreover, because ECOA focuses on the policies of each lender, 
ECOA has difficulty addressing the different experience of minority 
borrowers relying on different lenders than white borrowers in highly 
segmented subprime, as compared to prime, markets, even though the 
market-wide effect on minorities could be significant.509 
ECOA’s weaknesses do not necessarily imply that CRA is the only, or 
even the best, answer to credit market discrimination.  ECOA itself sets out 
important antidiscrimination norms, and should be strengthened.  Banking 
regulators could pay greater attention to rooting out problems arising from 
 
 506 Id.  The Justice Department cases resulted in important consent decrees.  See Consent 
Decree, United States v. Long Beach Mort. Co., No. CV-96-6159 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 5, 1996); 
Consent Decree, United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-CV-6(B)(N) (S.D. 
Miss., Jan. 21, 1994); Consent Decree, United States v. Shawmut Nat’l Corp., No. 93-CV-2453 
(D. Conn., Dec. 13, 1993); Consent Decree, United States v. Decatur Fed. Savings and Loan 
Assoc., No. 1-92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga., Sept. 17, 1992). 
 507 See supra notes 227–229. 
 508 See ROSS & YINGER, supra note 110, at 316.  
 509 See id. at 33.  But see Cason v. Nissan, No. 3:98-0223, 212 F.R.D. 518 (M.D.Tenn. 2002) 
(ECOA suit based on discriminatory overages in automobile market leading to settlement order). 
108
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 209 
 
disparate impact.  The FTC and the Justice Department could be given 
greater resources to investigate fair lending abuses, together with 
investigatory authority.  Building on the strength of HMDA, a disclosure 
law requiring creditors to disclose the borrower’s credit score and the 
creditor’s rate sheet could help address price discrimination.510  A new law 
on product regulation could bar the payment of yield spread premiums, 
which disproportionately fall on minority borrowers.511 
Still, each of these new measures would have their own costs, and 
CRA plays an important role in reinforcing the antidiscrimination 
principles underlying ECOA and in expanding access to credit for minority 
borrowers.  CRA may help uncover and remedy some practices with 
discriminatory effects that both disparate treatment analysis and disparate 
impact analysis, as they are currently formulated, have difficulty detecting 
or remedying.  Moreover, minority households are disproportionately 
represented among low- and moderate-income households and in low- and 
moderate-income communities.  CRA has encouraged banks and thrifts to 
increase their lending in such communities significantly, and minority 
households now constitute a larger share of such lending than they did a 
decade ago.  CRA’s focus on low-income neighborhoods may address 
structural inequalities facing African Americans and other minorities more 
effectively than ECOA’s disparate impact standard, which is hemmed in, 
on one side, by equal protection jurisprudence limiting consideration of 
race to assist minorities and, on the other, by the business necessity defense 
permitting the use of factors that have an adverse effect on minorities if 
such factors are justified by business necessity.512 
CRA can help to overcome the legacy of decades of official and 
private-sector discrimination reflected in segregated, low-income 
neighborhoods, while ECOA is only addressed to discrimination by current 
market participants.  In addition, by encouraging banks and thrifts to get to 
know these communities, CRA may help to overcome cultural barriers to 
equality.  Moreover, CRA goes beyond ECOA’s focus on credit 
discrimination to address broader market failures affecting low-income 
borrowers and communities, from collective action problems, information 
externalities, information asymmetries, and neighborhood externalities.  
Overcoming these market failures not only improves the functioning of the 
 
 510 See supra notes 207–210.  A full exploration of this proposal is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For more on this proposal and the concept of “cross modal” policies, see Barr, supra 
note 8. 
 511 See Barr, supra note 8.  
 512 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003) (lamenting “the growing tendency of equal protection 
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market, but also furthers antidiscrimination goals.  While CRA helps to 
reinforce ECOA, fair lending laws are no substitute for CRA. 
B. CRA Compared with Disclosure Law 
Disclosure laws are perennial favorites in the legal literature,513 and I 
agree that disclosure can help improve the home mortgage credit market.  
However, I take issue with disclosure advocates on three grounds.  First, as 
I will explain below, disclosure serves a broader set of purposes than 
usually posited.  Second, I have a healthier dose of skepticism about the 
effectiveness of disclosure in helping overcome market failures than legal 
scholars have recently espoused.514  Third, I thus argue that disclosure is no 
substitute for CRA. 
1. Types of Disclosure Laws 
There are two basic types of disclosure:  disclosures designed to 
improve market efficiency by making consumers better shoppers, and 
disclosures designed to help regulators enforce other laws and push 
markets towards compliance with social norms.  The Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) represents the first type.  TILA requires disclosures to consumers 
regarding the cost of loans.515  This type of disclosure seeks to remedy 
asymmetric information and improve market competition and efficiency 
through price disclosure, which would make it easier to comparison 
shop.516  It is this type of disclosure that scholars who favor disclosure 
usually advocate. 
HMDA represents the second type of disclosure.  HMDA requires 
most home mortgage creditors to disclose annually to the public 
 
 513 See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and 
the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1230–37 (2003); Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1533–37 
(1998). 
 514 See Camerer et al., supra note 513, at 1232–35 (arguing that TILA “provides potentially 
substantial benefits to those who are less than rational” and “may save some consumers, 
otherwise uninformed, from possible catastrophic outcomes, such as losing their homes”). 
 515 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.17 (2001). 
 516 See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (“The Congress finds that . . . competition among the various 
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be 
strengthened through informed use of credit.  [Furthermore, i]t is the purpose of this subchapter to 
assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him . . . .”); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 
A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 
1280–81 (2002) (describing opportunities that information asymmetries provide for predatory 
lenders and brokers); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 635 (1979) 
(“Because more consumers will become informed if information acquisition costs are decreased, 
reducing these costs is thought to be the preferable response to the problem of imperfect 
information.” (footnote omitted)). 
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information about home mortgage loans made or purchased, as well as loan 
applications denied.517  Regulations require disclosure of race, ethnicity, 
sex, and income of borrowers.  HMDA is not designed to enhance 
borrower information, but rather to increase the ability of the public, 
regulators, and fair lending enforcement agencies to assess whether lenders 
are engaged in discriminatory practices and how lenders are meeting their 
CRA obligations.  These broader disclosures are designed to reinforce 
positive social norms, promote market efficiency, and enhance the 
regulatory effectiveness of other laws.  The collection and public disclosure 
of information is an essential underpinning of CRA and ECOA in 
expanding access to credit.  Because HMDA does not include information 
on creditworthiness, loan terms, or property characteristics, HMDA data 
alone provide poor measures of discrimination.  However, wide availability 
of these data has empowered the public to assess financial institution 
performance.  Public debate over the large gap between loan denial rates 
for whites and blacks likely contributed to increased lending to minorities 
in the 1990s. 
2. Problems with Disclosure Laws 
TILA disclosure likely improves transparency in the market, and thus 
efficiency, even if not all consumers understand the disclosures.518  Yet we 
should be concerned not only with an efficient market in the aggregate, but 
also with efficiency within markets serving low- and moderate-income 
households, and with the consequences of inadequate disclosures for 
affected consumers.  Although TILA facilitates comparison shopping by 
consumers, in some cases too much information is provided for consumers 
to use, and in other cases too little.  Even outside of the subprime market, 
there is little reason to think that consumers understand most aspects of 
mortgage transactions.519  Decision theory suggests a need for simplicity:  
Individuals faced with complex problems simplify them to one or two 
 
 517 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801, 2803 (2000).  HMDA was enhanced significantly in 1989, for example, 
by requiring data to be not only reported to the regulators, but also disclosed to the public. See 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 1211, 103 Stat. 183, 524–26 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).  The Federal Reserve Board recently amended its HMDA regulations to 
require lenders to report certain price information about high-cost loans.  HMDA reporting could 
be improved further by requiring information on interest rates and fees.  See Barr, supra note 198, 
at 459 (suggesting further reforms).  
 518 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 516, at 630. 
 519 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. AND THE DEP’T OF HOUS. AND 
URBAN DEV., JOINT STUDY ON THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 9, 17, 62 (1998) (noting consumers’ difficulty in understanding 
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major decisions.520  The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with the 
goal of producing comprehensive disclosures that permit consumers to 
comparison shop based on the real price of loans.   
In addition, borrowers trust mortgage brokers to provide them with 
full and accurate information and to provide them with the best loan 
product.  Yet it is in the broker’s interest to provide the borrower with the 
highest rate loan that the broker can convince the borrower to accept.  
Brokers can earn higher yield spread premiums for placing borrowers into 
more expensive loans than ones for which the borrower could qualify.  
Even in competitive retail consumer markets for simple products (e.g., a 
box of Cheerios in a grocery store) price dispersion can persist.521  In home 
mortgage transactions, borrower understanding of complicated home 
mortgage terms is likely to be much lower.  Thus, transactions for home 
mortgages present an even greater possibility for price differentials based 
on race, sophistication, willingness, and ability to shop for better terms, or 
other factors.522  Moreover, with credit scoring, creditors know whether 
borrowers qualify for less expensive loans under the lenders’ pricing 
schedules, while most borrowers do not realize this about themselves.523 
Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily complex.524  The efficacy of 
disclosures is diminished by inadequacies in the nature and timing of 
disclosures,525 their limited effect on consumer behavior, and consumers’ 
 
 520 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 43–68 (3d ed. 2000); ROBIN M. 
HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 4–6 (1980); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING 107–88 (1993). 
 521 See Dennis Carlton & Jeffrey Perloff, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 437–41 (3d. 
ed. 2000) (citing empirical examples of price dispersion in retail markets); see also Vernon L. 
Smith et al., Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions, in 
PAPERS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 201, 201–20 (1991); Vernon L. Smith & Arlington W. 
Williams, An Experimental Comparison of Alternative Rules for Competitive Market Exchange, 
in PAPERS IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra, at 172, 172–99 (using experimental design to 
establish price dispersion in competitive markets).  
 522 See Jackson & Berry, supra note 164, at 63.  Ayres has documented similar price 
discrimination in automobile sales and other markets.  See AYRES, supra note 158, at 19–44. 
 523 Credit reports and credit scores will now be available to borrowers upon request.  See Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-159, §§ 211–12, 117 Stat. 1952, 
1968–69 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003)).  
 524 See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing 
ineffectiveness of TILA in conveying relevant information and concluding, “[s]o much for the 
Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers”); Thomas A. Durkin, Consumers and Credit 
Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 201, 208 tbl.9 (2002) 
(finding that seventy-five percent of respondents either agreed somewhat or agreed strongly that 
TILA credit card disclosures are complicated). 
 525 William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules 
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128–30 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A 
Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 715–16 (1979) (discussing 
timing problem under prior law). Early disclosure is now required by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.19(b) (2004) (requiring certain disclosures “at the time an application form is provided or 
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cognitive limitations.  TILA disclosure may not actually be noticed, read, 
or understood.526  TILA disclosures may also inundate the consumer with 
too much information to process.527  Moreover, low-income and minority 
buyers are the least likely to shop for alternate financing arrangements.528  
Lastly, these problems are exacerbated in the subprime market, making 
disclosure laws less likely to be effective for borrowers in the subprime 
market.529 
Moving from the first type of disclosure law to the second, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act requires a shift in thinking about both the purpose 
of disclosure and the mode of enforcement.  HMDA contains no 
substantive legal rule, but reveals information about the extent to which 
creditors may be falling short of meeting the credit needs of minorities or 
low- and moderate-income communities.  Even if no enforcement action is 
taken under ECOA, and even if no mergers are denied under CRA, HMDA 
data can change creditor behavior.  That may be so because the public 
cares, in general, about the social norm of equal access to credit, and 
because the creditors care sufficiently about their reputation with the 
public. 
Yet the social norm expressed through HMDA may push behavior 
beyond what is efficient or fall short of what was intended by the 
promulgators of the standard.  HMDA would be less effective without 
other laws, including CRA.  Relying on HMDA alone to overcome market 
failures and discrimination could in theory lead to overenforcement of 
antidiscrimination and community investment norms.  HMDA information 
does not contain measures of creditworthiness, loan terms, or property 
characteristics that influence creditor decisions.  Therefore, relying solely 
 
before the consumer pays a non-refundable fee, whichever is earlier”); id. § 226.5a (requiring 
disclosures “on or with a solicitation or an application to open a credit or charge account”); id. 
§ 226.5b (requiring disclosures related to “open-end credit plans secured by the consumer’s 
dwelling . . . at the time an application is provided to the consumer”), although borrowers will 
have expended some search effort prior to disclosures. 
 526 Elizabeth Renuart, Comment, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market: 
Suggested Reforms in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX. L. REV. 421, 
432 (2003).  
 527 Eskridge, supra note 525, at 1133–35; Landers & Rohner, supra note 525, at 722–25. For 
home mortgage and other “closed end” loans, this problem is likely not as bad as for credit card 
and other “open end” loans because, for closed end loans, the APR is put in a box on the 
disclosures. 
 528 See, e.g., Jeanne M. Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, Consumer Information for Home Mortgages: 
Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FIN. SERVICES REV. 277, 283 (2000) (noting that 
lower-income and minority households are less likely to comparison shop for home mortgages).  
But see Jeanne M. Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of 
APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70 (1999) (noting that 
“[i]ncome was not associated significantly with consumers’ understanding of the APR-CIR 
relationship”).  
 529 See supra Part III.C. 
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on HMDA data showing disparities in rates of lending and loan denials to 
members of different races can lead to overstatements of lending 
discrimination.  Similarly, HMDA data do not provide any context for 
understanding creditors’ ability to lend in low-income communities, so 
banks and thrifts might face undue pressure to make unsound loans if the 
data are not contextualized. 
Conversely, relying solely on public disclosure could lead to 
underenforcement of equal protection norms and would likely be 
insufficient to overcome market failures.  The need to maintain good public 
relations is assuredly an important component of why HMDA matters.  
Without fair lending laws, however, HMDA’s disclosure might convey less 
approbation because ECOA increases the sanction from, and itself 
reinforces, the societal norm against discrimination.  Similarly, without 
CRA, disclosure under HMDA that a bank did little lending in low-income 
communities would have little consequence unless two conditions were 
met.  First, there would have to be a societal norm, apart from CRA, that 
failure to lend to low-income borrowers and communities was morally 
wrong.  Second, the public would have to enforce that norm against banks 
and thrifts in a manner that replicates the enforcement power of CRA 
ratings and merger reviews.  Public approbation alone is unlikely to be 
sufficient to change corporate conduct unless shareholders and customers 
care enough about the norm, and have a sufficiently definite view of its 
contours, that they will penalize the firm for noncompliance with it.  CRA 
may help to develop such a norm, and it provides strong incentives for 
banks and thrifts to comply. 
3. Disclosure Reforms Compared with CRA 
Both TILA and HMDA play important roles in improving credit 
markets, and reforms of such laws to improve their efficiency would likely 
contribute to improvements in credit markets.  TILA has likely contributed 
to improved efficiency and fewer abuses, and public disclosure of HMDA 
data has likely helped to spur more lending to low- and moderate-income 
and minority borrowers.  Disclosure laws can and should undoubtedly be 
simplified and refined to improve price transparency.530   
 
 530 See, e.g., Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 
Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2000)); Simplifying and 
Improving the Process of Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settlement Costs to Consumers, 67 
Fed. Reg. 49,134 (July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500) (proposing significant 
simplification).  But see Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics, the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, and the Office of Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission, 
Before the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in the Matter of Request for 
Comment on Proposed Amendments to the Regulations Implementing the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act, Docket No. FR-4727-P-01 (Oct. 28, 2002) (arguing that HUD’s proposal would 
not assist consumers), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/11. 
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In addition, financial education can play a role in helping consumers 
understand disclosures better.  It is hard to find scholarly literature that 
does not end a discussion of disclosure with a call for consumer financial 
education.531  The problem is that expenditures for financial education lead 
to strong positive externalities, so it is quite difficult to induce private 
market participants to offer financial education to the borrowing public at 
anything like the scale it would take to make a difference. 
The federal government also could help to reduce information 
externalities by producing, analyzing and disseminating information about 
low-income borrowers and communities.  This third type of disclosure—
aimed at neither borrowers (as is TILA) nor at the public and regulators (as 
is HMDA), but at the banks and thrifts themselves—may improve market 
efficiency by lowering information costs.  Still, a central aspect of the 
information creditors need—whether this type of borrower in this 
neighborhood is credit worthy—is best measured by lending itself. 
More fundamentally, the current structure of the home mortgage 
market in low-income communities strongly suggests that disclosure alone 
would not be enough to overcome, even in theory, the market failures or 
discrimination that this Article earlier explored.  Disclosure laws are no 
substitute for CRA.  CRA gives strong incentives to banks and thrifts, those 
most able to alter their behavior in response to the problem of information 
externalities, information asymmetry, and collective action.532  CRA can 
enhance competition—and thus can improve efficiency and transparency—
in fragmented markets where information asymmetry, coupled with a wide 
range of price and term differentials, mean that disclosure seems unlikely 
on its own to significantly affect market structure.  Moreover, CRA 
encourages banks and thrifts to engage in the kind of contact with low-
income communities that may be required to overcome cultural, 
discriminatory, and other non-rational barriers to lending.  CRA also enlists 
expert agencies to further its goals, rather than relying solely on the public 
to change creditor behavior either in response to HMDA data or through 
TILA disclosures.  Furthermore, CRA is better positioned than disclosure 
laws to overcome the collective action problem in providing financial 
education, which generates significant positive externalities.  CRA 
encourages banks and thrifts to partner with community organizations to 
provide financial education to low-income households, both because such 
education helps banks and thrifts to meet the CRA services test,533 and 
 
 531 See supra note 516.  
 532 Cf., e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24–39 (1970) (discussing 
“cheapest cost avoider”). 
 533 See Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding 
Community Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,628 (July 12, 2001) (describing 
financial education as an example of community development services).  
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because such education likely bolsters their ability to make sound loans to 
creditworthy borrowers in fulfillment of the CRA lending test. 
C. CRA Compared with Abusive Practice Prohibitions 
CRA is designed to expand access to credit, but it can and should also 
play a role in combating abusive lending practices by enhancing 
competition from banks and thrifts in serving low-income borrowers and 
neighborhoods.  In contrast to the affirmative obligation inherent in CRA to 
expand access to credit, the dominant form of public policy addressing 
predatory lending practices is product regulation:  Congress enacted 
HOEPA in 1994 to respond to unscrupulous lending practices in the 
subprime home equity mortgage market.534  For some “high cost” loans, 
HOEPA imposes restrictions on certain contract provisions, provides for 
enhanced disclosures, and enhances remedies for violations.535  In addition 
to product regulation, HOEPA provides, directly and indirectly, for 
enhanced disclosures for borrowers facing high cost loans.  Directly, 
HOEPA enhances disclosure by requiring creditors to disclose mortgage 
terms three days in advance of closing.  Indirectly, HOEPA product 
restrictions would tend to drive more of the cost of the loan into the APR 
because lenders cannot use the prohibited mortgage terms to cover costs.  
With more of the cost of the mortgage reflected in the APR, it would be 
easier for consumers to understand the costs of the loan and comparison 
shop. 
Given the existence of a law designed to address problems of the 
subprime sector, why look to CRA at all?  As a theoretical matter, HOEPA 
is underinclusive.  It is designed to address a problem of abusive practices, 
rather than overcoming broader market failures or discrimination.  
Moreover, as a practical matter, HOEPA’s record has been decidedly 
mixed.536  In response, a Treasury-HUD report proposed a four-part 
 
 534 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 
2190 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).  
 535 Under current Federal Reserve Board regulations, HOEPA now covers mortgage 
refinancing loans and closed-end home equity loans with annual percentage rates more than eight 
percentage points above the yields on comparable Treasury securities or loans with certain points 
and fees that exceed eight percent of the loan amount or an amount adjusted for inflation (just 
under $500 for 2004).  Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 226).  HOEPA restricts prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative 
amortization under some circumstances.  Id. at 65,605.  Lenders are forbidden from engaging in a 
pattern or practice of making high-cost loans without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay 
from income (rather than from home equity).  Id.  For any mortgage loan, the Federal Reserve 
Board has regulatory authority to prohibit acts or practices that the Board finds to be unfair, 
deceptive, or designed to evade HOEPA.  Id.  The Board can also prohibit acts or practices in 
connection with refinance loans that the Board finds to be abusive or not in the interest of the 
borrower.  Id. 
 536 See, e.g., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 191 (gathering extensive evidence of 
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approach to curbing predatory lending.537  Many other improvements to 
abusive practice regulation are possible, but politically unlikely. 
CRA, by contrast, could play an increasingly important role in 
overcoming market failures and discrimination, and thereby reducing 
abuses.  Banks and thrifts can, and should, play an important role in 
improving competition in the credit market for lower-income consumers.  
Competition from banks and thrifts can help to drive out abusive practices 
and improve price transparency in these markets.  CRA still has a long way 
to go in this regard.  For example, low-income borrowers may be ending up 
in a bank’s subprime unit or affiliate when they could qualify for better 
terms.  Recognizing this fact, regulators now give CRA consideration for 
promoting borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.538  Banks and 
thrifts should have in place procedures to move borrowers with good credit 
histories into their prime units.  Moreover, to bolster CRA’s capacity to 
make more of a difference in overcoming problems in the subprime market, 
subprime affiliates should also be seen as a part of the performance context 
for evaluating banks and thrifts under CRA.539  By promoting competition 
from banks and thrifts in serving low-income neighborhoods and 
borrowers, CRA can help thwart abuses in the subprime market without the 
risk of cutting off access to credit that overly restrictive product regulation 
might entail.540 
CRA has other advantages over HOEPA’s product regulation 
approach.  CRA covers all bank and thrift loans, not simply loans that are 
 
predatory practices despite HOEPA).  
 537 See id.; Barr, supra note 198. The plan called for changes that would improve consumer 
literacy and disclosure, prohibit harmful sales practices, restrict abusive terms and conditions, and 
improve overall market structure.  Id.  None of the legislative changes have been enacted, but the 
Federal Reserve Board issued a rule addressing the harmful sales practices and abusive terms 
often associated with high-cost mortgages using its existing authority under HOEPA. Truth in 
Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). This rule takes 
significant steps towards limiting abusive practices, but congressional action would improve 
matters further.  See supra note 198.  Rule changes made in December 2001, under the Board’s 
HMDA authority, complement its efforts on predatory lending by requiring disclosure of certain 
rate spreads and of whether a loan exceeds HOEPA triggers.  Federal Reserve System, Home 
Mortgage Disclosure; Final and Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,221 (Feb. 15, 2002) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 203). The rule could be strengthened by requiring disclosure of all rate spreads, 
points, and fees, as well as other loan characteristics.  See Barr, supra note 198, at 459. 
 538 Community Reinvestment Act; Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community 
Reinvestments; Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 36,620, 36,622 (July 12, 2001).   
 539 See supra Part VI.B.4 (arguing that affiliates should be part of performance context). 
 540 Moreover, consumer loans should play a more central role in CRA examinations.  
Currently, such loans are only considered at the option of the bank, or in cases where consumer 
lending constitutes a core feature of the depository’s lending activities.  As evidenced by the rise 
of non-bank consumer lending in low-income communities, some low-income individuals have 
consumer credit needs that are not being met by banks.  Greater competition in the consumer 
market might help drive out sharp practices.  The agencies should consider ways of encouraging 
banks to assess how their consumer lending could contribute to meeting CRA obligations. 
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“high cost.”  CRA is designed to expand access to the full array of credit 
products by overcoming market failures, not simply to weed out bad actors 
or discourage predatory lending.  The effectiveness of HOEPA and state 
anti-predatory lending laws also relies in significant part on policing 
brokers, who are numerous, small, and difficult to monitor, as well as 
independent finance and mortgage companies, which are generally not 
subject to comprehensive supervision, instead of CRA’s focus on regularly 
examined and supervised banks and thrifts.  In addition, HOEPA’s product 
regulation approach is more prescriptive than CRA, and it is unlikely that 
any of CRA’s critics would prefer more extensive product regulation to the 
flexible approach provided under CRA.  CRA does not dictate that banks or 
thrifts provide or withdraw any particular loan product or service, but 
leaves decisions about business strategy and product design to the banks 
and thrifts.  Lastly, unlike HOEPA, which focuses on ending the worst 
abuses, CRA attempts to overcome market failures in order to bring low-
income households into the financial services mainstream. 
D. CRA Compared with Subsidies 
One alternative to CRA is to rely more on subsidies, either to the 
private sector or to households.  At some level, subsidies can become 
substitutes for regulation.  If the government pays private sector 
participants a sufficient amount, for example, they will look harder for 
creditworthy borrowers in low-income, moderate-income, or minority 
communities in the same way that they would under a regulatory regime.  
Developing such a subsidy regime is not without difficulties. 
First, one would need to decide whether the particular market 
participants or taxpayers should bear the cost of addressing the market 
failure.  For example, if lenders practicing statistical discrimination are 
paid sufficiently, presumably they would be willing to stop engaging in that 
form of discrimination.  The question is whether we as a society think that 
private market participants should be permitted to engage in “rational” 
discrimination.  In that area, ECOA bars statistical discrimination.541  That 
is, we prohibit discrimination even if it is “rational” and we do not think 
taxpayers should have to pay to stop market participants from employing 
statistical discrimination on a prohibited basis.  Presumably, society would 
have an even greater aversion to subsidizing institutions to get them to stop 
discriminating on the basis of racial animus.  Subsidies to overcome market 
failures, by contrast, do not arouse the same sense of moral disapproval, 
and so might be a more appropriate policy choice in that context.  Critics of 
CRA argue that the costs of overcoming market failures in low-income 
 
 541 See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,267–68 (Apr. 
15, 1994).  
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communities should be born by society as a whole, not by banks.542 
But critics rarely reach the second point:  One would need to 
determine whether it is likely that one could provide the amount of subsidy 
necessary to have the desired effect without generating undesirable 
windfalls to recipients.  In principle, subsidies should be used “to make 
marginal private costs equal marginal social costs, and to make marginal 
private benefits equal to marginal social benefits.”543  In practice, this is 
hard to do.  Substantively, it is hard to get private market actors to respond 
to government subsidies unless the subsidies are robust.  Politically, it is 
hard to prevent the subsidies from becoming too robust.  Previous 
experience suggests both that sufficient incentives are hard to create and 
that windfalls would be difficult to control if the incentives are sufficient. 
1. Supply-Side Subsidies Through the Government Sponsored 
Enterprises and the Federal Housing Administration 
Subsidies are pervasive in the home mortgage market.544  Most 
housing subsidies are not well-targeted at overcoming market failures to 
improve access to credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers, or at 
redressing housing discrimination.  Rather, they mostly subsidize the 
“American dream” of homeownership for all.  Subsidies to home mortgage 
credit include government insurance (through the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), the Government National Mortgage Association 
(Ginnie Mae)) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),545 including 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank (FHLB) system.  Tax expenditures and grant programs, 
including the home mortgage interest and property tax deductions, as well 
as a wide range of other programs, also subsidize housing markets.  I leave 
analysis of the housing subsidies in the tax code for others.546  Here I focus 
 
 542 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 21, at 1592; Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296; White, 
supra note 21, at 290–91. 
 543 STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 224 (discussing fines). 
 544 See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 46. 
 545 “In general, GSEs are financial institutions established and chartered by the federal 
government, as privately owned entities, to facilitate the flow of funds to selected credit 
markets . . . .” CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 1 n.2. 
 546 See generally PETER BRADY ET AL., REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE UTILIZATION OF THE 
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (Office of Tax Analysis, OTA, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Paper 
88, Aug. 2001) (finding that subsidy from mortgage interest deduction benefits high-income 
homeowners more than twice as much as homeowners earning at or below median), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ota88.pdf; EDWARD L. GLAESER & JESSE M. 
SHAPIRO, THE BENEFITS OF THE HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (Harvard Inst. of 
Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1979, Oct. 2002) (demonstrating that home mortgage 
interest deduction largely benefits upper income, married homeowners who would have owned 
homes in any event), at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/2002list.html (last 
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only on comparing CRA to FHA and the GSEs as illustrative of widespread 
housing subsidies.547 
During the Great Depression, Congress established FHA, the FHLBs, 
and Fannie Mae to fill a gap left by the collapse of the private mortgage 
insurance industry “under the weight of a default rate approaching 50 
percent and foreclosures exceeding 1,000 per day.”548  FHA, which 
operates within HUD, insures home mortgage loans made by private 
lenders in the event of default.549  Ginnie Mae, also within HUD, provides a 
credit enhancement to pools of FHA loans and places them for sale on the 
secondary market.  The housing GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
FHLBs—were created to “provide liquidity and stability to the home 
mortgage market.”550  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue debt to buy and 
hold mortgages in portfolio and insure mortgage-backed securities issued to 
investors.551  The FHLBs were created to provide short-term loans 
(“advances”) to thrifts in order to stabilize mortgage lending in local 
markets.552  Today, FHLB membership is broad, including commercial 
banks, and advances to members can be issued on a variety of collateral 
and used for any purpose.553 
The GSEs benefit from their relationships with the federal government 
in a variety of ways.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are exempt from state 
and local taxation,554 are exempt from Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) registration,555 can borrow from the Treasury,556 and 
issue debt that banks and thrifts can hold under capital standards that favor 
 
visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 547 In addition to subsidies in the credit markets, subsidies affect other aspects of the home 
mortgage transaction.  Such non-credit-market subsidies alter the market context for home 
mortgage credit and themselves may be alternatives to subsidizing the credit market.  
 548 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 358. 
 549 DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 (Feb. 3, 
2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy04/budgetsummaryu.pdf.  
 550  Fed. Subsidies for the Housing GSEs Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, 
and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs. 1 (2001) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, 
Director of Congressional Budget Office), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052301cr.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 
AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 1 (1996) [hereinafter TREASURY 
STUDY]. 
 551 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 2.  Fannie Mae was a government corporation, but 
Congress divided its functions into two parts, and Fannie Mae became a GSE in 1968.  Id. at 18.  
Ginnie Mae, the part that remained government-owned, insures securities of FHA loans.  Id. at 19 
n.5. 
 552 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 7. 
 553 Id. at 3–4, 7. 
 554 Id. at 13. 
 555 See MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 142, at 4, 23–24, 28. 
 556 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 13–14. 
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the GSEs over private conduits.557  Most importantly, the GSEs―similar to 
the largest banks558―benefit from the credit enhancement of an implicit 
guarantee that the federal government will intervene in the event of 
financial collapse.559  Measuring the subsidy provided to the GSEs is the 
subject of intense debate.560  Estimates are sensitive to assumptions about 
the funding advantages GSEs receive and about how to model the pass-
through to borrowers.561  For present purposes, the point estimates are not 
critical.  I will assume that the amount of the subsidy is some nontrivial 
amount above zero. 
The GSEs contribute to access to home mortgage credit for low- and 
moderate-income households.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance 
has generally met or surpassed the affordable housing goals that HUD sets 
for them from the time that the goals first were formally promulgated in 
1992 through subsequent revisions that have increased the goals over 
time.562  However, the share of GSE purchases financing affordable 
 
 557 Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 3(a)(2)(vi)–(viii) (2004). 
 558 See supra text accompanying notes 469–471.  
 559 Despite the disclaimer by both the federal government and the GSEs that there is no federal 
guarantee, there is a general belief by the market to the contrary.  That belief may arise because of 
the GSEs’ congressional charters, the indicia of federal support, or the notion that they are “too 
big to fail.”  The implicit guarantee permits the GSEs to issue debt at a lower cost, and to hold 
less capital than similar private firms.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS 
AND BENEFITS OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 10–11 (1996), available at 
http://ftp.cbo.gov/0xx/doc13/Fanfred.pdf. 
 560 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that the benefits accorded to the GSEs 
were worth $13.6 billion, of which Fannie Mae received $6.1 billion, Freddie Mac $4.6 billion, 
and the FHLBs $3.0 billion.  CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 2.  CBO estimated that a 
“little more than half ($7.0 billion) of that total subsidy in 2000 passed through” to mortgage 
borrowers through lower interest rates on conventional, conforming loans.  Id. at 1.  CBO did not 
calculate the benefits of the affordable housing goals in determining the net GSE subsidy.  CBO 
estimated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac retained $3.9 billion (thirty-seven percent) of the 
subsidy for their shareholders or other stakeholders.  Id. at 5.  As for the FHLBs, CBO estimated 
that they passed on only $300 million of their $3 billion subsidy to mortgage borrowers, with 
ninety percent of the subsidy accruing to the benefit of the FHLB member banks or reducing 
interest rates on other types of loans borrowed from FHLB members.  Id. 
 561 Compare id. at 22 (finding that GSE securitization lowers interest rates on conventional, 
conforming mortgages), with ANDREA HEUSON ET AL., CREDIT SCORING & MORTGAGE 
SECURITIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORTGAGE RATES AND CREDIT AVAILABILITY 6–8, 41 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 2000-44, Dec. 21, 2000) 
(arguing that lower interest rates lead to higher levels of securitization, not reverse), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2000/200044/200044pap.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2005).  
 562 See OVERVIEW OF THE GSE’S HOUSING GOAL PERFORMANCE, 1993–2001 (2002) 
[hereinafter OVERVIEW] (comparing statistics on annual housing performance to articulated 
goals), at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/GSE/gse2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005); OFFICE 
OF POL’Y DEV. AND RES., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 5: HUD’S 
AFFORDABLE LENDING GOALS FOR FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 3 (2001) (describing 
revision for 2000), at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/gse.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2005); SUMMARY: HUD’S PROPOSED HOUSING GOAL RULE 1–2 (2004) (describing proposal for 
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housing under the goals lagged behind that of the primary market during 
the 1990s.563  In the early 1990s, the GSEs held less of the credit risk 
associated with lending to low-income or minority borrowers and areas 
than did FHA and Ginnie Mae, as well as depository institutions, both as a 
share of the GSEs’ own activities and as a share of the market.564  In 
addition to the affordable housing goals, other factors contributed to this 
activity, such as the GSEs’ business strategies, the effects of CRA, HMDA, 
and ECOA, and the shift in the primary mortgage market towards greater 
levels of lending to low-income borrowers.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have also contributed, however, to affordable housing in other ways.  For 
example, both GSEs sponsor home counseling programs, train loan 
originators and support community organizations to increase affordable 
lending.  The GSEs have also increasingly used more flexible underwriting 
criteria for loan purchases. 
The FHLBs also provide modest subsidies for affordable housing and 
community development through the Affordable Housing Program and 
Community Investment Program.  However, the bank members of the 
FHLBs enjoy extensive low-cost advances that essentially subsidize the full 
range of bank activities.565  In addition, the FHLBs have begun to 
experiment with untargeted secondary market operations in the hopes of 
competing with the other GSEs. 
In contrast to the GSEs, FHA is operated by the federal government.  
FHA specializes in serving borrowers who make “low down payment[s], 
 
goals for 2005 through 2008), at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/gse/summary.doc (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2005).  In 1992, Congress enacted a new affordable housing requirement for Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.  HUD had set up the first affordable housing goals regulation for Fannie Mae in 
1978. See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 54 n.15.  The GSE definition of low- and 
moderate-income households, one-hundred percent of area median income, includes households 
with higher incomes than as defined for CRA.  OVERVIEW, supra, at n.2. Under CRA, low- and 
moderate-income households are defined as having incomes less than eighty percent of area 
median.  12 C.F.R. § 25.12 (n) (2005). 
 563 Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Proposed Rule, HUD’s Regulation of the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), 24 C.F.R. pt. 81, App. A, at 27, 58, 62 (2000); TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, 
at 56–61. 
 564 See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, Credit Risk and the Provision of Mortgages to 
Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers, 81 FED. RESERVE BULL. 989, 1000 tbl.3, 1004 tbl.4 
(1995). The authors surmised that primary market participants performed better because they had 
greater access to information about the creditworthiness of borrowers or the conditions of 
neighborhoods and used greater flexibility in underwriting than did the GSEs.  Id. at 1000–01. 
 565 CBO STUDY 2001, supra note 475, at 5.  The FHLBs made $16.8 billion in net advances to 
members in 2002, with $490 billion outstanding at the end of that year.  FED. RESERVE BD., 
FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FIRST QUARTER 33, 78, 124, (2003) (listing dollar levels 
and flows for Government Sponsored Enterprises), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Z1/Current/20030605/z1.pdf. 
122
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 223 
 
have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or have tarnished credit.”566  These 
borrowers tend to be first-time, minority, or low-income and tend to live in 
low-income or minority-concentrated neighborhoods.567  A higher share of 
FHA lending goes to low-income and minority borrowers, and low-income 
areas, compared to the GSEs.568  During the 1990s, the share of FHA 
lending going to low- and moderate-income minority borrowers grew more 
rapidly than did the share of conventional lending to those borrowers.569  
FHA also serves a role in regions with falling wages, increasing 
unemployment, and dropping house prices.570  At times, FHA has competed 
with conventional lenders.571  As the conventional market serves the more 
creditworthy portion of FHA’s pool of borrowers,572 adverse selection will 
leave FHA with higher risk.  That problem is exacerbated because FHA 
lags the private sector in risk management.573  The FHA portfolio is 
becoming riskier.574 
In sum, government subsidies generate windfalls for the GSE 
shareholders and others.  GSE subsidies are not transparent, making it 
difficult for the public to weigh their costs and benefits.  FHA subsidies are 
more transparent because the cost of the subsidy appears as user fees and as 
an item in the federal budget.575  The cost of transparency is, however, 
direct taxpayer liability for the FHA.  FHA may not have the management 
capacity and technical expertise to manage risk as effectively as private 
 
 566 SARAH ROSEN WARTELL, SINGLE-FAMILY RISKSHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS 
POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR FHA 11 (2002), at http://www.mhc.gov/papers/wartell.doc (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2005). 
 567 Id. at 11–14. FHA’s success in serving first-time homebuyers may be overstated, since 
studies suggest that these households would become homeowners anyway at a later age.  See 
Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 367. 
 568 See WARTELL, supra note 566, at 11 (noting FHA role in serving minorities); Canner et al., 
supra note 479, at 1089 (same); Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 362 (same). 
 569 See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 64. 
 570 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 172, at 362. 
 571 In part, this may be a sign of success.  FHA’s innovative underwriting practices, when they 
work, can be replicated by the private market.  Id. at 363–66. 
 572 See, e.g., WARTELL, supra note 566, at 17 (noting that PMI Mortgage Insurance Company 
increased portion of high [loan-to-value ratios (LTV)] loans insured to ten percent of their insured 
loans and that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had increased portion of high LTV loans purchased 
to four to six percent). 
 573 See id. at 16; THOMAS H. STANTON, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT FOR 
THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT, CREDIT SCORING AND LOAN SCORING: TOOLS FOR IMPROVED 
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 4 (1999), available at 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/gx/eng/indissue/endowment/images/credit.pdf. 
 574 See WARTELL, supra note 566, at 21 (“For FHA loans, delinquency and foreclosure rates 
have grown while these rates for conventional loans have dropped; average LTVs [loan-to-value 
ratios] have increased; borrowers are carrying greater debt burdens; and credit scores appear to be 
declining.”). 
 575 GSE activity is noted in federal budget documents, even though the GSEs are not “on 
budget.”  See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 550, at 25. 
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market participants. 
Seen in light of the tradeoffs involved with dominant existing subsidy 
regimes through the GSEs and FHA, the tradeoffs involved in CRA should 
be viewed as quite reasonable.  Although the costs and benefits of both 
CRA and the GSE subsidies are not fully transparent, CRA has important 
advantages over existing subsidy approaches.  Needless to say, CRA 
provides no windfall to banks and thrifts.  CRA targets all its efforts at 
expanding access to credit and financial services for low- and moderate-
income borrowers and communities, so there is no wasted effort on 
generalized policies subsidizing housing consumption.  CRA is less risky 
than subsidies through GSEs or FHA.  If CRA increased risk because of 
expanded lending to low-income borrowers, that risk would be diffused 
over the well-diversified portfolios of thousands of depositories, all of 
which are comprehensively supervised for safety and soundness and 
required to hold adequate capital.576  Moreover, banks and thrifts have 
expertise in finding creditworthy borrowers and in using extensive risk-
mitigation techniques that are more difficult for secondary market 
participants to operate.  It is certainly possible to design subsidies far better 
than the ones we have, but experience should augur caution.  It is difficult 
to design general subsidies that are effective, generate little windfall for 
recipients, and protect taxpayers.  In this context, it makes little sense to 
abandon CRA as a strategy for overcoming market failures and 
discrimination.   
2. CRA Compared with Targeted Supply-Side Subsidies 
In addition to subsidies to the secondary markets or to banks and 
thrifts more generally, targeted subsidies to specialized community 
development lenders can be an important means of expanding the reach of 
these lenders, as well as banks and thrifts.  Indeed, many critics of CRA 
argue that targeted subsidies are to be preferred.577  I have long been an 
advocate of targeted subsidies as a strategy to expand access to capital and 
financial services for low-income communities.578  Appropriately designed 
subsidies can, in principle, help to overcome market failures and improve 
social welfare at a reasonable cost.  Nonetheless, as I will explain below, I 
 
 576 See generally, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2000) (prompt corrective action); 12 C.F.R. Part 3, 
App. A (2004) (minimum capital).  
 577 See, e.g., Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 654–57 (arguing for government programs to 
subsidize community development banks); Hylton, supra note 21, at 225 (promoting ethnic 
lending); Klausner, supra note 21, at 1580–92 (discussing success of SouthShore Bank); Swire, 
Safe Harbors, supra note 21, at 354–59, 367–68 (arguing for investment in community 
development banks); Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 346 (citing example of community 
development credit union), 344–45 (promoting ethnic lending). 
 578 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 3, at 128–29; Barr, supra note 198, at 453–55.  
124
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 43 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art43
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS FINAL 041505.DOC 4/29/2005  5:25:27 PM 
May 2005] CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS 225 
 
do not believe that CRA should be abandoned in favor of such subsidies. 
One prominent example of targeted subsidies that both critics of CRA 
and I agree should be supported is the Treasury Department’s Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, established in 1994.579  
The CDFI Fund is designed to create a national network of financial 
institutions focused on low-income communities.580  The CDFI Fund has 
provided over $535 million to locally based, private sector CDFIs, as well 
as mainstream banks and thrifts.581  The Fund’s investments have helped its 
awardees to increase their capitalization, develop stronger infrastructure 
and operations, and expand their reach.582 
However, the small size and scale of CDFIs suggests that it would be 
inefficient to switch from relying on the banking system to a system based 
solely on such specialized lenders.583  Moreover, without the impetus of 
CRA, it is doubtful that banks and thrifts would have invested so heavily in 
CDFIs over the last decade.  CRA gives strong impetus for banks and 
thrifts to provide loans, investments, and services to CDFIs.  Such activity 
directly receives consideration under CRA examinations.  Moreover, 
support for CDFIs bolsters the ability of banks and thrifts to serve their 
communities.  Eliminating CRA in favor of CDFIs would thus require an 
even greater infusion of governmental funds to continue CDFI growth, and 
CDFIs might also lose out on the technical expertise, business judgment, 
and advice that banks have brought to the table over the last decade.  In 
addition, there would be enormous costs incurred in shifting to a system of 
targeted subsidy.584  Lastly, the CDFI Fund is subject to the vagaries of the 
 
 579 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-325, § 104, 108 Stat. 2166, 2166 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4703 (2000)). 
 580 See id. at § 107, 108 Stat. at 2172. 
 581 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, CDFI FUND OVERVIEW, at 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/overview/index.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).  
 582 In 2001, the Fund’s $74 million in CDFI awards leveraged $150 million in outside capital 
for CDFIs, and its $45 million in incentives to mainstream banks and thrifts brought $244 million 
in investments in CDFIs and another $1.1 billion in direct loans in low-income communities.  The 
CDFI Fund found that its 106 awardees from fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998 had made $3.5 
billion in community development loans and investments since receiving their award, or $31 in 
financing for each dollar received from the Fund.  See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FY 1999 ANNUAL 
SURVEY PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: CDFI PROGRAM—CORE COMPONENT (2001), at 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/news/pdf/1999_CORE_FY_Survey.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).  
 583 Compare, for example, the $535 million in CDFI Fund investments, from 1993 to 2000, 
see id., with the more than $800 billion in CRA loans over the same time period. 
 584 More serious objections could be made to switching to a system in which the government 
delivers the benefit directly—a system in which the government directly provided loans and other 
banking services to low-income communities.  This approach would require the government to 
create a loan distribution system parallel to the banking sector.  Not only would the transition 
costs be enormous, but the government probably would do badly at providing financial services 
in this way.  Even if the government were good at it, such services would unfairly compete with 
the private sector. 
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annual appropriations process.  The Fund has seen its budget cut in half 
over the last four years and now has been proposed to be effectively 
eliminated in the Administration’s most recent budget.585 
3. CRA Compared with Income Transfers or Demand-Side Subsidies 
Assume for the moment that the purpose of credit market regulation is 
to redistribute “something” to the poor so that afterwards their social 
welfare is higher.  The public finance literature usually assumes that 
income is a good proxy for social welfare, and that the “something” being 
redistributed should thus be income.586  That income redistribution should 
be confined to the tax and transfer system and should not be a goal of legal 
rules is a familiar assertion in public finance, and with good reason.  At 
least in principle, income transfer usually can be accomplished at lower 
cost than if redistribution were accomplished by changing legal rules.  
Kaplow and Shavell take the strong form of this argument, contending that 
legal rules should never take account of distributional consequences and 
should aim only for efficiency.587 
Macey and Miller argue that CRA could be characterized as a tax on 
banks and thrifts aimed at redistribution and that income transfers should 
be preferred in accomplishing this goal.588  CRA is not, at least not 
explicitly, aimed at redistribution, but rather at correcting perceived market 
failures.  Even if the goal of CRA were to be recast as income 
redistribution, it is not obvious that the tax-and-transfer system should be 
preferred over CRA.  One may want to use legal rules in place of transfers 
because income taxation is itself distortionary,589 and income transfers may 
have high administrative or compliance costs.590 
If income is transferred as an in-kind subsidy, the costs may be higher 
 
 585 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 
2006, at 258 (2005), available at 
http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/07feb20051415/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/
budget/treasury.pdf.  
 586 See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, 
and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 161 (2003). 
 587 See also Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A 
More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).  Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules 
should not be modified to favor the poor because “society can instead use the income tax system 
(here interpreted to include programs that transfer income to the poor) to redistribute income.”  
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of 
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822 (2000).  
But see Logue & Avraham, supra note 586, at 161 (arguing that legal rules may optimally 
redistribute social welfare under some circumstances).  See generally  Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 98; Kaplow & Shavell, supra.  
 588 Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 296. 
 589 STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 462–63. 
 590 For example, government income transfers to the unbanked often require costly financial 
services transactions to convert a check into cash.  See Barr, supra note 3, at 134. 
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than “cash” transfers—or even legal rules.591  Nor is transferring income as 
“cash” without controversy.  To begin with, there is no consensus on the 
appropriate distribution of income.  Moreover, even if one were to decide 
how much income to redistribute, the means are contentious.  The 
inefficiencies associated with the welfare system are well known.592  
Similarly, the literature debating tax expenditures is voluminous.593  
Furthermore, the distinction between tax and transfer programs and 
regulations is not obviously meaningful conceptually, and questions about 
program design, regulatory structure, and the appropriate incidence of the 
tax—whether on banks or other taxpayers—in relation to the tax structure 
generally, all would remain.594  That is, the decision to run the 
redistribution through the tax system does not eliminate any of the 
theoretical or policy tradeoffs involved in a regulatory system.  For 
example, to decide whether it is “fair” for banks to pay the tax, one would 
need to decide, among other things, whether the current level of taxation of 
banks is itself “fair.”  In addition, transition costs from laws that 
redistribute income to a tax and transfer program would diminish the 
benefits of such a change. 
Still, if the main goal of CRA were to redistribute income, as a 
theoretical matter it would seem more desirable and efficient simply to 
eliminate CRA and other credit market regulation and subsidies and to shift 
 
 591 See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 26.  First, in-kind subsidies are considered less efficient 
than cash subsidies because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for specified purposes.  
See, e.g., id. at 254–58 (presenting arguments concerning substitution versus income effect).  To 
the extent that the recipient undertakes the specified actions to the same degree as if given a cash 
grant, the in-kind subsidy costs more to administer.  To the extent that the subsidy changes 
behavior, the subsidy does not increase the recipient’s welfare to the same degree as if she had 
received a cash subsidy to pursue her own preferences.  Second, in-kind plans are paternalistic in 
telling the heterogeneous recipients that they should derive utility from the provision of a 
particular service.  See generally Edgar K. Browning, A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind 
Transfers, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 579 (1981).  In-kind mechanisms may impose a higher value on a 
service than an individual may have given it.  Third, in-kind programs are often more 
administratively costly than direct transfers.  See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 397. 
 592 See, e.g., COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 2000 
GREEN BOOK:  BACKGROUND MATERIALS & DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, Appendix L, Monitoring the Effects of Pre- and Post-TANF 
Welfare Reform Initiatives (17th ed. 2000) (discussing administrative costs, compliance costs, 
disincentives to work, and other inefficiencies). 
 593 For the debate over tax expenditures, see generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO 
TAX REFORM (1973); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Tax Reform, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budget: A 
Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The 
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986). 
 594 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 995 (2004). 
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to a much more progressive income tax.  If regulations and subsidies are 
intrinsically inefficient and one assumes away transition costs, provides 
that the tax and transfer system chosen will be the most administratively 
efficient possible, and ignores the political difficulty of the task, then 
income redistribution through significant expansion of the tax and transfer 
programs may be preferable.595  But all these conditions seem unlikely to 
hold in the real world. 
One also could think of credit market regulation as about 
redistributing not income, but access to credit.596  Suppose that society 
seeks neither to correct market imperfections, nor to guard against 
discrimination, nor to redistribute income, but instead to redistribute access 
to credit to low- and moderate-income and minority households.  Why 
would society have this goal?  Redistribution of home mortgage credit 
might advance a goal of spreading the positive externalities associated with 
owning a home.597  Redistribution of mortgage credit also would have 
“expressive” value,598 by conveying that low-income and minority 
households are full members of our society because they can participate in 
the “American dream” of home ownership. 
If this is the intended form of redistribution, then CRA may be more 
efficient than income redistribution.  Income is, after all, only a proxy for 
social welfare.  Directly redistributing the thing that society wishes to 
redistribute may be less costly than using income redistribution to achieve 
the same aim.  Society may have to redistribute a large sum of income to 
underserved borrowers to induce the credit markets to leave them as well-
off as they are with current regulations and subsidies.  Moreover, it would 
be hard to convey the same “expressive” effect regarding inclusion in the 
American dream through income redistribution if some aspect of the 
difficulty these households have in accessing credit markets is not solely 
due to their income.  For example, if racial discrimination, market failures, 
lack of wealth, poor credit history, or neighborhood racial or income 
characteristics are factors, then income redistribution alone would likely be 
inadequate to address them. 
The broader point is that CRA is not justified primarily by 
redistributive goals, but by the need to address market failures and 
 
 595 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 98.  
 596 For a thoughtful discussion of the role of legal rules in distributing non-income goods, see 
Logue & Avraham, supra note 586, at 161, discussing the different types of redistributive policy 
tools for non-income goods. 
 597 See GLAESER & SHAPIRO, supra note 546, at 3 (describing positive externalities from 
homeownership and from housing consumption). 
 598 On “expressive” benefits, see generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 410.  But see 
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 
(2000) (arguing that expressive theories of law are not persuasive conceptually).  I discuss this 
further in exploring the benefits of standards over rules in supra Part V. 
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discrimination.  It would be highly inefficient to attempt to redress these 
market failures by increasing the incomes of millions of individuals, 
regardless of whether they attempt to access the home mortgage market and 
regardless of whether they would experience barriers to credit from market 
failures or racial discrimination.599 
Critics of CRA often point to alternative means of effectuating CRA’s 
goals without adequately addressing whether these alternatives would, in 
theory and in fact, perform better.  Yet, all five policy approaches to 
overcoming market failures and discrimination, as well as policies to 
redistribute income, involve tradeoffs.  None of them is clearly superior to 
the tradeoffs involved in CRA.  Given the political, economic, and practical 
constraints of policymaking, and the imperfect nature of highly regulated 
and subsidized credit markets, CRA is reasonable policy and should not be 
eliminated in favor of these other policy approaches. 
CONCLUSION 
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized by 
leading scholars.  Critics have contended that CRA lacks any theoretical 
grounding, both because, in their view, competitive credit markets render 
alleged market failures and discrimination illusory, and because in their 
judgment CRA is an ill-considered policy response to market failures or 
discrimination even if they did exist.  They have alleged that the costs of 
CRA are considerable in lost profits, high risk, and regulatory burden.  
They have contended that CRA impedes efficiency in the financial system 
and burdens banks and thrifts and not other market participants.  Critics 
have contended that the standard used under CRA is vague, empowering 
rent-seeking by community groups and regulators alike, and should be 
abandoned, or at the very least replaced with safe harbors or clear rules.  
Others have pointed to alternative strategies to achieve CRA’s aims, such 
as disclosure, fair lending enforcement, subsidies, and the tax and transfer 
system.  In their view, CRA should be abandoned.   
This Article takes aim at these criticisms on theoretical, empirical, and 
comparative grounds.  As a theoretical matter, I have explained how market 
failures, discrimination, and the combined force of these problems lay a 
solid theoretical foundation for the Act.  Market failures in low-income 
communities stem from a range of sources.  I have shown how information 
externalities can produce credit constraints that affect creditworthy 
borrowers in “thin” markets.  Relying on Stiglitz and Weiss, I have also 
explained why the problem of credit rationing, which derives from 
 
 599 But see Calomiris et al., supra note 21, at 645–46 (arguing that income transfers would 
redress moral hazard by increasing ability of households to make larger downpayments that 
would demonstrate “attachment” to their homes).  
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information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers that give rise to 
adverse selection and moral hazard, is more acute for low-income 
households, who have a greater difficulty than other households in 
demonstrating their creditworthiness and avoiding the credit-rationing trap 
given their low incomes and low wealth.  I have also shown how these 
informational failures can lead to a collective action problem in which 
creditors delay entry into low-income markets.  Neighborhood externalities 
exacerbate these barriers, as do agency problems in financial institutions 
and in the market more broadly.  Low-income markets can become stuck, 
with low volume and liquidity blocking creation of a complete market. 
The Article has demonstrated that CRA constitutes a reasonable policy 
response to these market failures.  CRA helps to overcome information 
externalities, for example, by inducing lenders to increase their activity in 
low-income communities, helping to build volume and liquidity in low-
income markets.  CRA helps mitigate collective action problems by 
providing an effective means for banks to commit to increased lending and 
coordination mechanisms that decrease information costs and increase 
market thickness.  CRA also provides incentives for banks and thrifts to 
reform corporate structures to overcome agency problems, and CRA can be 
part of an overall strategy to reverse negative neighborhood externalities 
from low levels of homeownership and investment. 
The Article also explored racial discrimination.  As a theoretical 
matter, I described how credit rationing models explain the possibility for 
discrimination based on racial animus to persist even in reasonably 
competitive markets, and why statistical discrimination is even more 
immune to competitive pressures.  I explored the empirical evidence that 
indicates that discrimination likely persists in credit markets, although such 
evidence is not incontrovertible.  I also described the problem of price 
discrimination, particularly in fees paid to mortgage brokers.  The market 
failures and discrimination that I describe find more acute manifestations in 
the subprime market, through which low-income and minority households 
often borrow, particularly for refinancing.  I analyzed how CRA could play 
an important role alongside the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in helping to 
redress problems of racial discrimination, and could, but has not yet, played 
a key role in ending abuses in the subprime sector by fully overcoming 
market failures that stymie bank and thrift entry.  Further competition from 
banks and thrifts in the subprime sector would likely diminish opportunities 
for abuse. 
The Article marshaled considerable empirical evidence that CRA is 
helping to overcome market failures and reduce discrimination in 
significant ways and at relatively low cost.  Home mortgage and other 
credit expanded dramatically during the 1990s for low-income and 
minority households.  I evaluated a series of empirical studies, some of 
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which I directed, that controlled for a wide range of factors, and found 
statistically significant evidence that CRA is providing real, economically 
meaningful benefits to low- and moderate-income and minority 
households.  For example, one study found that the effect of CRA on home 
mortgage lending was equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point drop in 
unemployment over the time period studied. 
The Article also analyzed extensive evidence about the costs of CRA 
and argued that the relatively low costs of CRA are more consistent with 
the theory I have advanced that CRA is helping to overcome market 
failures and discrimination, than with the theories of CRA’s critics.  The 
Article showed that these costs were seriously overstated by CRA’s critics, 
in part because they dismissed the significance of market failures and 
discrimination and the role that CRA could play in overcoming them.  CRA 
lending is reasonably profitable and not overly risky.  CRA does not appear 
to be a drag on the efficiency of banks and thrifts or the financial sector as 
a whole.  The rampant rent-seeking feared by critics finds little support in 
the evidence, and compliance costs have also been significantly overstated.  
Although the benefits and costs of CRA as we have them are not, strictly 
speaking, summable, even a rough sense of the costs and benefits of the 
regulation suggests that it is, on net, socially beneficial, and consistent with 
the underlying theories justifying CRA.  My conclusions have been based 
on a wide range of empirical studies, but I recognize that further empirical 
research will be warranted as credit markets continue to evolve. 
Turning to the form of the legal directive of CRA, I argued that CRA 
more closely approximates a standard, rather than a rule.  Contrary to the 
views of CRA’s critics, I contended that there are significant benefits to 
this approach.  Employing a standard is likely somewhat less costly than a 
rule ex ante, even given the extensive notice and comment process 
employed in the 1995 revisions to the regulation.  More importantly, and 
contrary to the general literature on rules and standards, the CRA standard 
appears superior to a detailed rule, even ex post.  The CRA standard 
provides the flexibility needed to assess banks based on local context and 
business strategy rather than a one-size-fits-all national rule.  Permitting the 
meaning of the standard to vary according to local context and to change 
over time as the market evolves increases the likelihood that CRA will 
remain both relevant and efficient.  Those who favor rules over standards 
ex post highlight the transaction costs associated with standards but fail to 
take appropriate account of the substantive benefits of flexible standards.  
If the need for flexibility is strong enough, and the numbers of transactions 
not too high, these substantive benefits may swamp transaction costs.  
Furthermore, I explained why the current standards approach is preferable 
both to tradeable obligations and to safe harbors that rely on a numerical 
target or similar rules because the positive incentives those approaches 
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sought to harness can be catalyzed under CRA’s standard without the 
inefficiencies that inflexible targets would create. 
In addition, I argued that the rules and standards debate is missing an 
important point:  Employing a standard, coupled with an iterative process 
of public engagement on its implementation, enhances both the accuracy of 
the evaluation and the legitimacy of the regulatory response.  Regulators, 
the banks, and the public are engaged in interpreting the meaning of the 
CRA standard during examinations as well as merger reviews.  A rule 
would provide far less room for meaningful public engagement.  The 
iterative process of public participation in the shaping of a legal norm, far 
beyond the normal process of public input into notice and comment 
rulemaking, could be employed in other areas of the law where regulators 
enjoy significant discretion and concerns about regulatory accountability 
are heightened.  This level of ongoing civic engagement furthers regulatory 
accountability and democratic legitimacy, and thus ought to be counted 
among CRA’s benefits.  Moreover, CRA’s standard conveys expressive 
benefits by articulating a norm of inclusion and setting out a structure for 
an ongoing dialogue among the public, banks, and regulators about the 
meaning of that norm.  These expressive benefits ought to be weighed 
alongside the transaction costs of public involvement.   
Critics have often argued without serious analysis that alternatives to 
CRA are preferable.  In order to place CRA in the context of other 
alternative institutional arrangements, the Article considered the policy 
tradeoffs implicit in CRA with other approaches to market failures and 
discrimination.  I compared CRA to four other types of credit market 
regulation—fair lending laws, disclosure, product regulation, and 
subsidy—as  well as to the tax and transfer system.  Contrary to critics’ 
claims, I argued that the presence of these alternatives is not a sound 
ground for elimination of CRA.  Each of these alternatives involves 
tradeoffs, as to both theoretical foundations and practical results, as does 
CRA, which makes it hard to argue as a matter of either theory or practice 
that eliminating CRA would be preferable.  Viewing CRA in the context of 
these other real-world or plausible alternatives reinforces the essential 
argument of the Article that CRA is a reasonable policy response to market 
failures and discrimination, and that abandoning CRA would be imprudent. 
More broadly, it is my hope that the Article has contributed, at least by 
way of example, to a non-utopian form of legal analysis that takes seriously 
the economic, institutional, and political constraints under which regulatory 
policy is made.  I have shown that CRA is justified in theory, that the 
empirical evidence is more consistent with these theoretical justifications 
than with the views of CRA’s critics, and that comparative analysis 
supports my contention that CRA effectively responds to market failures 
and discrimination.  A number of different structures could plausibly be 
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employed to overcome market failures and discrimination in credit 
markets.  I have not sought to defend the Community Reinvestment Act as 
the “ideal” form of policy.  I have made what I hope is a persuasive case 
that it is a reasonable one.  In my experience, an assessment of whether a 
policy is reasonable or not is more useful, and more honest, than an 
evaluation of whether it is ideal.  In that regard, the case for CRA is strong. 
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